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A B S T R A C T
This doctoral dissertation addresses the problem of decisions involving eco-
nomic and moral values. Following a brief introduction in Chapter 2, Chap-
ter 3 oers a review of moral decisions in the economic domain, focused
on the situations of empirical interest in this dissertation. Chapter 4 asks
how to restore trust in mutual funds aer the recent diiculties encoun-
tered by the financial sector. Main results suggest that the positive eects
of the extra financial criteria used by Socially Responsible Investment (SRI)
funds are highly dependent on the similarity in values between the individ-
ual investor and a given fund. Chapter 5 seizes the suggestions of recent
debates about socially responsible remunerations, and draws a portrait of
laypersons’ acceptability of a company’s executive compensations and gen-
eral remuneration policies. The main result identifies four clusters of indi-
viduals, who decide based on personal views about the justice of remunera-
tions. Chapter 6 investigates the morality of windfall gains, introducing an
experimental game (the conceal-reveal dilemma) in which people have the
choice between revealing and concealing benefits that others deem as unde-
served. The main result is that people rely on decision strategies other than
cost-benefit analysis. Consequently, appealing to peoples’ moral values is
an alternative to financial incentives in situations with undeserved benefits.
Finally, the last two chapters (Chapter 7 and 8) discuss the theoretical and
practical implications of our empirical findings.
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R É S U M É
Cee thèse traite du problème de la prise de décision dans des situations
complexes qui impliquent des valeurs économiques et moraux. Chapitre 2
introduit les décisions morales en context économiques en proposant les sit-
uations d’un intérêt empirique. Le sujet du chapitre 4 est de restaurer la con-
fiance dans les fonds communs de placement perdus pendant les récentes
diicultés rencontrées par le secteur financier. Les principaux résultats sug-
gèrent que les eets positifs de l’intégration de critères extra-financiers -
comme cela se fait par exemple dans l’Investissement Socialement Respons-
able (ISR) (SRI) sont fortement tributaires de la similitude des valeurs de
l’investisseur individuel et celles d’un fonds donné. Chapitre 5 saisit les
suggestions des débats récents sur les rémunérations socialement respon-
sables et dresse un portrait de l’acceptabilité sociale de la rémunération des
dirigeants et celle des politiques de rémunération générales d’une entreprise.
Le principal résultat indique l’existence de groupes de personnes qui sont
déterminés par des points de vue personnels sur la justice des rémunéra-
tions. La troisième étude empirique est présentée dans le Chapitre 6. Elle in-
troduit un jeu expérimental (le dilemme conceal-reveal) qui permet l’étude
des gens qui ont le choix entre révéler et cacher des avantages qu’ils ont
reçues et qui seraient jugés comme non méritée par d’autres. Le résultat
principal est que les choix des gens ne reposent pas sur une analyse coûts-
bénéfices et que en conséquence les incitations financières ne sont pas une
motivation suisante pour révéler les avantages qui ne sont pas mérités.
Enfin, les deux derniers chapitres (Chapitre 7 et Chapitre 8) traitent des im-
plications théoriques et pratiques de ces résultats empiriques.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N
I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I
seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and
diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or
a preier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay
all undiscovered before me.
Isaac Newton

1
R É S U M É E N F R A N Ç A I S
Cee thèse est un recueil de trois études empiriques qui s’inscrivent dans
les recherches sur la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (RSE) (en. Cor-
porate Social Responsibility (CSR)). Alors qu’il existe un désaccord sur la
définition exacte de la RSE 1, nous mobilisons son acceptation la plus large:
La RSE consiste a se comporter responsable en aaires, et en particulier dans
les domaines de l’environnement, les ressources humaines et les échanges
avec les actionnaires (Crane, 2008).
A l’échelle individuelle on sait que l’homme se réjouit du bonheur des autres.
Autrement dit, tous les agents économiques ont un intérêt dans le bien être
de leurs pairs et le favorisent dans leurs actions (A. Smith, 1790). A partir de
ce constat on peut émere l’hypothèse qu’un important levier de la RSE est
le comportement individuel : Ce sont les agents économiques agissant au
sein des organisations qui influencent si une entreprise est plus ou moins
responsable.
L’étude du comportement à l’échelle individuelle est le domaine de la psy-
chologie. Les trois études qui constituent cee thèse s’inscrivent dans une
démarche de psychologie expérimentale et visent à révéler les processus
cognitifs, les croyances, et les motivations des personnes en tant que ac-
teurs économiques. Dans chaque étude des personnes auront a faire des
choix ou émere des jugements dans une situation qui implique des vari-
ables économiques et morales.
Le thème du Chapitre 4 est l’Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR).
Un investissement est considéré comme socialement responsable, si lors
de la sélection des investissements le gestionnaire du portefeuille inclut
de critères extra-financiers dans son analyse. Un gestionnaire ISR peut,
par exemple, éviter d’investir dans une entreprise financièrement arac-
tive parce que cee entreprise se comporte mal dans un domaine comme
l’environnement. Il va sans dire qu’il existent de nombreuses autres tech-
niques dans l’ISR. Une description plus en détail est prorogé jusqu’à la Sec-
tion 3.1, le lecteur intéressé peut également se référer à Crane (2008) et
Hoepner and Mcmillan (2009).
1 Le Oxford Handbook of CSR fait mention de 25 définitions dans la liérature académique.
Une revue détaillé des diérentes approches théoriques est donnée en Appendices 9
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4 résumé en français
On peut alors concevoir l’ISR comme un levier de la RSE. Puisque ce sont
les valeurs extra financiers qui déterminent l’investissement, la RSE va
s’améliorer dans les domaines qui sous tendent les choix des investisseurs.
Ces valeurs utilisée dans l’ISR sont souvent regroupé sous trois thèmes: En-
vironment, Social, Governance (The most commonly used themes in socially
responsible investments) (ESG) (Novethic, 2013). Mais cet acronyme dis-
simule l’étendu du contenu des valeurs morales, parmi lesquelles on trouve,
les émissions de CO2, la biodiversité, le travail d’enfants, les droits des tra-
vailleurs, l’égalité salariale ou encore la transparence des rapports annuels.
Les expériences du Chapitre 4 font intervenir les valeurs extra-financiers
afin d’expliquer le comportement.
Les Expériences 1 à 3 du Chapitre 4 testent l’hypothèse selon laquelle les
banqes peuvent utiliser l’ISR pour restaurer la confiance dans les fonds.
Après la crise financière en 2008 et plus récemment la crise de la dee eu-
ropéenne, les Français on perdu confiance dans les investissements, et pour
la restaurer ils s’aendent à un comportement plus moral des institutions
(Edelman Trust Barometer 2011, 2011). Puisque le levier de la confiance dans
les organisations le plus saillant est la similarité des valeurs (Mayer, Davis,
& Schoormann, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 2007), seul
les fonds qui appliquent les mêmes valeurs que l’investisseur bénéficieront
des eets de ISR sur la confiance. De plus, les résultats montrent que ce gain
de confiance est indépendant de la performance financière et ne peut pas
s’obtenir par simple labellisation.
Les Expériences 4 et 5 du Chapitre 4 explorent les variables qui influencent
les recommandations des conseillers bancaires. En France, l’ISR est majori-
tairement institutionnel (Blanc, Cozic, & Hobeika, 2010), alors que les parti-
culiers en expriment aussi la demande (Hummels & Timmer, 2004). Une ap-
proche pour augmenter les ISR des particuliers est de mobilier les conseiller
clients, car ils influencent les choix de leurs clients (Crawford & Sobel, 1982;
Pouget, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Les résul-
tats montrent des influences d’une ampleur diérente des caractéristiques
des fonds (rentablité, niveau de risque, approcha ISR), les aitudes (croy-
ances dans l’argument de la surperformance ISR, valeurs personnelles) et la
demande du client (valeurs personnelles du client). Il semble aussi que les
conseillers sur évaluent l’importance de la similarité des valeurs du client
avec celles du fonds.
Expérience 6 du Chapitre 4 rapporte les résultats d’un jeu d’investissement
organisé auprès d’investisseurs particuliers. Graçe a ce jeu il a été possi-
ble de mesurer l’influence de variables démographiques, psychologiques,
fiancières, et liées aux valeurs ESG sur la proportions qu’investissent les
clients d’une banque française dans une situation réaliste avec une incita-
tion financière (e5.000). Les principaux résultats montrent que les traits
psychologiques (par exemple, la capacité à résister à la tentation d’un
gain immédiat pour obtenir un gain futur plus conséquent, ou bien le
soucis de l’image sociale) ainsi que les valeurs morales, notamment en-
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vers l’environnement, peuvent être mobilisés pour augmenter les investisse-
ments ISR. Les traits psychologiques peuvent aussi conditionner l’eicacité
de leviers classiques tels que les labels ISR.
Le thème du Chapitre 5 sont les rémunérations. La rémunération est en-
cadré par système de règles contractuels qui déterminent les droits et les
devoirs respectifs de l’employeur et de l’employée. La RSE est une fonction
l’acceptabilité sociale des rémunérations, c’est à dire qu’on peut considérer
une rémunération comme socialement responsable si son acceptation so-
ciale est élevé, et comme irresponsable si son acceptation sociale est basse.
Appliquant la théorie fonctionnelle de la cognition (cf. Annexes 18) les ex-
périences dans Chapitre 5 mesurent la façon dont réfléchissent les gens
sur les plans de rémunération des dirigeants d’entreprises, la politique de
bonus générale, et les bonus des dirigeants. La méthode consiste à deman-
der aux gens de juger l’acceptabilité de situations décrites sur des vignees
en faisant varier les constituants du system de rémunération pertinentes.
Alors qu’elle mobilise le contenu des rémunérations, l’étude abandonne le
paradigme du problème principal-agent au profit d’une compréhension du
jugement moral.
Expérience 8 dans Chapitre 5 étudie l’acceptabilité des plans de rémunéra-
tion d’un dirigeant d’entreprise en fonction de son salaire de base, son bonus,
et de ses extras (avantages nature, plan de retraite et parachute doré). Deux
groupes de participants qui jugent l’acceptabilité de manière diérente ex-
istent. Tandis que pour le premier groupe seul une rémunération minimale
a tous les niveaux est acceptable le second groupe accepte diérentes con-
figurations et accorde beaucoup d’importance au salaire de base.
Les Expériences 9 et 10 du Chapitre 5 étudient l’acceptabilité des bonus en
fonction de quatre facteurs de justice (Kpanake & Mullet, 2011) dans deux
situations: Chez les dirigeants, et chez tous les employées. Dans les deux
expériences quatre groupes de participants avec des jugements structurelle-
ment diérents existent. La politique des bonus est jugé soit (a) toujours
acceptable, (b) principalement en fonction de l’envergure de la distribution
parmi les employées, (c) principalement en fonction de la transparance de
la procédure qui établit le bonus, (d) en fonction de l’ampleur de la distribu-
tion et de l’indemnisation en cas d’accident de travail ou maladie. Les bonus
des dirigeants sont jugés soit (a) toujours acceptables, (b) principalement en
fonction de l’existence de bonus pour tous les employées, (c) principalement
en fonction du montant du bonus et de l’existence de bonus pour les autres
employées, (d) principalement en fonction du montant du bonus.
Les études contribuent également en proposant un nouvel outil (la
méthodologie issue de l’Information Integration Theory (IIT); cf. An-
nexes 18) à la communauté des chercheurs en RSE. Il est possible d’envisager
des études similaires sur les rémunération des dirigeants qui font varier
des constituants tels que, la mesure dans laquelle les objectifs fixés par
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l’entreprise ont été aeints, le contexte économique global, ou la disponibil-
ité de cadres supérieurs expérimentés dans le secteur de l’entreprise.
Enfin, Chapitre 6 étudié la décision de révéler (ou cacher) de l’argent non
mérité aux autres. L’exemple d’une telle situation de la vie économique est
Christian Wullf (ex président d’Allemagne) qui avait reçu un crédit avan-
tageux mais tout à fiat légal d’un entrepreneur qu’il décida de dissimuler.
On peut également penser aux nombreux comptes oshores tenus en toute
légalité.
Dans les expériences les participants sont dans une situation semblable :
Ils perdent un quiz de culture générale mais reçoivent un prix plus impor-
tant que leur adversaire. Le gain est crée par l’expérimentateur et avoir reçu
le bonus n’est pas la conséquence d’une action immorale. Tout comme Mr
Wul s’est vu orir le crédit sans avoir enfreint la loi. Mais comment décide-
t-on si on va révéler cet avantage ?
Il est possible que mis dans une telle situation, les gens font une anal-
yse cout-bénéfice. D’un coté révéler pourrait engendrer réactions adverses
causé par un sentiment d’injustice des autres, de l’autre, dissimuler com-
porte le risque d’être découvert ce qui pourrait être perçu comme un men-
songe et engendre des réactions négatives encore plus violentes.
Mais dans les Expériences 11 à 15 du Chapitre 6 les personnes qui reçoivent
un prix non-mérité utilisent une autre stratégie pour prendre leur déci-
sion. Indépendamment des incitations ou contre-incitations financières, une
majorité des personnes (≈ 60%,+800 participants) décide de révéler le
gain. Des recherches récentes ont montré que pour de prendre des déci-
sions morales les gens substituent des normes déontiques aux analyses cout-
bénéfice (Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010;
Berns et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2005). L’insensibilité aux incitations dans les
expériences indique la présence d’une norme qui sous tend le choix.
En résumé, cee thèse identifie des mécanismes psychologiques qui influ-
encent des décisions économiques dans trois études. Chapitre 4 montre que
le contenu des valeurs, et les croyances sur l’ISR sont un facteur impor-
tant de l’eet de l’ISR sur la confiance, et des choix d’investissements fait
par des particuliers. Chapitre 5 montre qu’il existent des systèmes de ré-
munération socialement responsables, et que diérents idéologies quand a
l’acceptabilité des rémunérations existent en France. Il a également validé
une nouvelle technique d’investigation pour les recherches en CSR. Enfin,
Chapitre 6 montre que la décision de révéler des gains que l’on ne mérite
pas est une question de normes sociales plutôt que d’analyse cout-bénéfice.
2
E C O N O M I C D E C I S I O N S A N D M O R A L I T Y
I remember when, while having dinner with friends, someone asked me
what my doctoral dissertation was about. Aer a moment of thought I took
a breath and was ready to say some sentences about it: “It’s about moral
and economic values.”. But before I was able to pursue my friend knit his
brows and interrupted me: “Come on Marco, everyone knows that business
is business! When money comes into play morals are no maer.”
Probably without knowing it my friend had embraced the point of view of
classic economic models. These models characterize people as rational opti-
mizers who arbitrage in favour of the optimal solution (technically speaking
the equilibrium distribution). Arbitrage is a process in which the existence of
an opportunity for a net gain (the benefits of an action outweigh the costs)
results in behaviour that causes that opportunity to disappear. At supermar-
ket checkout lines people see a short line and move to it. This lengthens the
short line while shortening the long line until all lines are equal and there
is no incentive to move to another line.
Homo oeconomicusis is the name of the concept of human beings solely
motivated by the pursuit of their own self interest. The economic man was
first introduced by Pareto (1904). There is no clear definition of self interest
of the economic man - nor how it is dierent from morals? Adam Smith, the
father of modern economics, wrote in his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.
(A. Smith, 1790)
Since then authors criticized the strong interpretation of the economic man
and the underlying principle of perfect rationality. One of the earliest critics
was Herbert Simon (Simon, 1997). Simon notably coined bounded rational-
ity: Human beings are rational but bound to availability of information, time
and cognitive resources. Later Amos Tverski and Daniel Kahneman, have
stressed the important role of heuristics in human problem-solving and the
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resulting failures of rationality (A. Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; a. Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Even more recently research has documented situations in which people
resist to trade os between fiduciary values and moral values (A. P. Fiske &
Tetlock, 1997). It is, for example, hardly conceivable for most people to sell
their wedding ring, even if the price oered exceeds the value of the ring:
Moreover, people react with backslash and consider the oer as an oense
(Tetlock, 2003). This also happens when companies market green products
without real commitment (Crane, 2000).
But what does the observation that people have other than financial val-
ues imply for social responsibility? One implication lies in the answer to
question of who should correct “immoral” behavior. Asked how to tackle
challenges, like pollutions, income or wealth inequality my friend at dinner
argued that government is in charge. Again his thought was in line with an
economic pioneer: Pigou (1920).
But all people care about morals and others than government are initiating
against some of those challenges. Likewise, the movement of CSR is gain-
ing momentum, especially with the rising importance of non governmental
organizations, fair-trade and SRI.
All those examples illustrate that our societies are eager to change the values
that drive economic decisions. Op-ed commentary, election campaigners
and best seller authors all agree that once again human sinners have come
to praise the golden calf and need to return to more genuine values. Only
the suggested remedies dier.
This dissertation addresses the social demand for new ways in dealing with
economic questions from a psychological perspective. It selects particular
situations in which economic variables are at stakes with moral issues. It
then investigates the psychological mechanisms and motivations present in
those situations and empirically derives original practical solutions. Simply
put this dissertation aims to provide tools that allow scholars and practition-
ers to eectively assist socially responsible behavior initiated by individual
people and organizations.
3
S I T UAT I O N S I N V O L V I N G S O C I A L R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
For the interested reader a detailed account of the main CSR theories,
namely Corporate Social Performance (CSP), Shareholder Value (SV), Stake-
holder Theory (ST) and Corporate Citizenship (CC) is given in Appen-
dices 9.1. However, given the complexity of those theories and for the sake of
clarity, the following section is limited to accounts of the situations studied
empirically and their immediate relationships with aspects of CSR.
3.1 socially responsible investment
The first phenomenon in which people initiate social responsibility is SRI.
SRI is a movement that has gained momentum in recent years. Precisely
SRI seeks to integrate extra-financial concerns in the investment decision
process. Those extra-financial concerns are oen based on value systems as
for example the protection of the environment or the promotion of social
well being. We shall see later that values and practices within the field are
heterogeneous. However there is a clear distinction to conventional invest-
ments who only consider financial indicators.
SRI has become more and more important during the last ten years. The
total amount of money invested in SRI funds has grown exponentially, both
in the United States (“2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends
in the United States”, 2007), and in Europe (Marion de Marcillac, 2008). To-
day one out of nine USD under professional management invests in SRI
In The United States. In Europe and Australia SRI growth rates are higher
then growth rates of traditional investments (Hoepner & Mcmillan, 2009).
In the Unites States assets under classical management grew 3% between
2005 and 2007 whereas assets under socially responsible management grew
18%. Eurosif reports that in the same time assets under responsible manage-
ment in Europe doubled and broke the e2 billion barrier. Further, in 2009
German institutional investors expressed their intention to increase their
capital under socially responsible management over the coming years.
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In the following paragraphs I provide (a) a brief history of SRI (b) the gen-
erally accepted definition of SRI (c) a review of the dierent practices and
actors in the field; (d) the relation to peoples trust in investment funds.
3.1.1 (a) History of SRI
The origins of SRI go back hundreds of years and seem to be closely linked
to religious concerns. In early biblical times the Jewish laid down directives
about investing ethically. Passages about the proper use of money are every-
where in the new testament. Since the 18th century generations of religious
investors in the United States avoided companies that profit from sales of
products designed to kill on enslave human beings. Even today the deep re-
ligious origins of SRI manifest in the widespread avoidance of “sin stocks” -
companies in the alcohol, tobacco, or gambling business.
But the modern roots of SRI are the 1960s. During that decade a series of
themes like the anti-Vietnam war movement, civil rights concerns, cold war
or equality for women, made their way into accountability. Later, in the
1970s, investors included labor issues, and anti nuclear sentiment. In the
1980s, the SRI movement gained support from a wider public pressuring
the white minority government of South Africa to dismantle the racist sys-
tem of apartheid. Then, with the Bhopal, Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez and
public awareness of global warming and ozone depletion, environmental
concerns moved to the forefront of the socially concerned investors’ minds.
More recently globalization issues of human rights and working conditions
became drivers for people with dual motives for their capital.
3.1.2 (b) Socially Responsible Investment Today
The notion of SRI is far reaching and sometimes controversial. It is now
widely accepted amongst practitioners and academics that SRI is the the
integration of non-financial concerns, for example ESG values, into the in-
vestment decision process. Domini (2001) state that SRI means integrating
deeply held personal or moral concerns into the investment decision-making
process . (P. Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini, 1993) see it as the implementation
of political objectives in investment decisions. Brill and Reder (1993) evoke
means money management, and investment decisions made according to both
financial, and ethical criteria.
Nevertheless, beyond this point of consent, a significant heterogeneity of
concepts reigns within the SRI movement (Sandberg, Juravle, M, Hamilton,
& Hedesström, 2008). This is best shown in the heterogeneity of terms used
to describe SRI. For example the United Nations Principles for Responsi-
ble Investment (UNPRI) is an investor led initiative that set forth voluntary
guidelines for investment entities wishing to address ESG issues. Besides
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this common set of principles the UNPRI signatories use a wide range of ter-
minology: SRI (43%), sustainable investment (10%), responsible investment
(9%), sustainable and responsible investment (5%), ethical investment (3%),
socially, and environmentally responsible investment (2%), governance and
SRI (1%). Only three European (and no US) institutional investors use the
term ’ethical investing’ (Sandberg et al., 2008). The use of the term SRI is,
partly, justified by this large popularity in the US and EU (43%) but also
because it implies an investment process that allows for multiple strategies.
3.1.3 (c) Types of social investors and investment practices
Whereas previously SRI was intimately tied to religious motives an up to
date taxonomy of who invest in SRI cannot hold within secular aspects. The
question of who are SRI investors leads to a distinction of three types of
people (P. D. Kinder, 2005):
• Value based people: These people act in accordance with religious or
moral views. The main driver of their decision to include non-financial
criteria in the investment process is the desire to have investments
that are consistent with their moral beliefs. Religious institutions that
practice SRI fall into this category. Secular organizations (eg. pension
funds) that focus on values like the environment or human rights also
fit into this category.
• Value-seeking people: Value-seeking people use social and environ-
mental data to enhance portfolio performance. Financial scholars
have paid great aention to the performance of SRI funds relative
to conventional investments (Derwall, 2007; Bauer, Derwall, & Oen,
2007; Goldreyer & Diltz, 1999; Hamilton, Jo, & Statman, 1993; Hoep-
ner & Zeume, 2009; Rennebog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008; Schroeder,
2007; Fisher & Statman, 2002a; Gregory & Whiaker, 2007; Luther,
Matatko, & Corner, 1992; Luther & Matatko, 1994; Mallin, Saadouni,
& Briston, 1995; Cortez, Silva, & Areal, 2012) and the controversy is
still ongoing. However the financial out-performance argument has a
considerable amount of adherents.
• Value-enhancing people: This set of people use shareholder activism
techniques to enhance investment value, and focuses primarily on
corporate governance. CalPERS, a Californian pension fund is an ex-
ample of an institutional value-enhancing investor.
Value based people are best described by ST (cf. Chapter 9.1.3 and CC (cf.
Chapter 9.1.4. Due to their belief in financial advantages that are obtained
through SRI the other two categories fit into CSP (cf. Chapter 9.1.1.
For elaborateness’s sake I also describe the SRI investment process accord-
ing to the practices in SRI. The following six statements point out the main
technical approaches in SRI in order to clarify the definition Crane (2008):
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• First, all SRI includes into the investment decision process, over and
above considerations of financial risk and return, some combination
of moral religious, social, and environmental concern. This point is
similar to the broad definition and conceived as the cornerstone of
the building blocks of a more precise definition.
• Second, a significant number social investments construct portfolios
using a process known as negative screening. Negative screening is a
systematic method of excluding objectionable investments according
to decisions rules established beforehand. One common decision rule
is to exclude companies involved in tobacco, alcohol, or gambling. The
religious roots of negative screening immediately come into mind. But
negative screening has broadened its scope, and is also used for other
values.
• Third, some SRI seeks to include companies with notably positive so-
cial records in their portfolios in a process known as positive screen-
ing.
• Fourth, SRI might seek to change companies’ behaviour via proxy
resolutions and negotiation with management, a process known as
shareholder activism.
• Fih, the best in class approach compares the social performance of
assets in a specific sector to select only the investments with the best
social records1.
• Finally SRI may also refer to investments that bypass traditional chan-
nels and have a high social impact. This is oen termed community in-
vestment, but may also take the form of micro-finance (small loans to
entrepreneurs, usually in developing countries), social venture capital,
or community lending (bank lending focused on low and moderate-
income communities).
3.1.4 (d) Eects on trust
Whereas the historical, social and demographic drivers of investing in SRI
funds are well documented this dissertation focuses on personal motiva-
tions and the eects SRI can have on trust. Trusting others is a central
component in human life. Research shows that it is essential for stable re-
lationships, fundamental for cooperation, vital to exchange, and necessary
even for routine of everyday interactions. In organizations, like financial in-
stitutions, trust is important at interpersonal, and institutional levels. Trust
becomes a vital concept when there are significant risks involved in trust-
ing (i.e., vulnerability) and when there is objective uncertainty about future
consequences of trusting.
1 I defer a more detailed account of this approach to the section focusing on the French SRI
market.
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Chapter 4 studies peoples’ perceptions of SRI funds. Investing in mutual
funds is risky and trust is vital for people to leave the power over their sav-
ing to someone else. The economic turbulence encountered since 2008 have
resulted in historically low trust in financial institutions. Chapter 4 tests
the prediction that SRI can help foster trust in mutual funds through the in-
creased similarity in values that theses funds have with people. The method
is and implementation of experimental designs in a management context.
3.2 socially responsible remuneration
The second situation in which there seems to be a popular desire for more
social responsibility is remuneration for work. Modern remuneration plans
are oen so complex and arcane that they produce considerable worries to
people who deal with them on a daily basis. Remuneration systems are oen
tedious, yet essential to modern society: They appear, in dierent forms, in
all industrialized countries.
The primary objective of remunerations is generally linked to economic ef-
ficiency. Nevertheless men are alert to factors of social justice within remu-
neration plans. Moral aspects, such as compensation for bodily injury, have
existed in virtually every civilization. This historical perspective, outlined in
the following paragraphs shows that the drasmen of remuneration plans
have always been keen to also include goals linked to social justice.
3.2.1 Historical Perspectives on remuneration
The history of compensation for bodily injury begins shortly aer the ad-
vent of wrien history itself (Guyton, 1999). An ancient Sumerians outlined
laws that provided monetary compensation for specific injury to workers’
body parts, including fractures (Kramer, 1988). Later, the Babylonian law
code (code of Hammurabi from 1750 B.C.) provided a similar set of re-
wards for specific injuries and their implied permanent impairments. An-
cient Greek, Roman, Arab, and Chinese law provided sets of remuneration
schedules, with precise payments for the loss of a body part.
For example, under ancient Arab law, loss of a joint of the thumb was worth
one-half the value of a finger. The amount of the length lost was the com-
pensation for penis injuries, and the surface area for ears. All the early re-
muneration schemes consisted of “schedules” such as this; specific injuries
determined specific rewards. The concept of an “impairment” (the loss of
function of a body part) separate from a “disability” (the loss of the ability
to perform specific tasks or jobs) had not yet arisen.
Later the development of English common law in the late Middle Ages and
Renaissance provided a legal framework that persisted into the early Indus-
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trial Revolution across Europe and America. Three critical principles gradu-
ally developed which determined what injuries were to compensate:
1. Contributory negligence. The doctrine of contributory negligence
held the employer was not at fault if the worker was in any way re-
sponsible for his injury. Any worker who slipped and lost an arm or
leg was not entitled to remuneration. Regardless of how hazardous
the exposed machinery of the day was.
2. The “fellow servant” rule. Employers were not held liable if the
workers’ injuries resulted in any part from the action or negligence
of a fellow employee under the “fellow servant” rule.
3. The “assumption of risk”. The doctrine of “assumption of risk” was
exceptionally far-reaching. It held simply that employees know of the
hazards of any particular job when they sign their contracts. There-
fore, by agreeing to work in a position they assume any inherent risk it
carries. Employers had to provide the safety measures considered ap-
propriate in the industry as a whole. In the nineteenth century, this
oen le a great deal of interpretation. Assumption of risk was of-
ten formalized at the beginning of an employees’ tenure; industries
required contracts in which workers abdicated their right to sue for
injury. These became known as the “workers’ right to die” or “death
contracts”.
The landmark events in the development of modern workers’ remunera-
tion occurred in Prussia under the leadership of Chancellor, Oo von Bis-
marck. His first foray into the field was through the Employers’ Liability
Law of 1871, providing limited social protection to workers in certain facto-
ries, quarries, railroads, and mines. Later, Bismarck pushed through Work-
ers’ Accident Insurance in 1884 creating the first modern system of workers’
remuneration. Over the next years followed Public Pension Insurance pro-
viding a stipend for workers incapacitated due to non-job related illnesses
and Public Aid providing a safety net for those who were never able to work
due to disability.
The system as a whole valued active workers; Workers received the greatest
benefits, medical care, and rehabilitation for job-related injuries. The state-
administered Prussian system also established an important precedent: it
was an “exclusive remedy” to the problem of workers’ remuneration because
workers were unable to sue employers through the civil courts under the
system.
Societal demand for justice in remuneration plans persists. However re-
search has neglected the question of how people judge the acceptability
of modern compensations. The empirical studies in Chapter 5 patch this
lacuna focusing on socially responsible remunerations.
Chapter 5 studies executive bonuses, executive compensation plans and gen-
eral remuneration plans within companies in a French context. From a com-
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panies perspective fair and adequate remuneration is critical to motivating
employees, hiring and retaining competent employees. In determining ade-
quate remuneration for employees, from a companies perspective remuner-
ation managers usually consider the three major factors: the labor market,
the nature and scope of the job, and characteristics of the employee. From a
societies perspective fair and adequate remuneration is vital for maintaining
positive social climate. For example many remuneration policy restrictions
(like salary caps or minimum wages) have been introduced from govern-
ments and multinationals with the intention to prevent excesses.
3.3 windfall gains
Last I consider a situation of undeserved windfall gains and how people
react to them. A windfall gain is a benefit someone has received without
expecting or deserving it. A well known example from the business world
are the profits of US Oil companies that ensued form a sudden sharp in-
crease in Crude Oil prices due to the OPEC oil Embargo in 1979. The profits
big oil companies made were not due to technological innovation or some
other competitive advantage they had gained through an intelligent busi-
ness strategy, but rather the coincidental by-product of a political crisis. In-
terestingly the political reaction to these windfall gains was the US Crude
Oil windfall profit tax enacted in 1980. This tax intended to increase tax
rates on the profits mainly because Congress felt that the industry was not
paying its fair share on federal taxes.
Other examples of windfall gains are subsidies, that is financial assistance
given to support the development of a particular industry or individual be-
havior (eg. common agricultural policy in Europe, Chinese solar subsidies,
child allowances in most countries), heritage or gambling gains.
3.3.1 Spending windfall gains
The primary behavioural result about windfall gains is that people tend to
spend them more easily 2. A likely explanation of this fact is one of psy-
chologies best documented eects: “Loss aversion” (A. Tversky & Kahneman,
2009). Simply put this eect states that people tend to overweight the value
of their losses and underweight the value of their gains. In other words the
psychological distress from losing 100$ is superior to the psychological relief
from gaining 100$.
By extension this eect can be observed when people place values on objects
they own. In an experiment Carmon and Ariely (2001) organized a loery
amongst graduate students at their university. The prize were tickets for the
2 Anecdotally we are regularly reminded of when we read about loery winners who end up
loosing their new fortune.
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university football championship finals (probably the most important game
of the year and there were obviously less tickets then students). Aer the
loery they contacted both, students who had won tickets and and those
who did not. Those who had won were asked for how much they would be
willing to sell the tickets, and the others were asked about the price they
were willing to pay for geing tickets anyways. The impressive finding is
that the hypothetical selling price was 14 times higher that the hypothetical
paying price.
Technically speaking the way in which an object is endowed influences the
value that people aach to it. People who are rewarded with an object due to
exemplary performance tend to value the object more highly than people
who obtain the same object based on either chance or poor performance.
Likewise windfall gains, such as unexpected tax rebates, loery winnings, or
inheritances, are spent more readily than other assets, presumably because
they are valued less.
3.3.2 The choice people face in our studies
The choice people face in the studies in Chapter 6, however, is concerned
with revealing windfall gains to others and not so much concerned with
spending them. Indeed, when others come to know about windfall gains this
oen triggers adverse feelings like envy. For example people oen begrudge
windfall gains to Loery millionaires and subsidized industries.
Chapter 6 studies a situation in which people can reveal (or not) benefits
they have received without deserving them to others. The question that
is raised is whether the decision relies on classical cost-benefit analysis as
first proposed by Garry Becker or whether psychological mediators dier-
ent from monetary incentives do play a role.
The abstract situation under study is that someone has received an unde-
served benefit and can now decide whether she wants the others to know
about this, or not. Concretely this could be applied to many situations: Exec-
utives who receive excessive bonuses may or may not want to communicate
about them. Anyone who has already received an erroneous invoice or wire
transfer dealt with the question of speaking about it.
Findings about the drivers of revealing undeserved benefits to others could
find applications in government and business policies. In Europe for exam-
ple, some people have inherited large sums of money on Swiss bank ac-
counts on which they pay only marginal taxes. If politics of other countries
want to encourage them to repatriate this money, should they rather pro-
vide them with monetary incentives or appeal to their values base on social
norms? Another example are people who profit from loopholes in social se-
curity systems and perceive legal but undue subsidies. Again the question is
whether the most eicient way to encourage them to make those windfall
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gains public are monetary incentives or appealing to their personally held
values.
In many regards this research relates to Ariely’s work on honesty and cheat-
ing (Ariely et al., 2011; Ariely, 2012). In this research program it has been doc-
umented that people generally cheat (in the most famous experiment they
over-report their correct answers in math tests) but just a lile: As much as
they can still think of them selves in a positive way. The main result being
that cheating is not influenced by increased rewards or a higher probabil-
ity of being discovered but rather by appealing to moral values. The main
dierence with the situation we study is that cheating can be considered
morally condemnable whereas in our situation the moral fault incurs to the
experimenter. Just like the Swiss bank account was opened by the parents
and subsidies are provided by the state.
To summarize, this dissertation studies three situations that involve moral
and economic aspects and that are relevant for CSR theory and practice.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the decline of trust, during and aer the eco-
nomic turbulence of 2008, and the advent of SRI funds. Chapter 5 explores
what kind of remuneration systems are socially acceptable. Chapter 6 is con-
cerned with peoples reactions to windfall gains and the question of what
drives people to reveal, or conceal, undeserved benefits to their peers.
Before turning to empirical investigations of the three situations described
above Chapter 3.4 discusses the four main theories of CSR and reports the-
oretical implications for each of the situations.
3.4 psychology and csr
CSR theories describe what companies are doing, and to some extent what
they should be doing (cf. Appendices 9.1). While the practices of many com-
panies in the USA, for example, are probably beer described as following
SV theory, others, perhaps in Europe or Japan, might beer fit the stake-
holder model. SV requires companies to comply with fiduciary duties to-
wards shareholders - consequently the moral questions are dealt with by
the legislator. CSP theory also calls companies to follow public policy mak-
ers adding the notion of a long run competitive advantage of responsible
companies. ST goes further and adds a moral liability: companies are liable
towards the stakeholder defined as a person with interests in regards to the
actions of companies. CC aims at institutionalizing spontaneous socially re-
sponsible practices by business leaders by granting citizenship (a concept
usually granted to individual persons) to organizations. Citizenship then
comes with duties that are defined by international standards (e.g. UN Prin-
ciples).
Contrasting the precision of CSR theories in describing the structural mech-
anisms of social responsibility, scholars have rarely looked at psychological
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drivers of social responsibility. The development of social responsibility in
the business world is a recursive process and depends largely on how indi-
viduals interact with larger organizations throughout the process. A beer
understanding of peoples’ motivations, beliefs, and perceptions in those in-
teractive situations, contributes to the toolbox of those engaged in promot-
ing social responsibility.
Research in psychology has focused on drivers of pro-social behaviour, and
found that there is a good part of social image motivation (Ariely, Bracha,
& Meier, 2009), self-image concerns (Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Mazar, Amir, &
Ariely, 2008) and framing of the decision (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2012;
Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010) to it. One limitation of those studies, however
is that the experimental situations under study rarely apply to situations
in business seings. Most dependent variables fall into one of the follow-
ing categories: donations (organ, blood, NGOs), cheating in tests (anagram,
trivia quiz, maths exercise), or consumer choices of green products.
The empirical works presented in Part ii aempt to converge CSR theories,
and psychological research on pro-social behaviour. This aempt is guided
by the concern to investigate situations that are relevant for corporate de-
cision making, and at the same time subject to influences of psychologi-
cal factors. The resulting psychologically informed view of CSR may seems
more accurate in prescribing genuine, and eective, actions in support of
CSR practices.
The work on SRI in Chapter 4 evolves around the argument that financial
institutions can adopt SRI to mend the reputational damage they have suf-
fered during the crisis. SRI thus becomes a tool for banks to restore a climate
of trust amongst customers. Success in this enterprise is highly dependent
on people’s perceptions of the dierent values carried by SRI. The psycho-
logical factor linked to those values is value similarity between the investor
and the fund. Chapter 4 explores, how dierences in values, and similarity of
values aect investors perceptions of fund trustworthiness, and investment
decisions.
Chapter 5 tackles another important decision businesses have to make: The
remuneration systems they adopt. As expressed by regular media coverage
people have dierent views on executive remunerations, and in particular
bonus payments. In general there is a public outcry about high, and unac-
ceptable compensations, which in turn, raises the question of how people
conceive acceptable remunerations. To address the public outcry, legisla-
tors have debated salary caps, and companies have revisited incentive struc-
tures. However, from a CSR perspective the question addressed in Chapter 5
seems more important: How do dierent variables on which a company can
act, influence social acceptblity of remunerations.
Lile is known about how people value corporate actions. In the case of
remuneration policies fair distribution seems to be important (ie. of value)
for many people. Study 5 uses functional measurement to contribute a cog-
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nitive mapping of peoples’ acceptability of remuneration plans and exec-
utive bonuses. A thorough understanding of socially acceptable remuner-
ation policies allows to create value for society and help mitigate adverse
feelings towards executives.
Another point is that the CSR theories tell lile about how personal val-
ues influence decision making. Consider, for example, CC theory which
is tied to universal standards and claims of universal rights. Even propo-
nents admit that it lacks concrete knowledge about those personal values
(Munshi, 2004). Chapter 6 builds on psychological research on universal val-
ues (Tetlock, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Caldwell & Dixon, 2009; A. P. Fiske
& Tetlock, 1997) and provides a more detailed view on truth telling or the
personal value of revealing undeserved benefits. Telling other about unde-
served benefits is of a particular interest to companies since it can be linked
to principles like transparency, reputation or implicit contracting.

Part II
E M P I R I C A L S T U D I E S

4
S O C I A L LY R E S P O N S I B L E I N V E S T M E N T S
4.1 introduction
There seems to be a general lack of trust. The turbulent years since the burst
of the US housing bubble in 2008 have filled the newspapers with stories
about greedy executives, corruption, incompetence and general misconduct.
From bankers to executives, from media to politics, all have le the public
with scandals causing anger, disillusion and ignominy.
Aer the subprime crisis was at its highest point, chief executives pocketed
horrendous bonuses right before their institutes applied for government
bailouts in the US and Europe. Stan O’Neill le Merryl Lynch with a $165
package as the company posted $8 billion in losses. Charles Prince retired
from Citygroup aer only four years in the company and a poor 3rd quarter
performance. He took nearly $100 million with him. In October 2008 Richard
Fould sold the house he bought four years ago for $14 million house to his
wife for $100 in order to protect the house from potential legal actions.
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In 2011, the News International phone hacking scandal reveals that employ-
ees of British newspaper News Of The World listened to discussions by ille-
gally accessing mailboxes, they are further suspected of having bribed po-
lice oicers. In consequence of the scandal, James Murdoch, executive of
News Corp. Europe and Asia, announced the closure of the, at one time the
biggest selling English language news companies in the world. In December
2011 German president, Christian Wul, made public excuses for having re-
ceived a zero interest loan from the wife of business man Egon Geerkens.
Just when the aair seemed to sele down, it was revealed that he had ap-
plied undue pressure on the journalists to prevent initial uncovering of the
loan.
These anecdotal cases are in contradiction to what CSR theories would con-
sider responsible. Excessive CEO bonuses violate CSP’s individual principle
(cf. Section 9.1.1), and while they were not int the interest of stakeholders
(cf. Section 9.1.3) many shareholders seem to believe that they are in their
best interest (cf. Section 9.1.2). While Wuls zero interest loan (granted by
a private entrepreneur) was conform with legal requirements, SV theory’s
principle of corporate eects as well as CSP’s power principle would have
required omission.
If the public opinion is driven by anecdotal events like the ones described
above it is likely that people react with distrust. And polls show that in most
western countries trust in business and government to do what is right is low.
People aged between 25 and 64, answered the question “How much do you
trust business to do what is right?” below the 50% mark in France (48%), the
US (46%), UK (44%) and Russia (41%). Answers to the question “How much
do you trust government to do what is right?” paint an equally bad picture
in France (49%), Italy (45%), India (44%), the U.K. (43%), the U.S. (40%), Russia
(39%) and Germany (33%) (Edelman Trust Barometer 2011, 2011).
In recent polls people were asked what measures a business could take in or-
der to restore its trustworthiness. Amongst the top answers were: ”treating
employees well”, ”having transparent and honest business practices”, ”com-
municating frequently and honestly” and ”making progress on environmen-
tal initiatives”. Those answers are all from the field of CSR. In comparison
answers that topped the ranking some years earlier (”increasing profitabil-
ity and performance”, ”increasing shareholder value” or ”protecting profit
margins”) referred to financial aspects (Edelman, 2010). This suggests that
today, to trust a company, CSR has become even more important to people
than higher performance.
Experimental data paints a similar, but somewhat more precise picture.
Data clearly support a link between perceived morality and trustworthi-
ness. Bews and Rossouw (2002) demonstrated that executives could influ-
ence trust by adopting a set of moral interventions, procedural transparency,
trust training, adequate communication or improved employee care. Also,
several cause-related marketing studies have demonstrated that social ini-
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tiatives of companies result in positive aective, cognitive, and behavioral re-
sponses by consumers (T. J. Brown & Dacin, 1997b; Creyer, 1997; Ellen, Mohr,
& Webb, 2000; Folkes, 1988; Murray & Keith, 1997; Sen & Bhaacharya, 2001;
Becker-Olsen & Hill, 2006).
Also the immediate economic consequences of distrust may be short lived
they could be devastating in the long run. Because trust is a key element
of the concepts of social capital which, in turn, contributes to economic
development. The core idea supported by social capital proponents is that
the quality of social interactions can aect the productivity of workers and
groups, just like physical capital and human capital do. A one-standard de-
viation increase in a survey-based measure of country-level trust increases
economic growth by more than one-half of a standard deviation (Knack &
Keefer, 1997) and across countries, a one-standard deviation increase in the
same measure of trust increases judicial eiciency by 0.7 of a standard de-
viation and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a standard deviation
(La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).
Those long term eects could be empirical underlying of a concept around
the need for social support in CSR theories (cf. Section 9.1). The basic idea
of this concept is that companies require social support in order to be prof-
itable in the long run. The organizational principle (cf Section 9.1.1) ex-
presses this vision most clearly but it is also present in ST theory. SV the-
ory does not say very much about this. The only doctrine being to increase
shareholder value, formal proof of negative long term eects from a loss of
trust would certainly be considered as an indication that trust needs to be
reestablished by management. However those long term eects are oen
diicult to measure and may intermingle with cyclical factors.
Evidence of a long term eect of trust comes from, political economist
Fukuyama (1996). Observing a dierence between company dimensions in
developed countries close to each other he explained this dierence with
trust. In Germany and the USA company structures are bigger then Italy
or France. In Japan and Korea they are a lot bigger then in Hong-Kong Or
Taiwan. The size of the nations cannot be the cause since there are huge com-
panies in the Netherlands or for example in Sweden. Korea and Taiwan are
of almost equal size. He then observes that in countries with small company
sizes, people are unable to establish trusting relationships with people who
are not member of their family. His argument is simple: If people do not trust
each other only the state can construct society and build large companies,
if people do trust each other they create solid and complex relationships be-
tween each other and these relationships favor economic development and
democracy which are tied together.
Following this evidence and CSR theories actors of our societies economic,
and in particular financial development, do have a social responsibility to
foster trust on a general level. Public trust needs moral values to build up
on and, as trust is more diicult to gain than to loose, it will take more then
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loose promises. SRI funds could make a substantial contribution to foster
trust. Those funds include moral values in the investment decision process
and constitute a quickly growing asset class increasingly aractive. If used
properly without abuse, SRI funds might polish the image of financial insti-
tutions for the generations to come.
The next section provides a more detailed view of trust, its economic virtues,
theoretical approaches to it and trust measurement methods. Then the field
of SRI, its historical roots and recent developments, investor types, the meth-
ods used in the SRI process and specificity of the French SRI market are
described.
4.2 trust
Confidence in or reliance on some quality or aribute of a person or thing, or
the truth of a statement.
4.2.1 The Importance Of Trust
Imagine you are driving in your car and suddenly hear a strange noise. In-
trigued you will drive to the garage and ask a mechanic about it. The me-
chanic then will check what is wrong with your car and establish a cost
estimate for you and repair the car once you both agree on the price. Fi-
nally you will have to sele the bill before you can leave and drive you car
safely again.
The story described in these few lines is very common and we all experience
similar situations in daily life. Yet, we hardly realize how important mutual
trust is in social interactions like this one. When you bring your car to the
mechanic you both have to trust each other in several ways. First, You will
need to trust in his expertise and competence of being able to repair cars in
general. Second, You need to trust him to be a honest person. Since you do
not have a clue about the mechanics of your car he could charge you a lot
more then the actual cost of repairing. Third, he will have to trust in your
explanations about the noise: Was it rather shrill, hull or rasping? Right or
le side of the car? All these information will help him to detect the problem
quickly. And fourth, he will finally have to trust you to sele the bill, because,
who knows, you might be broke or worse a credit-cheater.
Just imagine the whole situation without the trust between both parties.
You would probably start by inquiring about dierent garages and their rep-
utation, then having narrowed down the number of garages you would still
bring your car to several garages in order to compare the diagnostics and
estimates before finally leaving your car. The mechanic in turn would would
dismantle the whole car since what you told him about the noise is just not
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trustworthy. But before he even starts to work on your car you will have to
advance, in cash of course, the amount of the repair.
If you think about it, trust is the groundwork of peaceful social interac-
tion and a cornerstone of modern societies (Kohn, 2008). Certainly, democ-
racy comes with duties and our society’s leaders will have to foster mu-
tual trust whenever and wherever possible (O’Neill, 2002). Trust is of par-
ticular interest to society as a whole (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995), organiza-
tions (Currall, 2003; Hart, Capps, Cangemi, & Caillouet, 1986; Mishra, 1996;
Schoorman et al., 2007; Enz, 1988; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), physi-
cians and medical institutions (Hall, Dugan, Zheng, & Mishra, 2001), mar-
keting and consumer product responses (T. J. Brown & Dacin, 1997a; Mor-
gan & Hunt, 1994; Doney, Cannon, & Hobbs, 1997; Morgan & Hunt, 2010;
Moorman, Deshpande, & Zaltman, 1993, 2010), close and romantic relation-
ships (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999), leadership (Dirks &
Ferrin, 2002) and psychological personality measures (Robinson, Shaver, &
Wrightsman, 1991). People need to trust, into each other, in their superiors
and leaders, in the ones they supervise or educate and finally in themselves.
Economic activity is particularly sensitive to trust and governmental au-
thorities in many countries periodically issue measures of consumer trust
(Jansen & Nahuis, 2003; Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006; Fisher & Statman,
2002b). For example the Consumer Confidence Index, a household survey, is
published by the United States, India, the Republic of Ireland, Canada and
Indonesia. Similar constructs exist in virtually every country. Private compa-
nies also have found a business in selling various indicators and analysis of
global or country specific trust. The “Edelman Trust Barometer” for exam-
ple is published annually with regular update throughout the year. Surveys
such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the World Values Survey (WVS)
also yield aitudinal trust measures.
Scholars have argued that trust is an element to every commercial transac-
tion conducted over a period of time, and that much of the economic back-
wardness in the world can be explained by lack of mutual trust (K. J. Arrow,
1972). Trust has been shown to be a social capital that contributes to, and
even predicts, economic growth in sociological (Coleman, 1988) and eco-
nomic studies (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanei, 1993; Fran-
cois & Zabojnik, 2005). There is some evidence that the eect is mediated
through trusts virtuous eects on risk taking and cooperation (Durante,
2010; Tu & Bulte, 2010) and that it is independent from religious beliefs and
ethnic origins (Alesina, 2002).
Knowing of the importance of trust for society as a whole and specifically
for economic well being sets it on the agenda of our leaders and decision
makers. I have argued that many have already become aware of the im-
portance of trust and that the use of trust metrics has become a standard.
However simply monitoring the state of trust, in a given society or organi-
zation, is merely scratching on the surface. In order to begin acting on trust
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a well conceptualized approach is much needed. The following section will
outline models of trust with a particular focus on psychological aspects.
4.2.2 Trust Theory
The psychological foundations of trust have interested researchers in game
theory, e-commerce and risk communication (Twyman, Harvey, & Harries,
2008). In behavioral game theory various types of games are used to study
the type of situations that influence on how much trust people are will-
ing to place in another person. Models based on data from experimental
studies have made valuable predictions and been widened to dierent labor
markets (Ernst & Gächter, 2000) and organizational structures in real com-
panies. Because customers must trust the business holders of online shops
to deliver the goods and services that have been paid for researchers have
studied electronic commerce. These studies have investigated relations be-
tween website characteristics, consumer’s ratings of trust in online shops
and probability of purchase. Finally, in the field of risk communication the
determinants of trust have been studied. In order to manage risks like for ex-
ample car accidents, governments can rely on legislation, for example laws
against using mobile phones while driving, or communication campaigns on
the levels of risk associated with mobile phone use while driving (Siegrist,
Earle, & Gutscher, 2003).
Going beyond psychological aspects, the integrative model of trust (Mayer,
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) is well established and has drawn on perspec-
tives from multiple disciplines. It draws from the psychological literature
that trust is a maer of perception and consequently defines trust as the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustee, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party. First
published in 1995, it has been applied to management and marketing ac-
counting, finance, economics, information systems, industrial engineering,
political science, communication ethics, law, psychology, sociology, health
care and agribusiness (Schoorman et al., 2007).
Approaching trust from a perceptional perspective allows to identify the
factors that make the trustee trustworthy. The traits and characteristics
that entitle someone to be perceived as trustworthy are defined as the an-
tecedents of trustworthiness and the model counts three of them: Ability,
Benevolence, Integrity.
Further, ability is the group of skills that enables someone to have influence
in a specific domain. It hat to be thought of in terms of competences and
expertise, for example someone could be perceived as trustworthy for his
engineering skills or his employee management skills. Benevolence, is the
extent to which someone is perceived to want to do good to the trustor, be-
sides egocentric profit motives. It implies a particular aachment a positive
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orientation of the trustor towards the trustee. Integrity, is the perception
that the trustor sticks to a number of principles as a whole that are impor-
tant to the trustee.
Integrity is of particular importance for the purpose because it introduces
a moral dimension (Bews & Rossouw, 2002) to trust. If the trustor simply
adheres to a set of principles and takes all his actions according to these
values this is not suicient for that he is perceived as integer by the trustee.
If a person, for example, swears by cheating in card games and puts cards
up his sleeves, makes bum deals and peeks at his opponents play he would
not be labeled integer simply because of the negative moral value of taking
the other players for a ride. The decisive point is that the personal values of
the trustor must be the same as the personal values of the trustee.
For the sake of detail it has to be mentioned that an open controversy
concerns empirical studies having reported strong correlations between in-
tegrity and benevolence. Whereas Dirks and Skarlicki (2007) argue for a sim-
ilar theoretical role of both Schoorman et al. (2007) explain similar the re-
sults by the limits of experimental designs. In short, laboratory experiments
do not allow for adequate panel data to be collected that could could vali-
date the theoretical specificity of benevolence and integrity found in field
studies.
Also notice that competency, openness, concern, reliability and loyalty have
been identified to be antecedents of trustworthiness (Mishra, 1996; Hall et
al., 2001; Rossouw, 2002), but postpone a detailed description of similarities
and interactions between these concepts for clarity’s sake.
Within the scope of a thorough review of trust the significant progress in
the field of personality factors influencing on trust must be acknowledged.
In contrast to the antecedents of trustworthiness those concern the trustee
and do not change easily. Increased trust scores seem to correlate with scale
measures from the “Big Five” trait taxonomy (Oliver & Sanjay, 1999) as de-
scribed below.
1. Agreeableness (good-naturedness, cooperativeness and courteous-
ness)
2. Conscientiousness (persistence, determination, hard work, depend-
ability and propensity towards achievement)
3. Emotional stability (being calm, enthusiastic, free from anxiety, de-
pression and insecurity)
4. Extroversion (sociability, friendliness and talkativeness)
5. Openness to experience or resourcefulness (broad-mindedness, cre-
ativity, imagination artistic sensitivity and intellectual ability)
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4.2.3 Measuring Trust
Considering the relative importance of trust for the economic well being
of societies, a crucial task for scientific research is the proper assessment of
trust in economic situations (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Souer, 2010).
Whereas most of the social capital research relies on aitudinal survey ques-
tions, many economic studies have turned towards behavioral measures of
trust. I first develop behavioral and survey measures, and then discuss trust
measurement used subsequent experiments.
Aitudinal survey questions are typically held close to, or taken directly
from the General Social Survey. For example they read: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be to careful
in dealing with people?”. They can generally be divided into questions about
aitudes and questions about past trusting behavior. While this type of sur-
vey questions have the advantage of a high ecological value, they also are
somehow vague and hard to interpret. estions like this are easily under-
stood and survey respondents are probably familiar with similar questions
asked in daily life. However the interpretation of abstract concepts and their
relation to trust is not artless. The trust measure interpretation in the exam-
ple above prescribes trust to being careful in dealing with people. However
there could be several other reasons why someone would be careful with oth-
ers: It might be because of her being anxious or overly protective. Scholars
from the social capital research have felt this lack and called for behavioral
indicators of trust (Putnam et al., 1993).
Economic games played with financial incentives have since filled the ab-
sence of behavioral measures. The trust game (J. Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe,
1995) has become generally known as the standard behavioral measure of
trust and prompted a great deal of dierent variations. The experiment of
the basic version of the game involves two players. One is given an amount
of money by the experimenter and has to choose how much of the total
amount he is willing to give to the second player as an investment. The
amount that is transferred is then multiplied by some factor and now the
second player is at the joint: he has to decide about the amount he is will-
ing to give back to player one. From a purely utilitarian perspective player
one should maximize his payo and hand nothing back, however realizing
this player one should not make any investment in the first place. In this
game the amount of money invested by player one is typically considered
as a measure of player ones trust in player two and in return the amount
handed back is considered as a measure of player two’s trustworthiness.
Another established economic game that measures trust uses “envelope
drops”. Participants are told that a stamped envelope addressed to the par-
ticipant and containinge10 will be dropped by the experimenter at the local
train station. The participant can now choose between the envelope and re-
ceiving immediately e1. the oer is then raised subsequently to e2, e3,...
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To what degree do you trust ? Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely
Figure 4.1: A 10-point Likert type scale for measuring trust in a fund.
e10. The evalue where people switch to the envelope is considered as a
measure of their trust in anonymous people who find the apparently lost
envelope at the station. A participant who prefers e2 immediately to the
envelope but prefers the envelope to e3, is considered to be more trusting
that someone who switches at e8 or e9.
Also behavioral measures are beer shielded from subjective bias they are
not free of shortcomings. First, behavioral trust measures easily fall prey to
the experimenter biases (Rosenthal, 1966). For instance, in the envelope drop
experiment a biased experimenter could influence on the decision while pre-
senting the choice between the envelope and immediate payo, and double
blind procedures do not always fit the needs of the experiments. Further
behavioral measures external validity is oen limited. Trust game experi-
ments usually concern a very specific situation and one cannot be sure that
the observed behavior will also occur in other situations.
Both, aitudinal survey measures and behavioral measures have made in-
valuable contributions and certainly capture large parts of trust. It has been
found past trusting behavior, as reported in survey questions, correlates
with experimentally measured trusting behavior (Glaeser et al., 2010). Nev-
ertheless for an experimental approach to an applied research the survey
method clearly lacks internal consistency whereas behavioral measures lack
external validity. I therefore now turn towards a new measure of trust de-
rived from psychological measurement theory.
Linear response scales are frequently used in psychological measurement.
Psychologists oen use a ten point Lickert-type measure with two end an-
chors (cf. Figure 4.1). The following section briefly reviews general aspects
of psychological measurement scales before discussing the proper use of
linear scales.
Response measurement scales can be classified into three categories with re-
gard to the essential aspect of psychological measurement: The relation be-
tween the numerical scale of response and the typically unobservable scale
of the conceptual quality, in this case trust (Anderson, 2001). The first type
of scales are monotone scales. They are also called ordinal scales and ex-
press relative magnitude, that means that the scale numbers have the same
rank order as the theoretical concept. In learning studies, for example, the
number of trials to reach the solution of a given problem is a common mea-
sure of learning rate. Monotone scales reach their limits when comparing
dierences. Suppose that R1 − R2 > R3 − R4, one can airm that
the first dierence is greater then the second, however this does not hold
for the conceptual quantity the numbers measure.
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The second type are linear or equal interval scales. In linear scales the ob-
served number are a linear function of the conceptual quantity. Linear scales
remove the limitations of monotone scales and allow for comparison of dif-
ferences (Anderson, 2001), because equal intervals on the number scale cor-
respond to equal intervals on the psychological scale.
The third type of scales are proportional scales, or ratio scales. Their partic-
ularity is that the observed numbers are proportional to the unobservable
conceptual quantity. Most physical scales are proportional scales, length
and mass for example have true zeros. Proportional scales are linear scales
with a known zero and therefore not very common in psychological mea-
surement.
Linear measurement scales are essential for quantitative theory (Anderson,
2001). This follows from the multiple determination of perception, thought
and action. Without linear scales, analysis of multiple determination is
severely limited. This is well illustrated by the compromise between con-
flicting forces, a common form of behavior. With only monotone scales of
the conflicting forces only lile can be known of the resultant of the conflict.
With only two opposing forces the greater will dominate but nothing can
be said about how much. With three opposing forces even the direction of
the resultant is unpredictable if only the rank order is known.
Faced with the problem of the relation between the measured number and
the psychological concept behind two aitudes are common. The first is
to refute the possibility of linear scales in psychological measurement. The
argument is that the true measure of the concept is commonly impossible
and therefore linearity cannot be guaranteed. The second aitude is to take
the measured numbers for their face value, that is assume linearity unthink-
ingly.
One can argue that linearity in psychological measurement is an issue of
good habit and experimental design. A good precaution for using linear mea-
surement scales is to let participants practice with the format before they
start responding. This takes the form of a set of practice stimuli that are
presented to participants but excluded from statistical analysis. In that way
participants can familiarize with the scale before making proper use of it. An-
other good precaution is to help participants calibrate themselves through
the use of the ’end anchors’ when they familiarize with the response scale.
Calibration consists in presenting participants with extreme stimuli, with
responses likely answers to fall at both ends of the scale, providing them
with a frame of reference before they judge the target items.
The functional measurement methodology (Anderson, 1982, 2008) is a sys-
tematic aempt to solve the riddle of scale linearity in psychological mea-
surement and a detailed description of the issues is deerd to Chapter 3.4
making use of the particular methodology developed within this framework.
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4.3 effects of value similarity on trust
As was already mentioned, SRI funds include extra financial criteria, like
ESG related issues, in their investment decisions. The field has recently be-
come more and more interesting to institutional investors and private peo-
ple all over the world (“2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends
in the United States”, 2007; Marion de Marcillac, 2008; Hoepner & Mcmil-
lan, 2009). In Europe, the French market has been one of the first to imple-
menting SRI practices amongst institutional investors and private people
(cf. Chapter 2).
Further we have seen that trust is an important factor of economic well-
being and prosperity (Fukuyama, 1996). Theory and measurement of trust
have come a long way since their beginnings.
The following experiments focus on the eects of SRI on trust in mutual
funds. Since trust is lost more easily lost than it is gained, and takes time
to develop (O’Neill, 2002) the main focus is on the generations to come:
University students and young adults.
4.3.1 The Key Feature of Trust in SRI Funds: Value Similarity
In light of the poll data on positive eects of ESG on trust the prediction is
a positive eect of moral values on perceived trustworthiness of investment
funds. More precisely the critical factor for the eect of SRI on perceived
trustworthiness will be the similarity in values between a given fund and a
given investor. As we shall see, this second prediction has a sound theoreti-
cal and empirical foundation.
Value similarity is one of the most common features of academic models of
trustworthiness. In the Salient Value Similarity model (Earle & Cvetkovich,
1999) shared values are the basis for trust. Mayer, Davis, and Schoormann
(1995) defined integrity as the perception that the trustor adheres to a set
of principles acceptable to the trustee, and other models introduced very
similar constructs (Gabarro, 1978; Hart et al., 1986).
The positive eects of value similarity on trust are documented in many
studies. For example, shared values between automobile retailers and auto-
mobile suppliers (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), or between top management and
employees (Enz, 1988), are beneficial to mutual trust. Value similarity also
precedes social trust for products such as pesticides, nuclear power, and ar-
tificial sweeteners(Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth, 2000), for the perception of
geographic cancer clusters (Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Gutscher, 2001) and for
electromagnetic field risks (Siegrist et al., 2003).
Value similarity will outplay the eects of other known antecedents of trust
in the context of investment funds. Among these other antecedents is ability
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(Mayer, Davis, & Schoormann, 1995) or competence (Mishra, 1996). With re-
gard to its perceived trustworthiness, however, potential eects of ability are
limited for a very practical reason: Investment fund marketing is already al-
most exclusively based on financial performance, and funds that lose money
are unlikely to survive.
Another antecedent of perceived trustworthiness in benevolence (Mayer,
Davis, & Schoormann, 1995; McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002) or
warmth (S. T. Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Benevolence, refers to the ex-
tent to which the trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside
from egocentric profit motives. In the case of investment fund the “good”
done to the trustor would be high return on his initial investment. Since
mutual funds are legally bound through fiduciary duty (cf. Siegl (2011) for a
recent approach to fiduciary duty in the SRI field), and because fund man-
agers have contractual incentives for financial performance, benevolence in
its current definition can be seen as a given (or in need of conceptual clari-
fication) in the context of investment funds.
Lastly, the organizational implementation of value similarity is straightfor-
ward in mutual fund marketing, as well as in the investment decision pro-
cess. From a practitioner’s perspective, value similarity is directly actionable
in two steps. Once people’ personal values are understood they can be used
for positive or negative investment screening, or active engagement tech-
niques. Then, in a second step, communication about those values that are
similar to peoples’ personal values can be honestly adopted in retail bank
advisers sales pitches, in press campaigns and fund leaflets.
4.3.2 A estion of Personal Values
Value similarity is one’s perception that the investment fund adheres to a set
of values similar to one’s own personal values. This study presents young
adults with hypothetical invest fund descriptions that have moral values
more or less similar to their own personal values.
The experiments use moral values adopted from the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2010). Those guidelines outline recom-
mendations for responsible business and cover a large range of issues from
labor and human rights, bribery and corruption to environmental concerns
and information disclosure. Because of their extensive coverage of CSR is-
sues, and their general acceptance by the SRI community and government
oicials, the moral values presented in the experiments are drawn from the
OECD Guidelines.
A weak interpretation of the definition of value similarity would expect that
because people generally adhere to moral values, any investment fund that
show any moral values would be perceived as more trustworthy. A stronger
interpretation is that not all moral values will increase trustworthiness in
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the same manner. The eect of the values promoted by a fund should de-
pend on the idiosyncratic, personal values of each investor. I thus expect
the perceived trustworthiness of a fund to be highly sensitive to the similar-
ity of the values adopted by the fund and the personal moral values of the
potential investor.
If this prediction holds, social responsibility cannot only be viewed as a me-
chanical labeling of funds that will increase people’ trust. Such use of social
responsibility would, at best, have no eect at all and fail to restore people’
trust.
4.3.3 Comparison Variables
To beer understand the relative importance of value similarity, I compare
its eect on trustworthiness to that of past performance and social labeling. I
include past performance as a comparison variable because of its ecological
value. It is part of virtually every mutual fund description and varies within
single funds (Carhart, 1997), in between funds (Sharpe, 1966) and single
investors (Barber & Odean, 2000).
I also compare the eect of value similarity to that of social labeling. So-
cial labels are known to impact charity giving (Kraut, 1973) and consumer
choices (Loureiro & Lotade, 2005). Yet, the underlying moral values of so-
cial labels are oen loosely understood by people and might not have the
desired eect.
I test predictions in a series of three experiments. In each experiment, I in-
troduce a dierent manipulation of the similarity in values between the par-
ticipants and hypothetical investment funds.
4.3.4 Experiment 1
4.3.4.1 Method
Young adults (22 women and 16 men, mean age = 22, SD = 3) were recruited
on the campus of Toulouse University and agreed to participate in the ex-
periment. Participants did not receive remuneration.
Experiment 1 followed a 3 (similarity) × 2 (past performance) design. The
experiment was conducted in individual sessions for each participant. Each
session had two phases. Participants first judged dierent personal values
relevant to responsible business conduct. These ratings were used to tai-
lor individual values profiles for each participant. In Phase 2, participants
rated the trustworthiness of investment funds descriptions based on those
profiles.
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The materials used to construct business ethics statements in Phase 1 were
randomly selected and adapted from the OECD Guidelines for Responsible
Business Conduct: Respect of workers rights; Respect of environmental con-
cerns; Struggle against corruption; Conformity to national and international
laws; Transparency; Respect of public security. For each item, participants
were asked “According to you, how important is the following statement
for business ethics?” They responded on a 5-point scale anchored at Not at
all and Completely. There were six target values in Phase 1, introduced in
random order among a set of filler items.
In Phase 2 of the experiment, participants rated the trustworthiness of 12
investment funds, whose format was adapted from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission prospectus requirements. The funds were profitable
either 6 or 9 out of the last ten years. The value similarity with each par-
ticipant was low, high, or unknown (no information about the moral values
of the fund). Each fund description appeared twice during the experiment,
with a manager of a dierent gender. The target funds appeared in random
order among filler funds. Here is one example of a possible fund description:
Performance: profitable for six out of the last ten years. The fund
received the following social responsibility ratings (5 being the
best rating):
• Transparency of the selected companies = 4
• Respect of environmental concerns of the selected compa-
nies = 3
• Struggle against corruption of the selected companies = 5
• Respect of public security of the selected companies = 5
• Conformity to national and international laws of the se-
lected companies = 1
• Respect of workers rights by the selected companies = 5
Management: The manager is in business for 15 years. She grad-
uated from an excellent business school.
Value similarity was manipulated by changing the values of the six social
responsibility ratings. In the high similarity condition, these ratings were
exactly identical to the ratings that the individual participant gave during
Phase 1 when asked about their importance. In the low similarity condition,
these ratings were exactly opposed to the ratings that the individual partici-
pant gave during Phase 1 when asked about their importance (i.e., the rating
in Phase 2 was 6 minus the rating in Phase 1). In the control condition, no
moral information was provided about the fund, whose descriptions merely
stated that “The fund has not been evaluated by a social responsibility rat-
ing agency.” Aer each fund description participants answered the question
“To what degree do you trust this fund?” on a 10-point scale anchored at Not
at all and Completely.
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4.3.4.2 Manipulation check
To validate the manipulation of value similarity, I randomly selected the
Phase 1 responses of five participants to the main experiment, together with
the Phase 2 funds that were constructed for these particular participants in
the low and high similarity conditions. I then recruited 111 additional par-
ticipants (44 women, mean age = 29) who considered the Phase 1 responses
and the Phase 2 funds, and judged the similarity in values between partic-
ipant (from Phase 1 responses) and fund (from Phase 2 descriptions), on a
10-point scale anchored at Not at all similar and Completely similar. The ma-
nipulation had the intended eect, F(2, 110) = 29.39, p < .001, η2 = .21.
4.3.4.3 Results
Value Mean SD
Respect of workers rights by the selected companies 4.7 0.5
Respect of environmental concerns of the selected companies 4.5 0.8
Struggle against corruption of the selected companies 4.3 0.8
Conformity to national and international laws of the selected companies 4.2 0.8
Transparency of the selected companies 4.1 1.1
Respect of public security of the selected companies 3.9 1.0
Table 4.1: Importance of responsible business conduct values, as rated by partici-
pants in Experiment 1.
Descriptive statistics for Phase 1 of the experiment are shown in Table 4.1.
As expected participants generally judged the values as important: Ratings
for all items were well above the scale mean. Respect of workers rights and
environmental concerns were, on average, judged most important by par-
ticipants. Transparency and respect of public security, as well as respect of
public security of the selected companies, came last in terms of average im-
portance.
Figure 4.2 displays participants’ trustworthiness ratings in Phase 2 of Exper-
iment 1. As seen in Figure 4.2, information about past performance is deci-
sive when no moral information is available about the fund: Funds that were
profitable for 9 years are deemed more trustworthy than funds that were
profitable for 6 years. As soon as moral information is available, though, it
plays a central role in judgments of trustworthiness. High value similarity
increases trustworthiness, whereas low value similarity even decreases an
investment funds trustworthiness.
A 3 × 2 analysis of variance with perceived trustworthiness as dependent
measure (averaging the scores of the two presentations of each fund) con-
firmed the large role played by similarity in values. Similarity in values (high,
control, low) and past financial performance (good, poor) were entered as
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Figure 4.2: Trustworthiness of investment funds, as a function of past financial per-
formance and similarity in values.
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repeated-measure predictors. As anticipated, this analysis detected a large
main eect of similarity in values, F(2, 37) = 151, p < .001, η2 = .80. The
analysis also detected an interaction between the two predictors, which ap-
pear to reflect the following result: Funds with 6-year profitability benefit
more from high similarity in values, while funds with 9-year profitability
are aected to a greater extent by low similarity in values, F(2, 37) = 20,
p < .001, η2 = .35. Before I commit to an interpretation of this interaction,
I wish to aempt to replicate it in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was designed to consolidate the eect of value similarity on
perceived trustworthiness and to introduce social labeling as comparison
variable. In addition, Experiment 2 addresses a potential methodological
concern. In Experiment 1, participants who gave high ratings to all moral
values were mechanically presented with low-similarity funds that scored
low on all moral values. This means that at least for some participants, simi-
larity was confounded with overall social responsibility ratings, which could
result in undue amplification of the similarity eect. Experiment 2 uses a
manipulation of similarity that allays this methodological concern.
4.3.5 Experiment 2
4.3.5.1 Method
Young adults (26 women and 25 men, mean age = 27, SD = 8) were recruited
through email and agreed to answer an online questionnaire. Participants
did not receive remuneration.
The experiment followed a 3 (similarity) × 2 (ethical labeling) design. Dur-
ing Phase 1, participants expressed judgments about various values rele-
vant to responsible business conduct. These judgments allowed to identify
which among these values which were very important, moderately impor-
tant, or not very important to each given participant. A computer program
could then immediately generate fund descriptions whose values were more
or less similar to that of the participant. In Phase 2, participants rated the
trustworthiness of these funds.
As for Experiment 1 the materials used in Phase 1 were randomly selected
and adapted from the OECD Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct:
Respect of workers rights; Respect of environmental concerns; Conformity to
national and international laws; Transparency of the selected companies; Strug-
gle for competitiveness and against price arrangements; supply chain responsi-
bility. For each item, participants were asked ”According to you, how impor-
tant is the following statement for business ethics?” They responded on a
10-point scale anchored at Not at all and Completely. There were six target
values in Phase 1, introduced in a random order among a set of filler items.
To improve the accuracy of measurement, every question appeared twice
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during Phase 1. The average of the two responses yielded the subjective
importance of each target value, for a given participant.
From these ratings, each value was assigned a tier of importance for each
participant. A given participants’ Tier 1 personal values consisted of the two
values that she rated as the most important. Tier 2 personal values consisted
of the two values that came next in terms of importance, and Tier 3 consisted
of the two values that the participant rated as the least important.
In Phase 2 of the experiment, participants rated the trustworthiness of vari-
ous investment funds. The funds were either labeled as conventional or ethi-
cal, and their similarity with the participant’s personal values was either low,
moderate, or high. I use the designation ethical fund because of its historical
importance (Schueth, 2003) and because it is still widely used (Sandberg et
al., 2008). Here is one possible example of a fund description:
The fund is an ethical fund and is run by a manager from London.
She made the fund profitable for the last eight years and made it best
in class. Recently the fund was evaluated by an ethical fund rating
agency and received excellent grades with respect to workers’ rights
and supply chain responsibility.
The label of the fund was manipulated by using either the word ”ethical”
or ”conventional” in the first sentence of the description. The similarity in
value between the fund and the participant was manipulated by changing
the two aspects that the fund received excellent grades for: These were ei-
ther the participant’s Tier 1 personal values (high similarity), or her Tier 2
personal values (moderate similarity), or her Tier 3 personal values (low sim-
ilarity). Each fund description appeared twice during the experiment, with
a manager of a dierent gender. The target funds appeared in random or-
der among filler funds. Aer each fund description participants answered
the question ”To what degree do you trust this fund?” on a 10-point scale
anchored at Not at all and Completely.
4.3.5.2 Manipulation check
In order to validate the manipulation of value similarity, I randomly selected
the Phase 1 responses of five participants to the main experiment, together
with the Phase 2 funds that were constructed for these participants in the
low, moderate, and high similarity conditions. I then recruited 49 additional
participants (24 women, mean age = 34) who considered the Phase 1 re-
sponses and the Phase 2 funds, and judged the similarity in values between
Phase 1 responses and Phase 2 funds, on a 10-point scale anchored at Not at
all similar and Completely similar. Again, the manipulation had the intended
eect, F(2, 48) = 15.22, p < .001, η2 = .24.
4.3 effects of value similarity on trust 41
4.3.5.3 Results
Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics for Phase 1 of the experiment. In ad-
dition to the average and standard deviations of the perceived importance
of each responsible business value, Table 4.2 indicates the percentage of par-
ticipants for whom this value was in Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3. Even though
individual rankings varied substantially (which is important for the manip-
ulation), there was some degree of homogeneity in the Phase 1 judgments:
Concerns for workers’ rights and protection of the environment were of-
ten ranked as most important, whereas competitiveness and supply chain
responsibility were oen ranked as least important.
Value Average importance SD Tier 1 (%) Tier 2 (%) Tier 3 (%)
Workers’ rights 9.6 0.5 88 10 02
Environment 9.3 1.7 86 08 06
Conformity to laws 8.8 1.1 19 75 06
Transparency 8.2 1.5 02 86 12
Competitiveness 6.2 2.5 04 16 80
Supply chain 5.9 2.8 00 06 94
Table 4.2: Experiment 2: Participants’ ratings of responsible business conduct val-
ues.
Figure 4.3 displays the trustworthiness ratings that participants gave in
Phase 2 of the experiment, as a function of whether the fund was labeled
ethical or conventional, and as a function of the similarity between the par-
ticipant’s personal values and the values of the fund. Figure 4.3 suggests
that value similarity played an important role in judgments of trustworthi-
ness, whereas the label of the fund did not. Funds whose moral strengths
were values highly similar to that of the participant were rated as trustwor-
thy, whereas funds whose values were not shared by the participants were
rated as untrustworthy. Merely labeling a fund as “ethical”, in contrast, did
not appear to aect its trustworthiness.
These visual impressions are confirmed by a 3 × 2 analysis of variance,
where trustworthiness was entered as the dependent variable, and where
similarity in values (high, moderate, low) and fund label (ethical, conven-
tional) were entered as repeated-measure predictors. As could be expected
from Figure 4.3, this analysis detected a main eect of the similarity in val-
ues, F(2, 50) = 71, p < .001, η2 = .58, and no other significant eect.1
1 I also conducted an analysis of variance that included the gender of the fund manager as
an additional predictor, coded as being either the same gender as that of the participant, or
the opposite gender. This analysis detected a main eect of similarity in values, but also an
interaction between the similarity in values and whether the fund manager was the same
or opposite gender as the participant, F(2, 50) = 4.1, p < .02, η2 = .08. This interaction
appeared to reflect a rather specific eect: When values were moderately similar (and only
in that case), participants appeared to trust the opposite gender more. Because this eect is
weak and not predicted, I will not speculate further about its interpretation.
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Figure 4.3: Experiment 2: Trustworthiness of conventional and ethical investment
funds as a function of similarity in values.
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It would thus appear that merely labeling a fund as “ethical” is not sui-
cient to increase its trustworthiness: Specific information is needed about
which moral values the fund is known for. Furthermore, not all moral values
increase trustworthiness by the same amount. Moral values shared by the
person assessing trustworthiness have the greatest impact.
Experiment 3 was designed to consolidate the comparison of the eect of
similarity in values to that of past financial performance, but also to address
a potential methodological concern with the protocol I have used in Exper-
iments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1 and 2 participants judged the importance
of various moral values first, and then judged the trustworthiness of invest-
ment funds with profiles including information about moral values. While
this method allowed to precisely tailor the fund descriptions to the values
expressed by each individual participant, one concern is that it might prime
participants to base their trustworthiness ratings on the moral information.
As a consequence, this method might lead to an overestimation of the im-
pact of similarity in values. Experiment 3 allays this concern by first asking
for trustworthiness ratings, and only then measuring similarity in values.
4.3.6 Experiment 3
4.3.6.1 Method
A total of 115 participants (36 women and 79 men, mean age = 30, SD = 10)
were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing mar-
ketplace. Participants received 10 ¢ for each completed questionnaire.
In the first phase of the experiment, participants rated the trustworthiness
of various funds, which were described so as to manipulate their past fi-
nancial performance, as well as their moral values. In the Phase 2 of the
experiment, the similarity in values between funds and participants was
measured by means of a standardized scale.
The fund descriptions used in the first phase were constructed according
to a 2 × 3 within-participant design, manipulating the past financial per-
formance of the fund (profitable for 6 of the last 10 years, or profitable for
9 of the past ten years), and the expected value similarity (low, moderate,
high). The values of the funds in the low (resp., moderate, high) similarity
condition were that which most commonly belonged to Tier 3 (resp., Tier 2,
Tier 1) in Experiment 2. For example, the fund with poor past financial per-
formance and low expected similarity in values was described in this way:
According to EcoReport, the fund only selects companies that act in a
competitive manner and have responsible supply chain politics. The
fund was profitable for 6 out of the last the ten years.
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Following each fund description participants answered the question ”To
what degree do you trust this fund?” on a 10-point scale anchored at Not at
all and Completely.
In the second phase of the experiment, participants reviewed again each of
the funds presented in the first phase, and completed for each of them a
6-item scale measuring similarity in values (Earle & Cvetkovich, 1999). This
scale involved a series of judgments on 7-point scales about the fund, re-
spectively anchored at shares my values and has dierent values; in line with
me and in the wrong direction; same goals as me and dierent goals; supports
my views and opposes my views; acts as I would and acts against me; thinks
like me and thinks unlike me. A composite score of similarity in values could
then be computed for each fund, for each participant. This composite score
was the average of the reverse-coded responses to the 6 items (so that a
high score would correspond to a high similarity in value).
4.3.6.2 Results
The manipulation of the similarity in values was a success, as shown by
the ratings provided in the second phase of the experiment. Funds in the
low similarity conditions scored an average of 4.4 (SD = 1.4), funds in the
moderate similarity condition scored an average of 4.7 (SD = 1.4), and funds
in the high similarity condition scored an average of 4.9 (SD = 1.5). Paired
sample t-tests revealed that the dierence between the low and moderate
conditions was significant (t(114) = 2.6,p = .01), as well as the dier-
ence between the moderate and high condition (t(114) = 2.1,p < .05). As
shown in Figure 4.4, trust increased with value similarity for all three sets
of values.
4.3.6.3 Mediation Analysis
To test whether the eect of the experimental manipulation was indirect, i.e.
mediated through value similarity, I tested the mediation model. I followed
the procedure described by Preacher and Hayes (2004) which was imple-
mented using their SPSS macro. This macro estimates the path coeicients
in a mediation model and generates bootstrap confidence intervals for total
and specific indirect eects of X on Y through the mediator. This analysis
is appropriate for use with a multicategorical independent variable (exper-
imental manipulation) and a mediator variable (value similarity ratings). I
created a sequential code variables to reflect the levels of the categorical
independent variable which were rank-ordered (1 = low similarity and poor
performance, 2 = low similarity and good performance; 3 = moderate simi-
larity and poor performance, 4 = moderate similarity and good performance,
5 = high similarity and poor performance, 6 = high similarity and good per-
formance).
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Figure 4.4: Experiment 3: Trust in a fund increases as a function of similarity in
values, for all three sets of values used in the experiment.
I hypothesized that perceived value similarity is the mediator of the experi-
mental manipulation - trustworthiness relation. Therefore, I used a nonpara-
metric re-sampling method (bootstrap) with 5,000 re-samples to derive the
95% confidence interval for the indirect eect of the manipulation via the
hypothesized mediator (perceived value similarity) to trust.
The relationship between the manipulation and trust in the funds was fully
mediated by value similarity scores. First, the standardized regression co-
eicient between experimental manipulation and trust decreased substan-
tially when controlling for value similarity. Second, the other conditions of
mediation were also met: Experimental manipulation was a significant pre-
dictor of trust and of value similarity, and value similarity was a significant
predictor of trust while controlling for experimental manipulation. The true
indirect eect was estimated to lie between 0.01 and 0.036. Because zero
is not in the 95% confidence interval, I can conclude that the indirect eect
is significantly dierent from zero at p < 0.05, and thus perceived value
similarity mediates the relation between the manipulation and trust.
4.3.7 Discussion
In Section 3.1 I have argued that, following CSR theories, increasing peoples
trust is part of companies social responsibility (cf. Section 9.1). I have further
argued that in the case of investment funds the ESG criteria, if used appro-
priately, could be an eective tool for levering trust. I then experimentally
tested for the eect of SRIs practices on young adults’ trust in mutual funds.
The prediction was that participants’ perception of the similarity between
their own personal values and that of a fund would be key to increased trust-
worthiness. I manipulated similarity in values in three experiments, using
three dierent protocols. In these experiments, I also compared the eect of
value similarity to the eect of social labeling and past performance. In all
experiments, funds whose values were similar to the personal values of the
participants were trusted more.
Funds with a beer performance record were sometimes judged more trust-
worthy. In Experiment 1, financial performance interacted with value simi-
larity in a way that funds with poor performance were trusted significantly
less when no moral information was available but reached the same trust
levels when they promoted values similar to the personal values of partici-
pants. The good performers lost even more trust when they had dissimilar
values. Experiment 3, however, did not confirm this interaction but revealed
an overall eect of performance on trust ratings. Nevertheless, funds with
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large value similarity and poor performance reached the same trust levels
as funds with low similarity and good performance.
The results suggest that people prefer to trust mutual funds with moral
values similar to their own personal values. This can be of value to finan-
cial institutions who seek to increase the social support (cf. organizational
principle in Section 9.1.1). As compared to funds that were not rated, funds
rated by a social responsibility rating agency were trusted significantly more
when the ratings directly reflected a participants’ personal business ethics
values. However if the social responsibility ratings were dissimilar to a par-
ticipants personal values, funds were perceived to be even less trustworthy
than those who had not received any ratings.
Gärling, Kirchler, Lewis, and Raaij (2010) asked how change towards a more
responsible investment fund landscape can be promoted, and suggested
strategic organizational interventions. The studies show that value similar-
ity should also play a central role if the goal of such interventions is to reach
out to individual people. ESG criteria are consensual values for profession-
als, but oen ambiguous and diicult to grasp for people. Governance, for
example, is a concept that most economists would relate to processes that
support consistent management and cohesive policies for the financial well-
being of a company, rather than with moral values. People are unlikely to
recognize this concern as a moral one.
The results suggest practical implications for fund promoters who are will-
ing to follow the individual principle of CSP (cf. Section 9.1.1). First, trusting
people are significantly more likely to invest, and if they do so, they invest
a larger share of their wealth; conversely, less trusting people are less likely
to invest, and if they so, they invest a smaller share of their wealth (Guiso,
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). The studies identified similarity of values to be
the key contributor to the formation of trust in SRI. Consequently, invest-
ment funds can acquire an edge by communicating on the specific personal
values of targeted clients.
Additionally, the results suggest that funds can compensate a bad finan-
cial performance by communicating on value similarity. While good finan-
cial performance increased trustworthiness to some extent in the studies,
value similarity was able to compensate poor past financial performance.
This finding concurs with data on the extra-financial utility of SRI (Hoepner
& David McMillan, 2009; Bollen, 2007). For example, semi-structured inter-
views of people invested in SRI identified their tendency to accept aggres-
sive return trade os in exchange for compliance wit moral values if a core
capital stays untouched (MacKenzie & Lewis, 1999). A survey study across
five countries also showed that the decision to invest in SRI mutual funds
may be driven more by aitudes towards social issues than by financial re-
turns (Williams, 2007). Increased trust may play a role in this extraction of
non-financial utility from moral aspects of investments.
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Lastly, the results suggest that merely describing a fund as ethical does not
make a significant dierence to its trustworthiness. This suggests that com-
municating on value similarity is a far beer choice than simply using a
social label. Because the focus was on young adults, the results are of par-
ticular interest for companies adopting a long term perspective. Fostering
trust in a financial institution within the generation to come will take time
but pay out in the long run (O’Neill, 2002). The study provides to the tool-
box available to SRI professionals engaged in this process by providing a
conceptual framework for the identification and implementation of individ-
ually relevant (personal) moral values within the SRI movement.
4.4 retail bankers’ recommendations: a preliminary investiga-
tion
4.4.1 Introduction
SRI has been successful in recent years. In France SRI assets rose frome21.8
billion in 2007 toe68.3 billion in 2010 (Blanc et al., 2010), and figures are sim-
ilar across the old continent (de Marcillac, 2008). Sparkes and Cowton (2004)
speak of a maturation of SRI becoming a classic investment management
(mainstream) more accessible to the general public. Crifo and Mois (2011)
analysed the behaviour of French SRI analyst teams and conclude that there
is an ongoing convergence between traditional management and SRI.
A closer look shows that the SRI movement is still dominated by institu-
tional investors: They account for 70 % of SRI in France and 94 % in Europe
(Blanc et al., 2010). However, individual investors ask for extra financial in-
formation (Hummels & Timmer, 2004), and consumer studies show a great
araction towards “green” products (Roberts, 1996; Griskevicius, Tybur, &
Van den Bergh, 2010), and fair trade (Loureiro & Lotade, 2005).
Here, I study an important element in deciding to invest in SRI: The retail
advisor recommendations. On the one hand, advisers can send signals to
investors about the aractiveness of dierent products (Crawford & Sobel,
1982) or simplify the decision by explaining the main advantages and dis-
advantages of the funds (Pouget, 2007). On the other, people follow experts
to make beer decisions (Harvey & Fischer, 1997), have a good conscience,
and psychological insurance (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995), but also to shrink
their own responsibility (Harvey & Fischer, 1997).
In addition, two factors present in situations of investment choices favour
the implementation of expert recommendations: The complexity of the sit-
uation and the lack of initial opinion. Indeed, people tend to choose de-
fault options in complex situations (Kahneman, 2003; Slovic, Zionts, Woods,
Goodman, & Jinks, 2011). Accordingly, the inclusion of new non-financial cri-
teria in the investing decision increases the complexity of the task and the
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tendency to follow a recommendation. Also, lack of initial opinion favours
the adoption of advice (Cain, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2005). It seems implau-
sible that individual investors have a clear view of the investment choices
before talking to his retailer.
In the following I investigate variables that influence recommendations of
SRI funds by financial counsellors: (a) the characteristics of the fund; (b) the
personal beliefs and values of the client counsellors; and (c) the personal
values of his clients.
(a) The first potential variable is the characteristics of SRI funds. Rating
seems the most important extra-financial characteristic advisers consider.
Just like credit ratings, agencies oer ratings of extra-financial fund perfor-
mance (Beer, Zenker, & Fernandes, 2006; Koellner, Weber, Fenchel, & Scholz,
2005). These ratings are commonly established on ESG values. Examples of
criteria for environmental performance are the eorts to reduce pollution
and conserve biodiversity investment fund. Examples of criteria for social
performance are eorts wage gap or the rights of workers in companies held
by the fund. Examples of criteria for governance performance are eorts in
the fight against corruption, and economic transparency for companies in
which the fund invests.
Nevertheless, one cannot consider extra-financial performance (ESG rating)
without reference to financial performance. One needs to compare the eect
of changes in extra-financial ratings to changes in the financial performance
of the funds. In the experiments the MSCI Europe Index indicates financial
performance.
Another feature of the fund which may influence recommendations are
independent labels that certify the authenticity of the ethical approach
(Hobeika, 2011). Consumer research has shown that labels increase choices
of fair trade coee (Loureiro & Lotade, 2005) and organic food (Sirieix, De-
lanchy, Remaud, Zepeda, & Gurviez, 2012). Nevertheless, the structuring
role of labels in the context of the French SRI is yet to come Hobeika, Pon-
ssard, and Poret (2013) and labels did not increase trustworthiness in our
previous study. In France NOVETHIC (Novethic, 2013) dominates the mar-
ket and serves as a label in the experiment study.
(b) The second variable that can influence the adviser are his personal be-
liefs and values. Schrader (2006) conducted a “mystery shoppers” study on
recommendations of SRI funds in Germany. He finds that advisers take a
passive role and have low knowledge of SRI funds. In conclusion, the study
advises banks to include an evaluation of self-interest, and the willingness
to take into account customers social and environmental needs, in their re-
cruitment process.
The belief in the financial performance of SRI funds may also be impor-
tant. Remember that advisers have a fiduciary duty towards their clients 2.
2 (Siegl, 2011) oers a legal framework of SRI funds and fiduciary duty.
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Accordingly, if they believe extra-financial criteria impeded financial perfor-
mance, fiduciary duty may compel them to retract from SRI. So far, evidence
of relative SRI performance is sample specific, and diicult to generalize
(Bauer et al., 2007).
Advisers personal ESG values can also influence recommendations. The con-
cept that revolves around the similarity of values between two parties mo-
bilised in Section 3.1 did influence trustworthiness 3. Since values similarity
also has positive eects on investment (Olsen, 2008), risk-taking, and trust
(Siegrist et al., 2000), we predict that higher value similarity between advis-
ers and investment fund, increases recommendations.
(c) The third variable influencing advisers recommendations are the values
of customers. Professional counselling manuals, emphasize that it is essen-
tial to pay aention to the request (Spielberger, 2004). We predict that bank
advisers are no exception, and fit recommendations to clients needs. That is
to say they are more likely to recommend a green fund to a customer who
expressed environmental values.
In addition, we assume that this individual tailoring can introduce a cogni-
tive bias. It is likely that the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer,
2002) can lead to a system based on an intuitive decision at the expense
of a considered judgement council. The recognition heuristic is a cognitive
process by which an individual makes inferences about paerns of missing
knowledge. That is, people make decisions on the basis of the recognition
of one single criterion. Advisers, recognizing the similarity between values
of a client and values promoted by a fund may abort a deliberate process of
reflection on the recommendation.
In summary, the experiments test variables influencing the recommenda-
tion of SRI funds by retail bank advisers. Potential predictor variables of
recommendations are: the characteristics of funds (financial performance,
label, ESG performance), the personal beliefs, and values of customers, and
advisers.
37 retail advisers of two French banks (aged 36 years, 23 women and 14 men),
participated in two online experiments. All participants except one had a
higher education degree. We excluded 22 other participants from analysis
because they stopped before the end of the study (82 % stopped aer less
than 2 minutes). Senior managers, and a chance to win e500, encouraged
advisers to participate.
3 The name give to similar concepts dier in academic literature: salient values (Siegrist et al.,
2000) similarity preferences (S. T. Fiske et al., 2002) and congruence of values (Enz, 1988)
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4.4.2 Experiment 4
4.4.2.1 Methods
Participants indicated their propensity to recommend funds aer reading
short fund descriptions. Each description included information on the funds
financial performance (five years vs. one year), ethical label (presence vs. ab-
sence), and extra financial ESG ratings from an independent agency. The
agency gave individual ratings ranging from poor, 1 to very good, 10 about
the environmental, social, and governance performance of each fund. Before
the judgements, participants read illustrations of all ESG to assure proper
understanding.
We also controlled for classical fund aributes. Participants read that all
funds invest in stocks of the MSCI Europe Index that all funds have a risk
equal to the index, and that there was no internal incentive to favour one
fund. Regarding ESG ratings, participants read that the average score for
MSCI companies was 5.
Table 4.3 shows a typical fund description. Aer each description partici-
pants answered to the question “Would you advise your clients to invest in
this fund?”. Participants responded on a 7 point Likert scale with a le hand
to anchor of “1 Not at all” and right hand anchor of “7 Absolutely”.
“Europe Actions”
5 year performance Inferior to MSCI
1 year performance Identical to MSCI
Environment/Social/Governance rating 7/7/7
ESG Label No
Table 4.3: Example of a fund description used in Experiment 1
Each adviser judged 20 funds in random order. We manipulated financial
performance, ESG ratings, and labelESG. The financial performance was low
(inferior to MSCI in 1 year and identical in 5 years), average (identical to
MSCI in 1 year and 5 years), or high (identical to MSCI in 1 year and supe-
rior in 5 years). ESG ratings were average (Environment: 5; Social: 5; Gov-
ernance: 5), positive (Environment: 7; Social: 7; Governance: 7), positive for
environment (Environment: 9; Social: 4; governance: 4), positive for social
(environment: 4; social: 9; governance: 4), or positive for governance (Envi-
ronment: 4; social: 4; governance: 9). Label was dichotomous.
To alleviate the study we retained only a subset of the 30 funds resulting
from an orthogonal combination of all three factors. Table 4.4 shows the 20
funds used in the experiment.
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Fund nbr. Financial performance ESG rating ESG Label
1 Low performance 555 No Label
2 Low performance 777 Label
3 Low performance 777 No Label
4 Low performance 944 Label
5 Low performance 944 No Label
6 Low performance 494 Label
7 Low performance 494 No Label
8 Low performance 449 Label
9 Low performance 449 No Label
10 Average performance 555 No Label
11 Average performance 777 Label
12 Average performance 777 No Label
13 Average performance 944 Label
14 Average performance 944 No Label
15 Average performance 494 Label
16 Average performance 494 No Label
17 Average performance 449 Label
18 Average performance 449 No Label
19 High performance 555 No Label
20 High performance 777 Label
Table 4.4: Subset of funds displayed to advisers.
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Figure 4.5: Propensity to recommend a fund as a function of label, financial perfor-
mance, and ESG rating.
4.4.2.2 Individual fund comparisons
Visual inspection of Figure 4.5 shows that all three variables (Performance,
ESG rating, and Label) influence advisers recommendations. Note that ad-
visers prefer funds with all ESG ratings above average. All else being equal,
beer performance increases recommendations. Finally, the presence of a
SRI label also increases the propensity to recommend a fund. Statistical
comparison of recommendation means (see Table 4.5) confirm the visual
impressions.
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4.4.2.3 Beliefs about the financial performance of SRI funds
To test whether the belief in higher SRI performance (short and long term)
influences recommendations we asked: “What do you think of the finan-
cial performance of SRI funds compared to conventional funds” for an in-
vestment horizon of 1 and 10 years?. Advisers responded on a 5-point scale
with a le hand anchor of “Lower performance” and a right hand anchor of
“Higher performance”.
Overall, advisers believe that in one year SRI is less profitable as compared
to conventional funds (M = 2.2, SD = 1.7). Nevertheless, in a ten year horizon
they think performance is the same (M = 2.8 SD = 1.3 10 years). Further, the
relative performance is higher then for one year t (54) = 5.43, p <.001.
To test if belief in a higher SRI long term performance increases recommen-
dations of SRI funds we regressed recommendations on the interaction term
between belief in 10 year performance and ESG ratings. For this analysis we
coded three ESG rating dummy variables: high, mean and low ESG. The high
ESG dummy was 21 for funds with ESG ratings of 777, or else 0. The mean
ESG dummy variable was 17 for funds with ESG ratings of 944, 494, and 449,
or else 0. The low ESG dummy was 15 for funds with ESG ratings of 555, or
else 0.
To exclude non significant predictors we introduced the model 4.1 in a step-
wise backwards regression. Table 4.6 shows the results. As predicted, a sig-
nificant interaction between high ESG ratings and long-term performance
indicates that funds with high ESG ratings were more recommended when
an adviser believed in higher 10 year performance of SRI funds.
Recommendation =β0 +β1 ∗ highESG+
β2 ∗meanESG+
β3 ∗ lowESG+
β4 ∗ Performance10+
β5 ∗ highESG ∗ Performance10+
β6 ∗meanESG ∗ Performance10+
β7 ∗ lowESG ∗ Performance10+
β8 ∗Age+β9 ∗Gender
(4.1)
4.4.2.4 Similarity of personal values
To see if advisers who have strong concerns for specific values overly recom-
mend thematic funds that promote these values we took two measures of
personal ESG values.
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Coeicient SD t stat Pr(>|t|)
(Constante) 3.0108 0.2579 11.67 0.0000
high ESG 0.0136 0.0140 0.97 0.3315
Belief in 10 year performance 0.5576 0.0502 11.11 0.0000
Age -0.0264 0.0055 -4.78 0.0000
Gender -0.4623 0.0973 -4.75 0.0000
HighESG:Belief in 10 year performance 0.0097 0.0047 2.07 0.0386
Table 4.6: Results of backwards stepwise regression (4.1).
The first measure of advisers personal ESG values was a pairwise compar-
ison. Advisers imagined working for an insurance broker and should arbi-
trate between two identical financial credits oered by two banks. The only
dierence was that there were scandals about negative behaviours related
to the environment, social issues, or governance issues in both banks. Arbi-
trage situations opposed scandals related to all ESG values. There were two
negative behaviours for each ESG values.
The second measure is a ranking of ESG values. Participants were asked
to rank environment (pollution reduction, biodiversity conversation), social
(wage gap, labor rights) and governance (fight against corruption, economic
transparency) issues in order of importance. The question also included filler
items.
Average ESG values of both measures are displayed in Table 4.7.
Environment Social Governance
Pairwise 3.7 5.1 3.1
Rang 5.9 6.2 5.4
Table 4.7: Retail advisers endorsements of ESG values measured by Ranking and
Pairwise comparisons.
To test for a bias of personal values we regressed the advisers recommen-
dations on the interaction term between personal ESG values and ESG
ratings of the funds (Model 4.2). The results (see Table 4.8) confirm that
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advisers recommend funds that promote their personal ESG values more
(R2 = .06, F = 12.88) 4.
Recommendation =β0 +β1 ∗ Environment+
β2 ∗ Social+
β3 ∗Governance+
β4 ∗Age
(4.2)
Coeicient SD t stat Pr(>|t|)
(Constante) -0.5913 0.3666 -1.61 0.1071
E advisor * E funds 0.0289 0.0048 6.07 0.0000
S advisor * S funds 0.0124 0.0044 2.82 0.0050
G advisor * G funds 0.0217 0.0047 4.59 0.0000
Age -0.0232 0.0061 -3.79 0.0002
Table 4.8: Significant interaction terms for model 4.2. Similarity in values between
personal values and values promoted by investment funds increases rec-
ommendations.
In summary, funds with a holistic approach on ESG integration are the most
recommended. Further, the influence of ESG ratings is greater if they ac-
companied by an independent label. Beliefs in long-term SRI performance,
and the similarity in values between fund and advisers, both increase rec-
ommendations but to a lesser extent. Another hypothesis is that advisers
are more alert to the values of their clients in counselling situations. Expe-
rience 2 tests this hypothesis.
4.4.3 Experiment 5
4.4.3.1 Methods
In Experiment 5, advisers faced a familiar situation: They were to give ad-
vice to investors who inherited a small sum of money (e10,000). All advisers
read about fictitious investors in random order. We used customer records
format to describe investors and kept usual information (Amount of savings,
savings capacity, risk profile, investment horizon) constant. In addition to
this information customers had concerns about environmental, or social, or
governance issues, or had a long term investment horizon. In a control con-
dition this information was missing.
4 A backwards stepwise regression of recommendations on all variables used in Experiment 1
confirms the eect of belief in a good long-term performance of SRI funds (β = 0.010993, p
<.01) and reveals an interaction between the E values of the fund and E values of advisers
(β = 0.009650, p <.01)
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Figure 4.6: Propensity to recommend SRI funds to clients with specific ESG con-
cerns. Advisers recommend the funds with an ESG rating of 777 to all
clients. Propensity to recommend the fund without ESG rating and the
“Solidarité” fund is low. Advisers target recommendations of funds that
promote one dimension of ESG while neglecting the others (944, 494,
449) towards clients with the value in question.
Advisers indicated their willingness to recommend each of six funds for
all five clients. Before, advisers read that prior screening had filtered those
funds with equal performance, risk and a similar investment universe. They
diered only in their non-financial investment strategy. The fund ESG strat-
egy was either environment themed (ESG ratings 9/4/4), social themed (ESG
ratings 4/9/4), governance themed (4/4 / 9), using a holistic (ESG 7/7/7),
or conventional (-/-/-) approach. At the demand of our partners we also
included a “SolidaritÃ©” fund in the design. This is a particularity of the
French market that builds on the concept of solidarity between people.
Aer each description participants answered to the question “Would you
advise this client to invest in this fund?”. Participants responded on a 7 point
Likert scale with a le hand to anchor of “1 Not at all” and right hand anchor
of “7 Absolutely”.
4.4.3.2 Results
Figure 4.6 displays the results of Experiment 5. They confirm that advisers
prefer a holistic ESG approach: Propensity to recommend a fund that has a
rating of seven in all ESG values is always greater than average. In addition,
recommendations of this fund are equally high across investors, even for
long-term, and control clients.
Recommendations of the three themed funds show that advisers match cus-
tomer vales and fund theme. For example, they recommend a fund with the
notation E: 9, S: 4, G: 4 to a customer who expressed a preference for the
environment. Propensity to recommend funds that match clients values is
as high as recommendations of the holistic funds.
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Funds without ESG rating (Panel “Without ESG” in Figure 4.6) and the “ Sol-
idarity” fund (Panel “ Solidarity” in Figure 4.6) are the least recommended.
However, advisers recommend the “ Solidarity” fund to investors worried
about social issues. This is probably due to the similarity of the “ solidarity”
concept with themes of social issues. Recommendations of funds with no
ESG rating to each customer type are the same as recommendations made
to the control client.
A repeated measures analysis of variance Client Type (5) ∗ Funds type (6)
confirms the visual impressions. There was a significant interaction between
the two factors, F (20.1050) = 2.41, p <.01. For clarity we omit the table Post-
hoc comparisons (Tukey HSD) due to the large number of comparisons 5.
4.4.4 Discussion
The objective of this study was to inquire variables aecting the recommen-
dations of SRI funds by retail advisers. In two experiments, we tested factors
related to the characteristics of investment funds, personal beliefs about SRI,
personal values of advisers, and personal vales of customers.
Experiment 1 tested two hypotheses. The first was that characteristics of SRI
funds influence investment advice. Precisely, it confirmed that beer finan-
cial performance, beer extra-financial performance, and presence of a label
favour recommendations. As we can see in Figure 4.5, all else being equal
recommendations of funds with superior performance are higher. However,
a holistic ESG approach is always recommended, even when performance
is poor. If an independent label lends a stamp of credence to a holistic fund
recommendations for funds with a financial performance identical to the
benchmark are even beyond recommendations of funds with superior per-
formance with no label 6.
The second prediction was that advisers personal beliefs and values influ-
ence investment advice. We tested this hypothesis in two steps. First, we
predict the recommendations of SRI funds with beliefs about long-term fi-
nancial performance of SRI funds, then with the similarity between values
put forward by the funds and advisers personal values.
While advisers believe that SRI funds underperform conventional invest-
ments in the short run they also believe that performance over a period
of ten years is the same. Results also show that the more advisers believe
in a long-term performance more they will tend to recommend funds that
have received good ESG ratings: Interaction between ESG values and ten
year financial performance.
5 The results are available upon request by writing to marcoheimann@gmail.com
6 We did not find an eect of labels on perceived trustworthiness of investment funds in Ex-
periment 2 of Section 3.1. Two possible reasons are the dierent dependent variable, trust
vs. recommendation, and the dierent populations.
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Results further show that advisers personal values influence advice. The
more an advisor adheres to a particular ESG value the greater the tempta-
tion to recommend a funds with a high rating of this value. This influence
is the largest value for environmental values. It is important to emphasize
that this is the magnitude of the interaction eect and not the importance
of each value in our sample. Further, all variables explain only a small part
of the variance, and future research should consolidate the findings.
An alternative hypothesis is that the eect of personality factors is more
global. A recurring feature of personality in pro-social behaviour is altruism
(Bereczkei, Birkas, & Kerekes, 2007; Griskevicius et al., 2010). Its definition
is the acceptance of a financial cost in the pursuit of a moral action. In an
exploratory posture, we proposed advisers to donate some of their potential
gains (e500) to a non-governmental organization (NGO). Participants were
free of the amount to (e0 to e500) and the distribution amongst six NGOs.
Participants who had given more to NGOs were more inclined to recom-
mend SRI funds in our study. For the moment this is an exploratory results
on the role of altruism in the SRI, but has the merits extension in further
research.
Experiment 5 tested the hypothesis that advisers seek to overly match cus-
tomer values with ESG ratings of funds. One could speculate that the recog-
nition of a similarity between the values expressed by a client and those of
SRI thematic funds triggers an intuitive advice at the expense of a deliberate
advice.
The results on themed funds favour of the speculation about the existence
of a recognition heuristic resulting in an intuitive advice. This is dangerous
because it is likely that investors who expressed concerns about one value
may also think that the others are important. Those customers may even be
more concerned with the other values then the average investor. A person
expressing concerns about the environment may also be highly concerned
about social issues 7. Recommending her a fund with the highest perfor-
mance in environment may be a good intuition. However considering the
bad performance in social, and governance recommending this fund to the
same extent as a fund with globally good ESG ratings is inadequate.
It goes without saying that professional can increase performance (finan-
cial and ESG), to lever advisers recommendations. But certification by a
label also increases recommendations. This laer finding has implications
for internal communication policy of banks.
It is possible to embed findings about beliefs and values in the promotion
of SRI by two non-exclusive strategies. Institutions willing to increase the
share of SRI funds in their clients accounts should shi their focus towards
advisers beliefs about SRI. Emphasizing the long-term performance argu-
ment seems to be a promising tool to increase advisers propensity to rec-
7 Correlation between the judgements of ESG values in our sample confirm this intuition.
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ommend SRI funds. Institutions can also make use of the influence advisers
personal values have on SRI fund recommendations. Nevertheless, since per-
sonality traits are more diicult to change over time, assessment of personal
values are most eective if integrated into the advisor recruitment process.
The following Chapter now turns towards the problem of remunerations. I
would like to remind the reader that the perspective of this question is rather
an organizational one. Whereas Chapter 4 aimed at revealing cognitive pro-
cesses of trusting behaviour with the aim to foster trust in mutual funds,
Chapter 5 aims at mapping cognitive drivers of acceptblity judgements with
the ultimate goal of making remunerations more widely acceptable.
Both, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can be embraced by management, the former
with a marketing focus, the laer with a focus on human resources. How-
ever In the case of remunerations, government policy measures seem to be
more closely related. Indeed in the actual situation it seems unthinkable
that governments would rule about the inclusion of extra financial criteria
in investments 8. It is a dierent case for remunerations where salary caps
are already on many agendas.
4.5 investor’s motivations to hold sri mutual funds
To elicit contributions, charities use incentives like wrist bands, thank-you
gis, concerts, or advertised donors lists. In some cases government also pro-
vides tax advantages for donors. Similar incentives exist for ’green’ products,
like hybrid cars, or solar panels. Given the relative absence of incentives for
SRI, the growing number of socially responsible investors is impressive (de
Marcillac, 2008). Here I propose to study the motives of socially responsi-
ble investors. Unlike previous studies who rely on survey, and/or holdings
data (Riedl & Smeets, 2011; Nilsson, 2008; Jansson & Biel, 2009), I use an
investment game with a financial incentive and real world funds.
Measuring pro-social behaviour in SRI is dierent from donations, and con-
sumption goods. Although there can be many reasons for someone to invest
(eg. retirement, children’s education, wealth creation), socially responsible
investors have in common a desire to improve the society. Unlike the donor,
the socially responsible investor joins his pro social objective to an existing
activity: investing. The dierence between SRI and consumer goods is that,
as for any investment, SRI’s objective is to generate returns. As opposed to,
say, someone who buys a coee for the pleasure of drinking it, someone
who buys an SRI fund expects a financial return.
Also pro-social activity (eg. volunteering) can decrease when it is financially
rewarded (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). This is mainly due to people’s concerns
8 Indeed the concept of fiduciary duty legally binds fund managers to invest exclusively with
the goal of financial return. Thought as protection against fraud some young scholars have
recently started to envision a new legal paradigm for SRI (Siegl, 2011)
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about their social image. The reason is that if someone is financially re-
warded for pro-social behaviour, this seeds suspicions about his true motives
with others (Ariely et al., 2009). Since investments are a private aair, this
crowding out of the eect of financial incentives through image concerns is
unlikely to appear in SRI.
4.5.1 Literature Review
It is a recurrent notion that multiple factors influence the decisions of so-
cially responsible investors (Beal, Goyen, & Philips, 2005; Hummels & Tim-
mer, 2004). The underlying theory of this research is that “financial”, “psy-
chological”, “pro-social value”, and “socio-demographic” factors influence
investments in SRI (cf. Figure 4.7).
While scholars have shown that investors also seek information about the
CSR of their investments (Hummels & Timmer, 2004; Hockerts & Moir,
2004), financial aspects strongly influence retail investor’s choices of SRI
(Jansson & Biel, 2009).
To this date, it is uncertain whether there is a dierence between conven-
tional and SRI performance (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Bauer et al., 2007). But
marketers of SRI stress the argument that their investments reduce intangi-
ble risks, for example of new regulations that require costly CO2 filters, or
bad press through a child labour scandal. Nevertheless this advantage, they
say, only plays out in the long run, since regulations may take time to come,
and scandals to unfold. Retail investors may see long term outperformance
as a reason for investments.
H1a: Ceteris paribus, the beer SRI funds are believed to perform in the long
run (as compared to conventional funds), the more money is allocated.
H1b: Ceteris paribus, the less SRI funds are believed to be risky (as compared
to conventional funds), the more money is allocated.
Another aspect of the financial world that is likely to influence investments
is a label. Strictly speaking an SRI label evaluates extra-financial criteria,
however it institutionalizes the quality of an investment’s ESG research and
has significant market structuring power (Hobeika et al., 2013). Further la-
bels increase giving to charity (Kraut, 1973), positive perceptions of fair trade
coee (Loureiro & Lotade, 2005) and sustainable food (Sirieix et al., 2012).
H1c: Ceteris paribus, SRI funds that are certified by an ethical label, are allo-
cated more money.
For some investors certification of ESG research through an independent la-
bel may also be a cue for the eectiveness of the long term outperformance
because it guarantees that the intangible risks are properly assessed. Con-
sequently the eect of a label might be stronger for investors who believe
in the long term outperformance argument.
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H1d: Ceteris paribus, SRI funds that are certified by an ethical label, are allo-
cated more money by investors who believe that SRI have a beer long term
performance.
Factors related to the investors psychology may also influence his decision
to invest. It is worth to notice that in order to study the psychological factors
the SRI it is paramount that investment decision, the assessment of the
psychological trait are made at the same time. The reason is that traits can
change over time and my not be stable. For example, a paern of routine
risk taking will not persist when it is proven unsuccessful. Knowledge of
outcomes, positive and negative reinforcements, will aect adaptations to
changing circumstances (Osborn & Jackson, 1988). An investor who bought
an SRI fund two years ago may have a dierent level of risk propensity today,
yet still appear in holdings data.
A growing body of literature has investigated people’s motives for pro-social
behaviour such as donating to charities and green products (Ariely et al.,
2009). These motives can roughly be devised in three broad categories. In-
trinsic motivation, is the personal value of giving, ie. ones preference for the
well being of others, or pure altruism (Griskevicius et al., 2010; Henrich et
al., 2005; Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2011). Extrinsic motivation,
is any material reward or benefit associated with the behaviour (ie. in SRI
the financial factors). Image motivation, or signalling motivation, refers to an
individual’s tendency to take into consideration how his actions will be per-
ceived by others. Image motivation thus captures the utility someone may
derive from being liked/respected by others, or himself. An individual who
is looking for social approval of his actions would thus conform his actions
with the social norm of acting pro-socially.
H2a: Ceteris paribus, intrinsically altruist investors allocate more money to
SRI funds.
H2b: Ceteris paribus, investors who are concerned with their social image al-
locate more money SRI when their allocations are made public.
I identified four cognitive factors that may influence SRI investments. The
capacity to delay rewards in inter-temporal choice is known to be a deter-
minant of economic decisions (Wimann & Paulus, 2009), with well known
neural rootings, and a developmental component (Eigsti et al., 2006). Eco-
nomic choices that involve an opportunity for near-term reward, are as-
sociated with cortical structures that have consistently been implicated in
impulsive behaviour (eg. addictions) (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Co-
hen, 2004). In parallel, the capacity to inhibit temporal discounting may lead
investors to increase their (long term) SRI allocations.
H2c: Ceteris paribus, investors who inhibit temporal discounting allocate more
money to SRI funds.
Risk propensity is the tendency to take or avoid risk in a specific domain (ie.
investment). A theoretical distinction is made between risk and risk events.
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The first is the probability of a decision outcome in the context of expected-
utility theories (von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, 1947), whereas risk events
mean low probability outcomes (Slovic, 1987). Risk events can imply uncer-
tainty (ie. an explicit quantification of the probability has not been made).
In a risk event such as a loery, the probabilities may be known (although
few buyers of loery tickets are likely to want to know them), whereas in a
risk event such as an investment, there is uncertainty because the probabil-
ities are unknown (but investors would like to know them). Further- more,
economic risk taking mostly pertains to perceived financial risks.
Practically risk-avoiders are more likely to overestimate the likelihood of
losses relative to gains, and consequently require a higher probability of
gains to tolerate exposure (Schneider & Lopes, 1986). Consequently, risk-
avoiders may choose SRI in because they search protection against intangi-
ble risks, whereas risk-seekers could overweight conventional funds.
H2d: Ceteris paribus, the smaller an investor’s risk propensity the more money
she allocates to SRI.
Studying the segmentation of ‘green’ consumers, (Straughan & Roberts,
1999) find that the most important segmentation variable is perceived con-
sumer eectiveness (PCE). PCE relates to the notion that a consumer is
more likely to act pro-socially if she believes that consumer choices will
make an impact on the issue in question. Precisely, PCE in SRI means that
investors are more likely to invest a greater proportion in SRI funds if they
think that their individual investment can help improve the ESG dimen-
sion(s) targeted by the fund. PCE has already been found to influence SRI in
holdings data analysis (Nilsson, 2008), and clustering approaches (Nilsson,
2009).
H2e: Ceteris paribus, the greater an investor’s perceived consumer eective-
ness, the more money she allocates to SRI.
Another belief about SRI is about the complexity of financial and moral as-
pects considered together. When there are two goals, pursuit of financial
return and prosocial impact, investors might be overwhelmed by the abun-
dance of information. This conflict with peoples tendency to limit their ef-
forts to be informed (L. Berg, 2007), and may trigger resignation. Labels
were first introduced by marketers to simplify consumer choices, by sub-
contracting the evaluation to independent labelling organisms. Likewise, in-
vestors who believ that there is an abundance of information in SRI, may
increase their investments when a fund is labelled.
H2f: Ceteris paribus, if an investor thinks that there is an abundance of infor-
mation to consider in SRI, a label will increase the money allocated to SRI.
In general, consumer expertise can have significant eects on consumer de-
cision making (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). Researchers have been concerned
with consumers economical rationality and at the same time with their lack
of awareness of joint responsibility for environment and the society (L. Berg,
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2007). In investing, familiarity with financial products results in increased
investor expertise, but does not guarantee expertise in SRI.
Since dierent tasks require dierent types of expertise, task performance
on a particular task requires specific knowledge. Here we propose to eval-
uate the investment expertise and SRI expertise as task specific. Whereas
investment expertise is primarily concerned with broad knowledge about fi-
nancial products, and market mechanisms, SRI expertise is concerned with
knowledge about SRI practices, and ESG (implementation).
H2g: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s investment expertise influences the money
allocated to SRI.
H2h: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s SRI expertise influences the money allo-
cated to SRI.
One characteristics of novice, as compared to expert reasoning, is that they
tend to simplify complex problems and ignore hidden complexities (Alba &
Hutchinson, 1987). Likewise they are less likely to engage in research, and
are more likely to be influenced by top-of the mind aributes or cues avail-
able immediately at purchase. One immediate cue in SRI is an ethical label
from which novice investors can readily infer SRI and investment quality.
H2i: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s investment expertise influence on the money
allocated to SRI is moderated by an ethical label.
H2j: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s SRI expertise influence on the money allo-
cated to SRI is moderated by an ethical label.
The factors related to investors pro-social values, are very much linked to
value similarity (cf. Section 3.1). As we have seen similarity in values in-
creases perceived trustworthiness, which in turn is a prerequisite for risky
decisions. Simply put, people are more likely to take risk with someone who
has values similar to their own values. In the case of private investors, it is
therefore reasonable to speculate that those who place a higher value on
pro-social aspects are more disposed to invest (take a risk) in SRI.
In SRI the values of the funds are commonly divided into the ESG categories
(cf. Section 3.1). The environment aspect comprises climate change, haz-
ardous waste pollutions, nuclear energy, and sustainability. These dimen-
sions have in common that they are concerned with the preservation of life
and biodiversity on earth. The most representative dimension fo the social
aspects is human rights, but it is also concerned with consumer protection,
working conditions and gender equality. The typical dimensions of corpo-
rate governance are executive compensations (cf. Chapter 5), transparency
in corporate decision making (cf. Chapter 6), and management structure.
Marketing researchers have argued that scepticism towards green claims
from products can lead to a “green backslash” (Crane, 2000). Nilsson (2008)
have suggested that this can also be the case for SRI and showed that trust
in green claims increases SRI behaviour. Since trust increases with value
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similarity the consensus on ESG values comes with a risk. It is possible that
investors place dierent values on each of the ESG issues, and that some
are not similar to their own values. In other words, SRI funds may appeal to
investors for whom the environment is very important, but for those who
care about corporate governance, or social issues, SRI may not be the opti-
mal tool. Therefore each ESG dimension should be evaluated separately.
H3a: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s valuation of environmental issues influ-
ences the amount allocated to SRI.
H3b: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s valuation of social issues influences the
amount allocated to SRI.
H3c: Ceteris paribus, an investor’s valuation of corporate governance issues
influences the amount allocated to SRI.
Finally, a number of socio-demographic variables are included to test
whether, and how demographic factors relate to the extent of SRI invest-
ments. Socio-demographic variables have been widely used within the liter-
ature on financial services. Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) find that
clusters based on variables such as age, and gender are significantly dier-
ent in consumption of financial services. Also, younger households tend to
hold investment portfolios associated with a higher level of risk (Pålsson,
1996).
Those dierences, however, concern general investment behaviour. Socio-
demographic variables in SRI studies are less frequent. Only few have actu-
ally looked at the influence on responsible investments (Mclachlan & Gard-
ner, 2004; Williams, 2007; Nilsson, 2009). To derive viable hypothesis I turn
towards results form general pro-social behaviour.
Socially responsible Consumer have been shown to be younger (e.g. Diaman-
topoulos, Schlegelmilch, Sinkovics, & Bohlen, 2003), female (e.g. Laroche,
Bergeron, & Barbaro-Forleo, 2001; Lee, 2009) and beer educated (Chan,
1999).
H4a: Ceteris paribus, younger investors invest a greater proportion of their
portfolio in SRI profiled funds.
H4b: Ceteris paribus, women invest a greater proportion of their portfolio in
SRI profiled funds.
H4c: Ceteris paribus, beer educated investors invest a greater proportion of
their portfolio in SRI profiled funds.
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Figure 4.7: A model of predicted influential variables on private investors decision
to invest in SRI profiled mutual funds
4.5 investor’s motivations to hold sri mutual funds 67
4.5.2 Experiment 6
4.5.2.1 Sample and data collection
This study investigates the impact of several perception related, and demo-
graphic variables on private investors decision to invest in socially responsi-
ble mutual funds. This said, the population of interest are investors that hold
mutual funds and potentially allocate some of their wealth to an SRI fund.
Additionally, it is interesting to explore dierences between investors who
already hold socially responsible funds and those who don’t. Consequently
we generated our sample from an existing customer base from a European
mutual fund provider that oers both, SRI and conventional investments.
The advantage is that those customers can easily choose between two types
of funds that have a similar investment universe and technique, except that
one adds ESG analysis to the investment decision process.
The data was collected in France. The mutual fund providers local branch
invited 1305 investors holding at least one SRI investment, and 4367 conven-
tional investors to participate in an online investment game with a chance
to win e5.000 followed by some questions. Aer sorting out unusable ques-
tionnaires, including those with missing cases a total of 196 remained, rep-
resenting a response rate of 4.5%. One reason for this comparably low rate 9
could be that the questions on personality, and values may seem incongru-
ous in the investment context.
4.5.2.2 Sample characteristics
The sample consisted of more women (52%) then man, ad the average age
was 51 years (SD: 13.6). Although a high average age was expected, the large
dispersion around the mean was somewhat surprising. The sample was well
educated as 71% of participant held a higher education degree. The median
net wealth of participants is between e250.000 and e300.000.
4.5.2.3 The investment game
Aer a few introductory sentences and disclosure about anonymity, in-
vestors read about the investment game. In order to have a chance to win
e5.000 invested in the mutual fund they choose during the game, investors
needed to answer all questions. One main concern was that investors could
receive the funds they choose in the experimental game credited to their
account. Therefore, investors had to indicate the percentage of the e5.000
they wanted to allocate to each fund next to summary descriptions of exist-
ing funds they also could have purchased at their own initiative. There were
links to the summary prospectus at the mutual fund providers homepage.
9 Comparable studies report response rates of ≈ 20% (Nilsson, 2008)
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Table 4.9 is an example of the allocation investors had to make during the
game. The instruction read “Please write in the case next to each fund the %
you would like to invest”.
Europe Capital Durable Learnmore
Euro Capital Durable is suitable for investors who wish to invest in European businesses who
have a sustainable development approach.
..............%
Europe Stock Learnmore
Europe Stock is a fund intended for investors seeking access to European equities. ..............%
France Stock Learnmore
France Stock is a fund intended for investors seeking diversified investments in the euro zone
mainly French
..............%
Fund European Equity High Dividend Learnmore
Fund European Equity High Divident ID D support for investors seeking access to European
equities with strong dividends.
..............%
Europe Actions Immobilier Learnmore
Immobilier European equities ND is a fund intended for investors seeking access to French or
European listed real estate companies.
..............%
Total 100,00%
Table 4.9: Example of the allocation investors had to make during the investment
game.
The game was registered with a baili to comply with legal requirements.
Investors only participated if they agreed with eligibility requirements, dis-
claimer (cf. Appendices 10). The baili was also responsible for randomly
drawing one investor who would receive the funds credited on his account.
To provide control for fund dierences other than the addition of ESG evalu-
ations to the investment decision, funds were selected that had equal perfor-
mance objectives and risk profiles, also the investment universe of all funds
were stocks listed in European exchanges.
4.5.2.4 Measurements
The independent variables included in the questionnaire were those related
to pro-social valuations, psychological, financial, and socio-demographic as-
pects. The eects of ethical labelling, image concerns, and pro-social values
were experimentally manipulated in between subjects. All other measures
were standard measurement scales.
Since we predicted that ethical labelling would have and influence on SRI
behaviour, half of the investors was randomly assigned to an experimental
condition in which the description of the SRI fund in the game was followed
by the indication that the fund was labelled by an independent agency. The
other half did not receive this cue.
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In order to test our prediction about image motivation for pro-social be-
haviour in socially responsible investment, half of the investors was ran-
domly assigned to an experimental condition in which the portfolio of the
winner of the game was made public online and a local newspaper. In or-
der to make anonymous participation possible, investors could opt-out from
publication, but were no longer able to participate in the loery.
Finally, half of the participants were told that they could make a donation to
one of four NGOs before they played the game. For equality the other half
could make the same donations, but aer having played the game. Partici-
pants were told that the amount of the donation would be taken from the
e5.000, but that the proportions they would choose/had chose were not af-
fected. In order to inquire whether an investors individual valuation of each
of the ESG dimensions aects his SRI behaviour, the NGOs were themed en-
vironment (WWF), social (Care), corporate governance (Transparency Intl.),
or neutral (Wikipedia). Table 4.10 provides a summary of all variables and
the corresponding measurements.
H: Variable Measurement constructs
1a Perceived riskiness of SRI Compared to conventional funds SRI funds are less risky.
1b Perceived SRI financial performance SRI funds have a higher long term performance.
1c Label Experimental manipulation
2a Intrinsic altruism Overall level of donations
Altruism scale from Goldberg et al. (2006)
2b Image concern Experimental manipulation
Self monitoring scale from Goldberg et al. (2006)
2c Delay of rewards Measure from Laibson et al. (2002)
2d Risk taking Risk propensity scale from Saini and Martin (2009)
2e SRI eectiveness Consumer eectiveness, adapted from Nilsson (2008)
SRI can help to improve environmental aspects of society.
SRI can help to improve social aspects of society.
SRI can help to improve corporate behaviour.
2f Information abundance There is an abundance of information to consider in SRI.
2g Investment expertise Self report: How good is knowledge about financial products?
Self report: How good is your expertise with financial products?
Trivia quiz with 3 questions (eg. If interests go up, do bonds go? Up, Down, No change, Don’t know.)
2h SRI expertise Self report: How good is your knowledge about socially responsible investments?
3a Valuation of environment Donation to WWF
Businesses should care about ’economic’ (1) vs. ’environmental’ (7) issues.
3b Valuation of social Donation to Care
Businesses should care about ’economic’ (1) vs. ’social’ (7) issues.
3c Valuation of corporate governance Donation to Transparency Intl.
4a Age Self report
4b Gender Self report
4c Educaiton Self report
- Exploratory Clicks on summary prospectus
- Exploratory Time to select funds
Table 4.10: Hypothesis and relevant measurements of independent variables in Ex-
periment 6
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4.5.3 Results and data analysis
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the eects of psychological, pro-
social, financial, and demographic variables on SRI behaviour. However be-
fore conducting the main analysis descriptive results of the dierent mea-
sures were addressed (see Appendices 16). Continuous variables meet as-
sumptions of normality necessary for regression analysis. No ceiling eects
were observed.
4.5.3.1 Investment game behaviour
Aer reviewing the descriptive statistics the analysis turned towards the
question of how each variable influences the investment behaviour in the
investment game. As the focus of the analysis was to explain the proportion
of funds allocated to the SRI fund, the dependent variable of the analysis
was calculated as the amount of thee5.000 invested in the SRI fund divided
by the sum of the amounts in the SRI and the conventional fund:
SRIProportion =
FundSRI
FundSRI + FundConventional
(4.3)
As the dependent variable was a proportion (ranging between 0 and 1)
beta-regression was chose as an appropriate method (Cribari-neto & Zeileis,
2010). The class of beta regression models as introduced by Ferrari and Neto
(2004) is useful for modelling continuous variables that assume values in the
open standard unit interval (0, 1). Because in some cases y (the proportion)
assumed the extremes (0 and 1) the transformation (y ∗ (n− 1) + 0.5/n,
where n is the sample size was applied (Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). Stan-
dardized z-scores were calculated for all continuous variables. The cate-
gorical variables, Label, Public portfolio, and Gender were dummy coded,
whereas for the donations the amount donated to each charity was intro-
duced. The total amount was excluded because it is a linear function of the
individual amounts 10.
In order to look for dierences in SRI behaviour, between investors who al-
ready hold SRI funds and investors who only hold conventional investments
the same beta regression was repeated for each subgroup of investors. Ta-
ble 4.11 reports the results of all three regressions. In order to test whether
the observed dierences are significant, a investor type dummy variable was
created and interaction terms of the dummy with all terms were introduced
in the initial beta regression (for a table see Appendices 16).
Overall, the model for all investors (1), and conventional investors (3), ex-
plained only a limited amount of SRI behaviour, as the pseudo R2 (.27 and
10 Separate analysis was ns and is not reported here.
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.36 respectively) indicate. The model for SRI investors, on the contrary, was
able to explain a great part of variance in SRI behaviour (pseudo R2 = .76),
and this despite the smaller sample size. In all three models, the proportion
invested in SRI funds significantly exceeds the average, and as one would
expect, this eect is strongest for the SRI investor population.
Financial perceptions. The first group of measures concerned the constructs
related to the three perceptions of riskiness of SRI, financial performance
of SRI, and the ESG labelling of mutual funds. According to Table 4.11 one
measure showed a significant impact on the proportion SRI investors invest
in the socially responsible fund. Perceived riskiness of SRI proved significant
predictor of investment behaviour. The more participants agreed that SRI is
less risky than conventional investment the more they were likely to invest a
greater proportion in SRI mutual funds in the game. With regards to the hy-
pothesis the study finds support for H1a in the case of SRI investors but not
conventional investors.H1b, andH1c, are not supported. As for hypothesis
H1d, no significant interaction eect was detected for SRI investors.
Psychological factors. The second group of measures concerned a number of
psychological variables, thought to influence SRI behaviour. Overall three
measures showed a significant impact on the proportion invested in the SRI
fund: Delay of rewards, the belief that SRI can improve governance, and SRI
expertise. No group dierences were observed for the three measures (cf.
Appendices 16.4). The significant eect of delay of rewards suggests that
investors with the capacity to inhibit temporal discounting are more likely
to have higher SRI allocations. Investors who think that SRI can improve
corporate governance are also more likely to invest. Finally, both SRI and
conventional investors with expertise in SRI are less likely to invest. That is,
the eect predicted in H2h is found to be in the opposite direction.
Nevertheless when the fund had received a label SRI experts were more
likely to invest. The moderating the eect of a label on SRI expertise (H2f)
shows is significant in all three models. Interestingly, a label also increases
the likelihood to invest of investors with investment expertise, but only for
those invested in SRI.
General consumer eectiveness only plays a role for those who are already
invested in SRI. This is shown by the significant likelihood increase in SRI
behaviour for investors who believe in the eectiveness of individual con-
sumer actions in Model 2 (Table 4.11 and the absence of this eect in Model
3. A test of the dierence between the regression coeicients of the two pop-
ulations was also conclusive (cf. Appendice 16.4).H2a,H2b,H2d,H2g, and
H2i are not supported.
Finally, label moderated the eect of the perception of SRI information
abundance (H2j). Those who thought that there was too much information
involved in SRI were less likely to invest in SRI labelled funds.
Pro social aitudes. The pro-social valuation factors is the model, environ-
mental, social, and governance valuation relate to an increased similarity in
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]
All investors (1) SRI (2) Conventional (3)
(Intercept) 0.51 (0.17)∗∗ 1.20 (0.32)∗∗∗ 0.51 (0.20)∗
Riskiness of SRI −0.02 (0.10) 0.61 (0.21)∗∗ −0.11 (0.11)
Perceived SRI performance 0.00 (0.09) −0.04 (0.20) 0.08 (0.11)
Label 0.05 (0.18) −0.42 (0.32) 0.06 (0.21)
Altruism (donations) 0.08 (0.09) −0.11 (0.16) −0.15 (0.15)
Altruism (scale) 0.04 (0.09) 0.19 (0.20) −0.03 (0.11)
Public portfolio −0.09 (0.18) 0.10 (0.39) −0.27 (0.22)
Self monitoring 0.06 (0.16) −0.31 (0.31) 0.29 (0.20)
Delay of rewards −0.22 (0.09)∗ −0.41 (0.21) −0.28 (0.11)∗
Risk propensity 0.25 (0.15) 0.12 (0.34) 0.21 (0.17)
Cons.Eectiveness 0.06 (0.10) 0.83 (0.19)∗∗∗ −0.14 (0.13)
SRI improve E 0.18 (0.13) 0.13 (0.30) 0.32 (0.16)∗
SRI improve S −0.12 (0.14) 0.31 (0.26) −0.16 (0.18)
SRI improve G 0.24 (0.11)∗ −0.09 (0.22) 0.15 (0.15)
SRI avoid complicity 0.10 (0.10) 0.19 (0.20) 0.15 (0.13)
Information abundance 0.00 (0.15) 0.23 (0.40) −0.08 (0.17)
Investment expertise (
∑
) 0.09 (0.18) 0.03 (0.37) 0.10 (0.21)
SRI expertise −0.54 (0.17)∗∗ −1.34 (0.43)∗∗ −0.56 (0.19)∗∗
WWF −0.12 (0.11) 0.53 (0.27)∗ −0.10 (0.13)
Econ. vs. environment 0.21 (0.10)∗ −0.63 (0.20)∗∗ 0.42 (0.13)∗∗
CARE −0.07 (0.10) −0.78 (0.23)∗∗∗ −0.12 (0.12)
Econ vs. social −0.16 (0.10) −0.86 (0.20)∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.12)
Transparency Intl. −0.11 (0.10) −0.15 (0.25) −0.01 (0.14)
Age −0.07 (0.11) −0.09 (0.30) 0.01 (0.15)
Male −0.09 (0.10) −0.14 (0.20) −0.22 (0.12)
Education 0.17 (0.09) −0.08 (0.20) 0.22 (0.11)∗
Clicks on funds −0.19 (0.10)∗ −0.61 (0.19)∗∗ −0.16 (0.11)
Time to select funds −0.04 (0.10) 0.90 (0.24)∗∗∗ −0.12 (0.11)
Label:Risk of SRI −0.32 (0.18) −0.17 (0.39) −0.12 (0.21)
Label:Invest. expertise −0.29 (0.22) 1.17 (0.47)∗ −0.45 (0.26)
Label:SRI expertise 0.44 (0.22)∗ 1.10 (0.53)∗ 0.50 (0.24)∗
Label:ISR.Abon.2 −0.46 (0.19)∗ −1.00 (0.51)∗ −0.33 (0.21)
Public:Self monitoring 0.11 (0.19) 0.14 (0.35) −0.15 (0.22)
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.71 0.36
Log Likelihood 94.72 65.73 67.83
Num. obs. 196 53 143
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 4.11: Proportion of SRI investments in investment game (betareg).
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values of investors with SRI funds, in contrast to conventional funds. Con-
ventional investors who place a great value environmental issues, are more
likely to display SRI behaviour. However, SRI investors with high valuation
for environmental, and social issues are less likely to display SRI behaviour.
The dierences between coeicients of the two populations are significant
(cf. Appendice 16.4. Therefore H3a, and H3b, find support for the SRI in-
vestors population, H3c is not supported.
Demographic variables. There were no eects of Age and Gender (H4a, and
H4b). Higher education increased SRI behaviour likelihood in Model 3, but
not Model 2 (H4c). However, there was no interaction with the popula-
tion variable. The two exploratory measures, time for decision, and clicks
on funds, explained a significant proportion of variance in Model 2, but
not Model 3. Both interactions with population were significant. SRI in-
vestors who seek information about the funds are less likely to display SRI
behaviour, however if they take longer to make their decisions likelihood
increases.
4.5.3.2 SRI holdings
The objective of the second analysis was confirmatory. The focus was to
find out what variables influence SRI behaviour using the holdings data
as dependent variable. Since the dependent variable was dichotomous (SRI
or conventional investor) logistic regression analysis, an extension of linear
regression, was chosen as the method (D. Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). Be-
fore performing the analysis experimental measures were removed from the
dataset, because their interpretation would have been senseless 11.
Table 4.12 displays the results of the logit regression model. The null de-
viance and residual deviance help evaluate the overall performance of the
model. Null deviance shows how well the response is predicted by a model
with nothing but the intercept. Adding in the predictors decreased the de-
viance by 58 points on 28 degree of freedom. This is interpreted as a chi
square value and indicates a significant decrease in deviance (p<0.01). The
residual deviance is 161 on 167 degrees of freedom. We use this to test the
overall fit of the model by treating this as a chi square value. A chi square of
161 on 167 degrees of freedom yields a p=0.6162. The null hypothesis (i.e.,
the model) is not rejected. The fied values are not significantly dierent
from the observed values.
The eect of gratification delay found in the previous analysis is confirmed:
Investors with the capacity to inhibit temporal discounting are more likely
to hold SRI funds. Precisely, for every one point increase in the gratification
delay score, the odds of being invested in SRI increase by 0.6352. Remember
that higher scores, mean less ability to delay. From the pro-social values
11 In an exploratory approach we also introduced two interaction terms but did not find signif-
icant eects and will not report further
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variables, donations to WWF (environment) are in a negative relationship
to the odds of being invested in SRI. This measure was not significant for
actual SRI behaviour in the investment game, however SRI investors showed
significantly lower values for three other measures of values. Finally age and
education seem to be demographic markers. SRI investors are more likely
to be of an older age and to be beer educated.
4.5.4 Discussion
This exploratory study examined private mutual fund investors aempting
to explain the motivations that lead some investors to invest large shares
of their portfolio in SRI themed funds, while other investors invest lile
or no money in those funds. From this study, two major conclusions can
be drawn. First the explanatory power of the model is limited for conven-
tional investors. This indicates that the variables that were incorporated in
the study explain a greater part of the decisions of those who are already in-
vested in socially responsible mutual funds. Second, the study indicates that
dierent types of variables can be useful in explaining SRI behaviour with
private investors. This study combined demographic measures, economic
concerns, pro-social values, and psychological variables, and all proved to
have some influence on the proportion invested in the socially responsible
fund. Below these factors are discussed in more detail.
The importance of financial perceptions seems to be a maer of perceived
riskiness of SRI. The finding is that investors who already hold SRI funds,
raise their stakes in SRI if they believe that it is less risky. This finding nu-
ances the findings of Nilsson (2008), who reports that perception of financial
return is an important factor for SRI investment behaviour by predicting SRI
holdings with perceptions of financial return. In this study we measured SRI
behaviour in an investment game with ae5.000 incentive, and SRI holdings.
While financial perceptions did not explain SRI holdings, SRI holder were
more likely to invest again if they thought SRI was less risky. While this
finding encourages retailers, to insist on the argument of lowered risk for
SRI investors, it also confirms that SRI investors are not solely motivated by
pro-social, altruist behaviour. They also pursue profit oriented goals.
Results also confirm that psychological factors influence SRI behaviour. Sur-
prisingly it were not the traditional pro-social behaviour variables (altru-
ism, image concerns, self monitoring), but the cognitive capacity to delay
rewards that turned out to explain investments and investment holdings.
Investors who care more about the presence, than the future (ie. temporal
discounting) are less likely to be invested, and to invest in SRI mutual funds.
This temporal discounting tendency tempts people to choose a small im-
mediate reward over a larger delayed reward, simply because the first is
immediately available. Such a choice can greatly sabotage the aainment
of long-term goals and is diicult to resist.
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]
Investor type (logit)
Riskiness of SRI −0.183 (0.236)
Perceived SRI performance 0.024 (0.196)
Altruism −0.184 (0.206)
Self Monitoring 0.067 (0.213)
Delay of rewards −0.635∗∗ (0.268)
Risk propensity 0.044 (0.227)
Cons.Eectiveness 0.099 (0.236)
SRI improve E 0.240 (0.315)
SRI improve S −0.344 (0.295)
SRI improve G −0.196 (0.262)
SRI avoid complicity 0.018 (0.236)
Information abundance −0.329 (0.211)
Investment expertise (
∑
) 0.057 (0.252)
SRI expertise −0.010 (0.235)
WWF −3.067∗∗∗ (1.163)
CARE −0.177 (0.362)
Transparency Intl. −0.179 (0.307)
WIKI 0.547 (0.636)
Age 0.766∗∗∗ (0.284)
Gender (F) −0.120 (0.145)
Education 0.379∗ (0.207)
SelfMonitoring:Altruism −0.172 (0.221)
Risk:Invest.experience −0.256 (0.215)
Constant −2.264∗∗∗ (0.566)
Observations 196
Log Likelihood -88.161
Akaike Inf. Crit. 219.782
Residual Deviance 161.782
Null Deviance 228.796
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.12: Regression of investment holdings (logit).
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One practical solution to reduce impulsive choices would be to exploit the
hidden zero eect (Magen, Dweck, & Gross, 2008). It has been shown that
the choice of larger rewards at a later point in time can be encouraged when
the alternative outcome is made explicit. For example, if the conventional
fund has a small short term, and the SRI fund a large long term advantage
the framing of the investor’s choice should be similar to the following: “Do
you prefer, a small advantage now and no advantage later, or no advan-
tage now and a large advantage in the long term?”. One possible explana-
tion for this is that the framing draws aention to the opportunity cost of
each choice, and encourages people to choose the alternative that incurs
the lower opportunity cost (ie; to forego the smaller, sooner reward).
The finding that perceived consumer eectiveness only increases SRI be-
haviour of those already invested in SRI but not the holdings is somewhat
puzzling. One possible explanation would be that investors who hold SRI are
beer informed about its outcome and have made a more evolved judge-
ment about its eectiveness. If their belief about SRI is disenchanted, or
strengthened this aects their choices. Consequently it becomes very im-
portant for retailers to illustrate eectiveness of their products with existing
customers.
Also a good knowledge of SRI reduces SRI behaviour with both populations,
however when the ESG approach of a fund is certified by an independent la-
bel SRI experts even increase their investments. Further research is needed,
in order to decipher this counter-intuitive finding. One possibility is that SRI
experts are more fearful of free-riders and see the label as a guard against
abuse.
The findings about pro-social valuations also need further inquiry. Higher
valuations of environmental, and social issues are associated with less SRI
behaviour. An explanation could be that the behavioural measures used suf-
fer from compensatory ethics (Zhong, Ku, Lount, & Murnighan, 2009; Monin
& Miller, 2001). Compensatory ethics are about the idea that a good moral
action in one domain creates psychic moral credentials that lower the need
for moral actions in subsequent situations (the inverse is true as well). This
is supported by significantly lower overall donations aer the game. Self
report, measures were also taken aer the game, so that it is possible that
investors who had invested significantly more in SRI had acquired moral
credentials and subsequently lowered their pro-social behaviour.
This study also found that socio-demographic variables are connected to
SRI behaviour. Investment in SRI profiled mutual funds was found to cor-
relate with education, as beer educated conventional investors were more
likely to buy a higher share ofSRI funds, and SRI investors we likely to have
a higher education. This finding has also been supported in previous studies
(Rosen, Sandler, & Shani, 1991; Nilsson, 2008). While age did not influence
on decisions in the game, SRI holders are older than holders of conventional
investments. This finding probably documents the general shi in SRI from
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a marginal phenomenon and niche product to a more mainstream invest-
ment vehicle (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004).
In conclusion, this study shows that financial, and extra-financial factors in-
fluence investors with regards to investments in SRI profiled mutual funds.
That is, investors decisions are not always only made with simple profit
maximizing rationality in mind. Instead, investors are, at least to a certain
extent, incorporating their beliefs in the decision. One of the most influ-
ential factors is the delay of rewards, which is rather a cognitive ability to
inhibit impulsive behaviour, than a deliberate decision. Investors combine
these extra-financial factors with perceptions about the financial risks asso-
ciated with SRI.

5
S O C I A L LY R E S P O N S I B L E R E M U N E R AT I O N S
Chapter 5 is concerned with the situation in which people receive a remuner-
ation in exchange for work they have dispensed. The two studies presented
are entrenched in Anderson’s IIT of cognition and its methodological frame-
work. This framework is dierent from other approaches in many regards. It
consists of a set of conceptions about the thought process and a set of tools
to reveal the essence of this process: the cognitive rules used to integrate
information. Because the conclusions that are drawn from the studies are
intimately related to IIT method and theory a more detailed account for the
interested reader is in the Appendices (18).
5.1 remuneration studies
Literature suggests two distinct fields of studying compensations: Executive
compensations and workers remuneration. In the first field literature has
abundantly focused on the principal-agent problem that occurs when com-
panies are managed by executives: When the owners of a company, most
oen stockholders, delegate the management of the company to someone
there is the possibility that the executive has interests conflicting with the
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interests of the owners. To align the interests of executive and owners, the
owner has to pay a price, in economic jargon known as the agency costs
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 1.
The established solution to the agency problem was thought to be linking
remuneration to performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Jensen & Meckling,
1976). The “pay for performance” idea was to add to the fix base salary of
executives a revenue changing as a function of company performance. Stock
options, for example give a holder the possibility to purchase a stock at a
fixed price and fixed time. executives who are granted stock options thus
have an incentive to keep the price of their company above the fixed price
of the option.
From a CSR perspective this line of thought is close to SV theory (cf. Sec-
tion 9.1.2) in that its solution to the agency problem was thought in alien-
ation of financial interests of employees and shareholders. Consequently
the solution was thought in terms of contracts that increase the employees
remuneration if share prices rise. Of course this link is seldom straightfor-
ward, rather remuneration is linked to sales, production and similar data.
However, more recently it has been brought forward that the design of com-
pensations is also partly a product of the agency problem and therefore in-
eicient (Bebchuk & Jesse M . Fried, 2003). One of the basic ideas of this re-
search is that executives can indirectly influence on their own remuneration
by seing industry references. A simplified example is that most executives
are also members of boards of other companies and vote for the remuner-
ation plans of their peers. When negotiating their own plan they are now
able to point towards the plans of the other executives as a reference. For a
survey of recent theories that extend traditional frameworks in favor of the
eiciency of contracts see (Edmans & Gabaix, 2009).
This finding has provided an empirical base for a SV argumentation that
complains that the shareholder value principle is not assured. Following SV
theory it is the firms social responsibility to re-establish the pay for per-
formance link. On the other hand, ST, CC and CSP would reasonably argue
that there is a moral duty of firms towards stakeholders. According to CSP’s
institutional principle power comes with responsibility (cf. Section 9.1.1),
ST insists on the principle of responsibility for corporate eects (cf. Sec-
tion 9.1.3), whereas CC would appeal to managerial discretion in fulfilling
the corporate citizen’s duties towards the larger community at its origin (cf.
Section9.1.4).
Workers remuneration studies, on the other hand, are the object of organi-
zational studies that focus on remuneration fairness perception, motivation
and legal aspects. The most prominent approach to fairness perception is
probably equity theory which states that the ratio of a persons outcomes
1 Agency costs are defined as the sum of monitoring expenditures, bonding expenditures and
a residual loss
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and his own inputs must equal the ratio of his referent others outcome and
input.
Motivational studies mainly aim to increase the employees motivation in
order to increase company performance. In that motivational studies are
somewhat linked to the agency debate because they seek to align the inter-
ests of the workers with the interests of the company.
Legal aspects concern mainly the protection of workers. In most industrial-
ized countries or example, employers must provide workers with remuner-
ation insurance (eg. medical bills or injuries). Social Security must be paid
by the employer (in addition to the amounts deducted from employees re-
muneration) and employers must pay for unemployment insurance against
the event that their job is eliminated.
Interestingly in both fields of study the dichotomy of normative and
economically motivated approach of CSR as described by Wühle (2007)
emerges (cf. Section 9.1). Is action against excessive executive bonuses eco-
nomically motivated (the solution to the agency problem has been hijacked)
or a maer of duty towards the society? Should workers wages be fair be-
cause this motivates them to work harder and increase production or does
power come with responsibility and there is a corporate duty towards indi-
viduals.
The contribution of CSR scholars to these two fields has been connected to
structuring sustainability performance into remuneration packages. That is
to say helping to design incentive systems that reward not only financial
performance but also sustainability. It is important for such an approach to
identify the types of incentive systems that could be used, the tasks and
employees who can be rewarded, the type of information that is needed to
make sustainability linked incentives function well and methods to deter-
mine whether such systems are working.
The following study does not take part in the controversy whether the
principal-agent problem can be solved within the realm of linking remunera-
tion to performance or not, nor does it seek to reward executives or workers
for sustainability. Rather it borrows from those studies the elements that
constitute remuneration situations, in order to conceive ecologically sound
descriptions submied to the judgement of French people. The intention is
to introduce a psychological measure of the acceptability compensations by
inferring peoples’ weights and combination rules of the factors of the plans
(cf. IIT in Section 18).
Fathoming out the rules that people use to judge the acceptability of com-
pensations it administers to CSR theorists and practitioners an original map-
ping of how the smallest unit of society reasons about compensations. It is
not entering the political debate about compensations received aer com-
panies filed for bankruptcy or received tax payer money. In many ways, the
public outcry about the colossal paychecks during the US housing crisis wit-
nesses a general feeling of injustice and ought to be treated by legislators. In
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lieu thereof, the emphasis on ecological factors will favour the practicability
of the findings.
5.2 executive remuneration plans
5.2.1 Introduction
Recently, people have been concerned with the high levels of chief executive
compensations. Frequently, executive compensations become controversial.
Are these compensations excessive? What justifies these compensations?
Justification of such large sums of compensation is traditionally linked to
value creation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990b) (cf. Section 9.1.2). In fact, a signifi-
cant portion of executive remuneration results from exercising stock options.
And during the bull markets those stock options were oen valuable. Yet,
ordinary working-class people seem outraged by the shocking contrast in
remuneration rises: annual executive remuneration at large companies rose
54 percent, whereas remuneration rises of average workers were between 3
to 5 percent, during the same period.
Obviously this public outcry has raised awareness for CSR issues in execu-
tive compensations. As we have seen in Chapter 3.4 most CSR theories hold
the view that companies are accountable to society, at least to some extent
(Crane, 2008). CSR theory also describes the voluntary contribution of com-
panies to sustainable development that goes beyond the legal requirements
(compliance). Further, CSR stands for responsible business conduct in the
actual economic activity, in environmentally relevant aspects, in relations
with employees at the workplace, and in exchanges with stakeholders.
A first issue is to justify whether stakeholders are a restrained group of peo-
ple directly linked to the company or include any group who is aected by
the corporation (customers, suppliers, owners, employees and local commu-
nities) (R. E. Freeman, 1984). If one accepts the wider definition one is forced
to embrace government intervention in order regulate excessive compensa-
tions.
A second issue is whether one believes the motivation for CSR should be eco-
nomic or normative (Wühle, 2007). The normative approach justifies regula-
tory pressure from governments and transnational institutions, that require
social responsibility from corporations. Thus the normative approach would
be in line with restrained ST.
The economically motivated approach, (in line with broad ST) tries to es-
tablish an intrinsic motivation for the implementation of CSR. It seeks to
demonstrate that a voluntary, non-normative implementation of CSR is a
benefit increase for the company itself. The reason given for this increase
in benefits is the creation and valuation of intangible assets, such as trust,
reputation, employee motivation and customer satisfaction.
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Executive remuneration can be considered an economic variable because
it is linked to workers remuneration fairness perceptions (Marcos & Sales,
2006). The argument is as follows: People evaluate the fairness of their own
remuneration, in large parts through comparisons with others (Dornstein,
1989). Since remuneration fairness is linked to employee outcomes (Shaw
& Gupta, 2001; Cowherd & Levine, 1992) and counterproductive behaviour
at work (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007), executive remuneration that is
perceived as unacceptable can directly harm a companies profits. There are
probably other intangible assets in question but I’m not aware of other em-
pirical studies.
Executive remuneration packages are typically composed of (1) base salary,
(2) annual incentives or bonuses, (3) long-term incentives, (4) executive
perquisites, (5) executive benefits (e.g., health insurance, life insurance, and
pension plans) and (6) remuneration protections (Burton S. Kalinski, 2007;
Murphy, 1998).
Base salaries are the fix part of executive remuneration. They are typically
determined through benchmarking, based primarily on general industry
surveys and supplemented by detailed analysis of peer companies. Firm size
is traditionally an important determinant of base salary. For small sized com-
panies in France mean base salary is e51.281. Since this part is fixed it is
particularly aractive to risk adverse executives.
Virtually all for profit companies oer an annual bonus plan covering exec-
utives and paid annually based on a single year’s performance. Those an-
nual bonuses are largely explicit with a limited role for discretion. The most
prevalent performance measure as reported by surveys is earnings. Other
measures include, EBIT, EVA, Sales, Customer satisfactions and stock price
(Murphy, 1998).
Long term incentives are mainly contracts which give the executive the right
to but a share of stock at a specified exercise price for a pre-specified term.
Those options are typically non-tradeable and and become exercisable over
time. A majority of US grants have a five to ten year term for their major
part. The main purpose of these contracts is to give an incentive for a long
term sustainable management approach.
In addition to monetary remuneration, executives receive dierent types
of perquisites. Such executive perks include the luxurious oice, the exec-
utive dining room, special parking, use of a company airplane, company-
paid membership in high-class country clubs and associations, and exec-
utive travel arrangements. Many companies even oer executives tax-free
personal perks, including such things as free access to company property,
free legal counselling, free home repairs and improvements, and expenses
for vacation homes or boats (Burton S. Kalinski, 2007).
Since executives don’t grow younger, pension plans have also become part
of remuneration negotiations. Having lived with high revenues for several
years during their active years, executives are eager to keep those revenues.
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Advantageous pension schemes have been designed that allow executives
to perceive a fixed a percentage of their salary aer retiring.
Another remuneration that became popular recently is the so called remu-
neration protection - or golden parachute - a protection plan for executives
in the event that they are forced out of the organization. Such severance
frequently results from a merger or hostile takeover of the company. The
golden parachute provides a significant one-time sum to the departing ex-
ecutive.
Based on previous studies in moral decision making (Muñoz Sastre, Pecca-
risi, Legrain, Mullet, & Sorum, 2007; Nann et al., 2012; Frileux, Munoz Sas-
tre, Antonini, Mullet, & Sorum, 2004; Guedj, Munoz Sastre, Mullet, & Sorum,
2006; Guedj et al., 2005; Kpanake & Mullet, 2011) I expect the integration pro-
cess that participants use to combine information about all components of
executive compensations to be a complex one. The term complex, expresses
the view that these factors are expected to interact.
In a nutshell, the study aims at revealing the rules people use to judge the
acceptability of executive compensations. Thus providing CSR practitioners
and theorists with democratic empirical results on morally superior designs
of remuneration schemes.
5.2.2 Experiment 7
5.2.2.1 Method
As in the many studies conducted in the field of empirical ethics (eg.
Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Nann et al., 2012; Teisseyre, Mullet, & Sorum, 2005),
the method was an application of Functional Measurement (Anderson,
2008). The study was approved by the Ethics and Work laboratory of the
Institute for Advanced Studies, Paris, France.
The participants were unpaid volunteers recruited and tested by one stu-
dent trained in the application of Anderson’s methodology. Participants
were contacted individually, explained the study, and asked to participate.
Subsequently, the experimenter obtained informed consent and arranged
when to administer the experiment. Of the 92 persons contacted, 53 (57.6%)
participated (Mean Age = 23; 29 women, 24 men).
The material consisted of 54 cards. The vignees were composed accord-
ing to a three within-subject factor design: Base Salary (e30.000, e60.000,
e90.000) * Bonus (2%, 4%, 6% of annual turnover, or 2% 1 year + 2% 5 year
average turnover) * Supplementary benefits (All small, High fringe benefits,
high fringe + pension plan, High fringe + pension plan + remuneration pro-
tection), 3 * 4 * 4. Six vignees of this design were duplicated and a supple-
mentary information stating that the company is a leader in sustainability
and has considerably reduced CO2 emission was added.
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The question under each vignee was, “To what extent do you think that
such a bonus policy is acceptable?” The rating scale was an 10-point scale
with a le-hand anchor of “Certainly not” (1) and a right-hand anchor of
“Certainly yes” (10). An example vignee is the following:
Mr Ramolin is chief executive of Sanobi company (≈ 12.000
workers, in France and the rest of the world)
His base salary is e30.000
In addition, he receives 2% of the annual turnover. This bonus is
calculated on the previous years turnover. There is no bonus
calculated on a longer time-frame that would incentivize a
sustainable management approach.
He has only lile fringe benefits (a company car).
He has an average managers pension plan.
In case of early departure, he would receive a bonus of only
e50.000.
The cards were arranged by chance and in a dierent order for each par-
ticipant. The participants answered additional questions about age, gender,
and educational level.
5.2.2.2 Procedure
The site was either a vacant room at the university. Each person was tested
individually. The session had two phases. In the familiarization phase, the
experimenter explained what was expected, and presented each participant
with 18 vignees taken from the complete set. For each vignee, the partic-
ipant read it out loud, was reminded by the experimenter of the items of in-
formation in the vignee, and then made an acceptability rating by puing
a mark on the rating scale. Aer completing the 18 ratings, the participant
was allowed to look back at his or her ratings and to compare and change
them. In the experimental phase, each participant gave ratings for the whole
set of 36 vignees, working at his or her own pace, but was no longer al-
lowed to look back at and change previous responses. In both phases, the
experimenter made certain that each participant was able to grasp all the
necessary information before making a rating.
The participants took 20-40 minutes to complete both phases. The exper-
imental phase went quickly because they were already familiar with the
task and the material. The participants knew in advance how long the ex-
periment would last. They did not complain about the number of vignees
they were required to evaluate or about the credibility of the proposed situ-
ations. They then completed the questionnaires.
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5.2.3 Results
For each of the 54 scenarios in the experimental phase, the distance was
measured between the le anchor (0) and each answer given by the par-
ticipant on the rating scale. All subsequent analysis were based on these
measures of distance. The overall mean value of all the ratings was 4.46;
that is, close to the midpoint of the response scale. The lowest mean rating,
1.88, and the highest mean rating, 7.54, were quite distant from the possible
minimal and maximal answers (1 and 10). There was thus neither ceiling nor
floor eect to complicate the interpretation of the results. In all subsequent
analysis age and gender were controlled for.
An ANOVA was conducted on the raw data. The design was Base salary
* Bonus * Extras, 3 * 4 * 4. Because of the multiplicity of comparisons, the
significance level was set at .005. All three factors had significant eects (Ta-
ble 5.1. A lower base salary was more acceptable. Post-hoc analysis, using
the Tukey honestly significant dierence test, showed that the mean accept-
ability value observed when the base salary of a executive was e30.000, ac-
ceptability was greater (M = 5.65, SD = .19), than when it was e60.000 (M =
4.52, SD = .1) ande90.000 (M = 3.47, SD = .11). Extras were also a significant
factor of executive remuneration acceptability, p < .00. Mean acceptability
was greatest when there were only lile extra compensations (M = 5.9, SD =
.12) than when large fringe benefits (M = 4.8, SD = .13), large fringe benefits
and a generous pension plan (M = 4.2, SD = .10) or large fringe benefits, a
generous pension plan and a remuneration protection (M = 3.15, SD = .15)
were added. Performance based bonuses were significant, p < .00 but ac-
counted for lile variance. When the performance based bonus was 2% of
turnover, mean acceptability was highest (M = 4.79, SD = . 11) and lowest
when it was 6% of turnover (M = 4.32, SD = .10). The dierence in means
is only .47. The 2% 1 year + 2% 5 year sustainable bonus was not dierent
from the other conditions in post-hoc analysis.
Four interaction eects were significant (cf. Table 5.1). The highest interac-
tion eect involved all three factors and is shown in Figure 5.1 . When there
was a lile base salary, a small performance based bonus and few extras ac-
ceptability was highest (M = 7.55, SD = .16). It was lowest whene90.000, 6%
and large extras were granted to executives. However the opacity of the in-
teractions (for example the eect of a long term bonus is inverted, when base
salary is high, fringe benefits and pension plans are granted) makes inter-
pretation intricate. One explanation for this kind of paern is the presence
of multiple ideologies. That is dierent groups of participants follow sepa-
rate, eventually conflicting rules during the information integration process.
Recent research has revealed such paern in many areas related to moral
questions (Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Nann et al., 2012; Kamble, Sorum, &
Mullet, 2012).
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Factor df MS F p η2
BASE (2/104) 1012 74.7 .00 0.58
PERFORMANCE (3/156) 25 6.2 .00 0.11
EXTRA (3/156) 853 146.4 .00 0.74
BASE*PERFORMANCE (6/312) 4.64 2.43 0.02 0.04
BASE*EXTRA (6/312) 4.82 5.08 0.00 0.09
PERFORMA*EXTRA (9/468) 6.19 6.95 0.00 0.12
BASE*PERFORMANCE*EXTRA (18/936) 3.88 4.12 0.00 0.07
Table 5.1: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance with Eect Sizes and Powers
Figure 5.1: Acceptability of executive compensations across levels of Base Salary
(3), Bonus (3) and Extras (4)
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In order to identify groupings of participants, a cluster analysis was per-
formed on the raw data in accordance with Hofmans and Mullet (2011)
the recommendations, that is, I used K-means clustering (Euclidean dis-
tances), a non-hierarchical centroid-based method. This technique uses all
data points and, moreover, is less susceptible to outliers and the distance
measure used.
Two clusters of participants were identified. They are shown in Figure 5.2,
with mean acceptability rating pooled across levels of base salary and extras.
The first cluster was termed “Rather Unacceptable” because the responses
were mostly on the le hand side of the scale (M = 4.13, SD = .09). This
cluster is shown in Figure 5.2 (le panel). For participants in this cluster,
acceptability ratings in the two most favourable scenarios were the only
ones that were slightly above the midpoint of the acceptability scale (M =
6.43 and M = 6.18). Also it did not maer to them whether the base salary
was e30.000 or e60.000. Only very high base salaries are considered less
acceptable. When there were large fringe benefits a generous pension plan
and a remuneration protection acceptability never was greater than 2.63.
The second cluster was termed “Depending on circumstances” because ac-
ceptability were well dispersed above and below the midpoint. For the par-
ticipants in this cluster the most important factor are the three levels of
the base salary. When the base salary is small the remuneration is always
acceptable, independently from the extras. If base salary exceeds e60.000,
however there cannot be any high extra compensations and mean accept-
ability ratings are lower then if there is a small base salary with all extra
benefits. When base salary ise90.000 the remuneration is always unaccept-
able.
These visual, impressions were confirmed by a second analysis of variance
conducted on the raw data including Cluster as a between subjects factor.
The design was Cluster * Base Salary * Performance Bonus * Extras 2 * 3 *
4 * 4, F(18/918) = 3.5, p < .00.
An independent sample t-test comparing the overall mean of scenarios that
included the CSR from the companies to the scenarios without did not re-
veal any dierences, ns. However equality of variances could not be assessed
(Leven’s test, ns.) and standard errors were greater in the CSR scenarios.
Analysis of variance was conducted to explore eventual inequality in vari-
ances between groups. The design was Cluster ∗ CSR, 2 ∗ 2. A significant
interaction was found, F(1,51) = 20,48, p < .00. It is show in Figure 5.3. Clus-
ter 1 judges the acceptability of executive compensations more acceptable
in companies that are leaders in CSR and CO2 emission reduction (M =
5.13) than in regular companies, p < .0. This is not the case for cluster 2, ns.
Overall, Cluster 1 had higher mean acceptability, p < .00.
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Figure 5.2: Acceptability of executive compensations across levels of Base Salary (3)
and Extras (4) for Cluster 1 and Cluster 2
Figure 5.3: Cluster 1 judges remunerations for executives of companies with a good
CSR record more acceptable than when there was no CSR record. This
is not the case for Cluster 2.
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5.2.4 Discussion
Peoples’ acceptability of executive compensations was best explained by
the general context provided through the amount of the executives base
salary and extras, and individual dierences between respondents cognitive
integration rules. When the whole sample was considered increasing extras
like fringe benefits, pension plans and remuneration protections lowered
acceptability judgements in a linear manner. Also a lower amount of the
executives base salary added to acceptability. Surprisingly the eect of the
performance based bonus part of the remuneration plan was weakest, and
did not seem to follow a consistent paern.
Exploratory analysis revealed the presence of two groups of participants
using distinct rules to integrate information about executive remuneration.
The first group found executive compensations generally unacceptable but
could tolerate compensations when the base salary was small or medium
and no extras were granted. The second group used the scale to a larger
extent and mainly thinks that executive compensations are acceptable when
the base salary is small. As compared to the first group they think that
e30.000 ande60.000 are not equally acceptable. Extras seem less important
for this group.
However, because of the small sample size it is recommendable to further
inquire heterogeneity of peoples’ views on compensations. Of particular in-
terest are executive bonus payments. First, because they oen constitute
the major part of executive compensations (Murphy, 1998) and seem al-
most irrelevant for people. And second, because persisting incoherence in
the data. For example the positive eect of a long term five year remunera-
tion is not present for cluster 1 when fringe benefits and a pension plan are
granted, however it is there when a supplementary remuneration protection
of e500.000 is installed. This kind of paern could be an indicator of more
than two groups with dierent views on executive remuneration as found in
medical ethics (Kamble et al., 2012; Nann et al., 2012; Teisseyre et al., 2005)
or CSR (Devinney, T.M., Auger, & Eckhardt, 2010) and SRI (Hoepner & David
McMillan, 2009).
Exploratory analysis further revealed dierent views on the question
whether executive remuneration should be linked to sustainability per-
formance. The first group of participants, those who have generally lower
acceptability, does not think that executives with a good sustainability
track record should receive extra considerations. Their remuneration plans
are judged exactly the same as the ones of their less responsible peers.
The second group, people with generally higher acceptability of executive
remuneration, do think that socially responsible executives should receive
extra credentials.
Economists have long found that it’s not how much is paid but how (Jensen
& Murphy, 1990a). However their analysis has mostly concerned the me-
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chanics of incentive structures and in how far interests of the company are
equal to the executive interests. The analysis qualifies this finding by provid-
ing preliminary evidence that general acceptability of executive remunera-
tion is probably less concerned with the nominal amount of the remunera-
tion then with policy factors.
The findings are relevant for academics and practitioners of CSR. Work-
ers perception of remuneration fairness is linked to many factors, such as
employee the, job satisfaction and product quality (Morand & Merriman,
2012), that are relevant in organizational management. Therefore, practi-
tioners are encouraged to be alert to individual dierences about remuner-
ation plans in a companies’ code of conduct intended for use in manage-
rial decision making (Crane, 2008). Further, a particular aention should be
devoted to the interplay of the base salary and supplementary aentions
granted to executives.
Academics in the field of CSR will find in the results preliminary guidance
towards a democratic approach to socially responsible remuneration plan.
Indeed, most theoretical approaches admit that companies do have obli-
gations (Jones, 1980; Evan & Freeman, 1988), duties Carroll (1991) and re-
sponsibilities (Wood, 1991a) for social problems. Nevertheless most theories
have failed, so far, to develop a practical framework for the integration of
a correct view of human nature, business, and society, and the relationship
between business and society (Crane, 2008). The findings are a first step
towards such a democratic view.
5.3 acceptability of executives bonuses and remuneration
policies
5.3.1 Introduction
People hold passionate opinions about compensation. Whether it is the
public outcry about greedy CEOs’ who, despite leading their companies to
historic losses, walk away unrepentant with huge annual pensions or blue-
collar workers who think their wages are unfair, virtually everyone has an
opinion on how compensations should be determined.
There is only lile empirical work on laypersons’ opinions about compensa-
tion policies. Instead scholars have described how social actors’ discourses
helped to legitimate bonuses (Joutsenvirta, 2012), or conceptualized impor-
tant ethical notions like equity and equality (Morand & Merriman, 2012).
Others have successively considered descriptive, normative, and prescrip-
tive perspectives (Dunham & Washer, 2012). Yet the public debates about
topics like salary caps, minimum wages or banker bonuses indicate that
everybody feels concerned.
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The traditional economic perspective considers the rise in executive com-
pensation as a maer of firm competition for a limited number of skilled ex-
ecutives or as a way to align managerial and stockholder interests (Jensen &
Murphy, 1990a). From a lay people’s perspective, however, executive com-
pensation is above all an issue of social justice: It does not maer much
whether, for instance, the "incentive zone" bonus curve follows a linear, a
convex, or a concave function. Kpanake and Mullet (2011) have elaborated
four types of justice: Retributive justice, procedural justice, distributive jus-
tice, and restorative justice. The present study aimed to examine the extent
to which each of these types of justice is associated with perceived accept-
ability of bonuses and compensation plans among lay people.
5.3.1.1 Four Types of Justice
Higher compensation for managers is oen justified because managers
might have to work late and on weekends, and pick up phone calls in the
night. This is a maer of retributive justice. According to retributive justice,
the amount of the bonus must be “equal” to the burden inflicted by the
work expended. In other words, the retributive justice is to compensate for
restricting the executives individual freedom. People generally express re-
tributive justice as a number of monthly wages. Indeed many people in a
company receive a thirteenth month; that is, an exceptional annual bonus
that represents generally one months’ salary. We consider this extra month
of salary as the proper expression for laypersons reasoning about bonuses.
Procedure is as important to stakeholder theory as the final distributions
(R. Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). Procedural justice relates to the trans-
parency and fairness of the decision making process (Thibant & Walker,
1975; Lind & Tyler, 1988). This factor draws on the question of who deter-
mines compensation and how it is determined (Murphy, 1998). Fairness in
the resource allocation process is unaainable if the person who makes the
decision of allocation has conflicting interests (e.g., deciding on the most
eicient solution for the company and, at the same time, maximizing his
outcome as a beneficiary of the decision Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). Lay peo-
ple would not care too much about the mechanisms by which executives
influence on their own pay. Rather, they would consider whether the calcu-
lation of the bonus is comprehensible and traceable, and follows clear rules
or not. The more the calculation follows clear rules, the more bonuses would
be perceived as acceptable.
Donaldson and Preston (1995a) have argued that an underlying principle
of distributive justice must firm up property rights. Classical distributive
justice theory is a maer of socially fair allocation of goods in society: It is
therefore primarily concerned with outcomes (Eatwell, Milgate, & Newman,
2008; Rawls, 1971). For instance, the extent to which all categories of employ-
ees in a company receive bonus payments is a good proxy for distributive
justice. In other words, the acceptability of compensation will depend on
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aribution, i.e. whether only senior executives, junior and senior executives
or everyone (executives, management and workers) are aributed bonuses.
Finally, restorative justice, sometimes called reparative justice, applies to
the needs of victims and oenders and is probably the oldest ethical prin-
ciple applied in compensation: The history of compensation for bodily in-
jury began shortly aer the advent of wrien history itself (Guyton, 1999).
For instance, a Nippur Tablet from ancient Sumaria outlines the law of Ur-
Nammu, king of the city-state of Ur, a law that provided monetary compen-
sation for specific injury to workers’ body parts, including fractures (Kramer,
1988). Special bonus for employees who have had hazardous working con-
ditions or have suered from work accidents is an instance of restorative
justice. Experiment 1 Experiment 1 explored lay peoples’ judgements of the
acceptability of companies’ compensation policies as a function of the ex-
tent to which these policies implemented the four types of justice discussed
above. Our main hypothesis was that, as in most previous studies on people
views regarding ethical maers (see Nann et al., 2012; Kamble et al., 2012)
qualitatively dierent personal positions exist among participants.
5.3.2 Experiment 8
5.3.2.1 Method
As in the many studies conducted in the field of empirical ethics (e.g. Nann
et al., 2012; Kamble et al., 2012; Teisseyre et al., 2005), the method was an ap-
plication of Functional Measurement (Anderson, 2008). The Ethics and Work
laboratory of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Paris, France approved the
study.
Participants. The participants (30 women, and 39 men aged at average 24
years) were unpaid volunteers recruited and tested by one student trained
in the application of the functional measurement methodology. The experi-
menter contacted participants individually, explained the study, and asked
them to participate. Subsequently, the experimenter obtained informed con-
sent and arranged when to administer the experiment. Of the 112 persons
contacted, 69 (61.6%) participated.
Materials. The material consisted of 36 vignees. They were composed ac-
cording to a four within-subject factor design: Extent of the bonus policy of
the company (every worker in the company vs. only executives) x Amount of
bonus aributed (corresponding to about 1 vs. 3 months of salary) x Trans-
parency of the bonus aribution procedures in the company (clear aribu-
tion rule, not very clear rules or completely arbitrary) x Existence of a special
bonus for excess responsibility (corresponding to three months, one month
or no special bonus), 2 x 2 x 3 x 3. An example of vignee is the following:
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“The STATAGEM Company manufactures and sells appliances. Like many other
medium-or large-sized companies it applies a bonus policy. In this company the
principle of distribution for bonuses is: (a) everybody, top executives, managers
and workers receive an average bonus, (b) equivalent to three months’ salary;
(c) the procedure for assigning the bonus is quite questionable (there are rules
but they are not always rigorously enforced), and (d) there is no complementary
bonus for jobs of great responsibility or hardship.”
The question under each vignee was, “To what extent do you think that such
a bonus policy is acceptable?” The rating scale was a 10-point scale with a
le-hand anchor of “Not at all” (1) and a right-hand anchor of “Completely”
(10).
Procedure. The site was either a vacant room at the university. The experi-
menter tested each person individually. The session had two phases. In the
familiarization phase, the experimenter explained what was expected, and
presented each participant with 18 vignees taken from the complete set.
For each vignee, the participant read the description aloud and aer the
experimenter had reminded her all items of information in the vignee, she
made an acceptability rating by puing a mark on the rating scale. Aer
completing the 18 ratings, the participant could look back at her ratings,
compare, and change them.
In the experimental phase, each participant gave ratings for the whole set
of 36 vignees, working at her own pace, but was no longer allowed to
look back, and change previous responses. In both phases, the experimenter
made certain that each participant was able to grasp all the necessary infor-
mation before making a rating. The participants took 20-40 minutes to com-
plete both phases. The experimental phase went quickly because they were
already familiar with the task and the material. The participants knew in ad-
vance how long the experiment would last. They did not complain about the
number of vignees they were required to evaluate or about the credibility
of the proposed situations. They then completed the questionnaires.
5.3.2.2 Results
For each of the 36 scenarios in the experimental phase, we measured the dis-
tance between the le anchor (0) and each answer given by the participant
on the rating scale. We made all subsequent analyses with these measures
of distance. The overall mean value of all the ratings was 5.54; that is, close
to the center of the response scale. The lowest mean rating, 3.13, and the
highest mean rating, 8.59, were quite distant from the possible minimal and
maximal answers (0 and 10). There was thus neither ceiling nor floor eect
to complicate the interpretation of the results.
We conducted a cluster analysis following statistical recommendations by
(Hofmans & Mullet, 2011) using k-means clustering (Euclidean distances), a
non-hierarchical centroid based method. Outliers and the type of distance
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Figure 5.4: Four groups with structurally dierent acceptability judgements of com-
pensation plans across levels of extent of distribution (2), and clarity of
the procedure (3)
measure less influence this method. Further, it and makes immediate use
of all data. Recent applications of the k-means clustering technique in the
field of bioethics can be found in Nann et al. (2012), or Kamble et al. (2012).
We retained a four-cluster solution. Figure 5.4 shows the main results from
this analysis. The first cluster was called "Always acceptable" because par-
ticipants’ ratings were always well above the midpoint (M = 7.62; SD =
0.22); that is, participants judged all compensation policies acceptable. Their
judgements did not change much as a function of variations in the levels of
the four justice factors. An ANOVA showed no significant main eects (see
Appendix 17).
The second cluster was called “Distribute or Compensate” (M = 5.9, SD =
0.11). Participants in this cluster judged the acceptability of policies mainly
as a function of the extent to which all employees benefited from bonuses
(the distributive justice factor) and as a function of the existence of compen-
sations for special responsibilities and/or hard work (the restorative justice
factor).
In addition, the eect of the special bonus was stronger when only execu-
tives receive bonuses than in the opposite case. In other words, when the
level of distributive justice was low, special compensations for people who
had work accidents or who worked under harsh conditions gained in im-
portance at the time of judging of the acceptability of policies. An ANOVA
showed that the distributive factor and the restorative factor had significant
eects, and that their interaction was significant (see Appendix 17).
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The third cluster was called “Egalitarians” (M = 4.6, SD = 0.32). For the par-
ticipants in this cluster, policies were always largely acceptable if a company
gave all workers a bonus and always largely unacceptable if only executives
receive bonuses. In other words, the distributive factor was, by far, the most
important one for judging acceptability. For these participants, however, ac-
ceptability was also, but to a lesser extent, a function of procedural justice
and distributive justice. An ANOVA showed that all three factors had signif-
icant eects (see Appendix 17).
The fourth cluster was called “Legalists” because of the great importance of
clear procedure for them at the time of judging acceptability. Participants
in this cluster have the lowest mean acceptability (M = 3.9, SD = 0.19). For
these participants acceptability of compensation policies is mainly a maer
of establishing clear rules for bonus compensations. It is also, although to
a lower extent, a maer of distributive justice, and the two factors clearly
interacted: The eect of clarity of procedure was even stronger when compa-
nies were granted a bonus to everyone than in the opposite case. An ANOVA
showed that the procedural factor and the distributive factor had significant
eects, and that their interaction was significant (see Appendix 17).
5.3.2.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 provided a detailed mapping of peoples’ views regarding the
acceptability of bonus compensation policies. We found four distinct po-
sitions. A first group of people showed itself to be insensitive to policy fac-
tors: They considered that bonuses were always largely acceptable. A second
group of people judged bonus policies largely unacceptable; this group, how-
ever, considered as acceptable policies that have a transparent procedure
to the condition that all employees benefit of them. A third group judged
bonus policies rather acceptable. Judgements increased when companies
gave bonuses to all employees and had established a clear procedure to de-
termine the bonus. A fourth group considered bonus policies as largely un-
acceptable when a company only gave bonuses to executives. Policies with
bonuses given to all employees were generally acceptable and the more so
if there was a clear procedure.
5.3.3 Experiment 9
Experiment 2 explored lay peoples’ judgements of the acceptability of chief
executive oicer bonuses as a function of the extent to which a company
implements the four types of justice discussed above. Our main hypothesis
was that, as in Experiment 1 qualitatively dierent personal positions exist
among participants.
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5.3.3.1 Method
The method was the same as in Study 1 (Anderson, 2008, 2001). The Ethics
and Work laboratory of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Paris, France
approved the study. Participants. As in Experiment 1 all participants (36
women, and 23 men, aged 23 years on average) were unpaid volunteers re-
cruited and tested by one student trained in the application of Anderson’s
methodology. The experimenter explained the study, and asked to partici-
pate. He obtained informed consent and arranged when to administer the
experiment. Of the 80 persons contacted, 59 (73%) participated.
5.3.3.2 Materials
The material consisted of 36 cards containing a vignee of a few lines, a
question, and a response scale. The vignees were composed according to a
four within-subject factor design: Amount of bonus aributed to senior exec-
utives (corresponding to about 6, 12 or 18 months of salary) x Transparency
of the bonus aribution procedures in the company (clear aribution rule
versus obscure procedure) x Extent of the bonus policy of the company (only
senior executives, middle/senior executives or every worker in the company)
x Special bonus for excess responsibility and hardness of work or not), 3 x 2
x 3 x 2. Following is an example of one vignee:
Mr. Bouillot is CEO of Builtup Inc., a construction company. (a) This year Mr.
Bouillot receives a bonus equivalent to eighteen months of his salary. This
bonus rewards good management eorts. (b) It is calculated based on clear
rules that take into account the benefits and the aainment of certain fiscal
targets.(c) In this company, everyone, workers and managers, is given a bonus.
This bonus varies with eective responsibilities. (d) Further, a special bonus is
intended for people who have suered from accidents, excess responsibility or
harsh working conditions.
The question under each vignee was, “To what extent do you think that such
a bonus for senior executives is acceptable?” The rating scale was an 11-point
scale with a le-hand anchor of “Not at all” (0) and a right-hand anchor of
“Completely” (10).
5.3.3.3 Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 1.
5.3.3.4 Results
Cluster analysis, using the technique from Experiment 1 was applied to the
raw data aer having controlled for ceiling and floor eects (lowest mean
rating = 2.61); highest mean rating = 7.92).
98 socially responsible remunerations
Figure 5.5: Four groups with structurally dierent acceptability judgements of com-
pensation plans across levels of extent of distribution (3), and amount
of the bonus (3)
As expected, participants responded in very dierent ways and we retained
a four-cluster solution. Figure 5.5 displays the main results with mean ac-
ceptability ratings pooled across the extent of distribution and amount for
each cluster. Four separate analyses of variance were conducted on the raw
data of each cluster with a design of Extent x Amount x Procedure x Spe-
cial, 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 (Annexes B). Owing to the great number of comparisons
conducted, the significance threshold was set at .01.
We named the first cluster Always Acceptable, because acceptability ratings
were well above the midpoint of the response scale (M= 5.7; SD=3). Partici-
pants judged bonuses for executives acceptable in any situation. Variations
in the justice factor levels did not change their judgements very much, as is
confirmed by a repeated measure ANOVA (see Appendix 17).
We named the second cluster Egalitarians (M=4.4; SD=1.9). For participants
in this cluster executive bonuses were only acceptable if the company gives a
bonus to executive, managers and all workers. This means that the distribu-
tive justice factor was by far the most important for acceptability judge-
ments. Situations in which a company gave bonuses to executives and man-
agers (but not workers) were as acceptable as situations in which only exec-
utives had a bonus.
Post-hoc Tuckey HSD tests confirm this finding. These participants also
used information about a special bonus, the procedure and the amount for
their judgements. ANOVA showed that restorative, procedural, and retribu-
tive justice eects were significant importance (Appendix 17). In comparison
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to distributive justice, however, those other factors were of lile importance.
Furthermore, acceptability increased only when everyone received bonuses.
We named the third cluster distribute and small amounts (M=5.8; SD=2.4).
Participants judged the acceptability of executive bonuses as a function
of the extent to which all workers also received bonus payments (the dis-
tributive justice factor) and as a function of the amount of the bonus (re-
tributive justice factor). Similar to egalitarians, participants’ acceptability
increased only when everyone received bonuses. Situations in which a com-
pany gave bonuses to executives and managers (but not workers) were as
acceptable as situations in which only executives had a bonus. Post-hoc
Tuckey HSD tests confirm this finding. Reducing executive bonuses grad-
ually increased acceptably. For the participants the procedure used to es-
tablish the bonus (procedural justice) was also important, but to a lesser
extent. ANOVA showed that the eects of Extent, Amount and Procedure
were significant (Appendix 17).
Because of the great importance of the amount a company’s executive re-
ceived for judging the acceptability, we named the fourth cluster Depends
on amount (M=2.72, SD= 1.6). Participants of this cluster judged the ac-
ceptability of executive bonuses as a function of the amount (retributive
justice). Additionally, the eect of the amount was stronger when all em-
ployees received bonuses. In other words, when everyone received bonuses
(distributive justice), small bonuses for executives gained in importance at
the time of judging the acceptability of executive bonuses. ANOVA showed
that Extent, and Amount had significant eects and that their interaction
was significant (Appendix 17). Again, participants did not dierentiate be-
tween the chief executives, and chief executives and managers conditions.
It is noteworthy that in the most “favourable” scenario when the bonus is
granted to all workers, the amount is only 6 month; there is a qualitative
change within the answers of this cluster (M = 5.56, SD = 0.78). Indeed if
these two conditions are satisfied, they deem executive bonuses acceptable.
5.3.3.5 Discussion
Experiment 2 provided a mapping of people’s views on the acceptability of
chief executive bonus compensations as a function of four justice factors.
We found four distinct positions. A first group was insensitive to policy fac-
tors. For them executive bonuses were always acceptable. A second group of
people judged executive bonuses largely unacceptable; however this group
considered executive bonuses acceptable, if a company gave bonuses to all
employees and if the amount of the executive bonus was small. A third
group thought that executive bonuses were only acceptable if a company
gave bonuses to all employees. A fourth group judged executive bonuses
rather acceptable. However, the judgements were higher if everybody re-
ceived a bonus and the executive bonus was small. This group deemed ex-
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ecutive bonuses unacceptable when they were high and a company did not
give employees a bonus.
5.3.4 General Discussion
We explored laypeople’s views on the acceptability of compensation poli-
cies and executive bonuses as a function of justice factors using a technique
borrowed from previous studies conducted in the domain of bioethics. As
hypothesized, we found qualitatively dierent personal positions in both
studies. A common position held by all but one cluster was that accept-
ability depends on distributive justice, ie. the extent of a company’s bonus
distribution. People judged executive bonuses and general compensation
policies more acceptable when all employees received bonuses then if only
a subgroup did.
Experiment 2 also showed that people judge distributive justice in a cate-
gorical manner. Indeed no group thought that executive bonuses were more
acceptable in companies that gave bonuses to managers and executive as
compared to companies that gave bonuses only to chief executives. In the
three groups that were sensitive to distributive justice, executive bonuses
were more acceptable only if all employees received bonuses.
In Experiment 1 a small minority of people considered that bonus policies
were always acceptable, and in Experiment 2 a small minority of people con-
sidered that executive bonuses were always acceptable. In both studies, the
group was not sensitive to justice factors and it is likely that the underlying
ideology is the same: A company’s only social responsibility is to increase
shareholder values (Friedman & Friedman, 2002).
Additionally, Experiment 2 revealed that the amount of executive bonuses
is not a function of retributive justice in the expected way. According to re-
tributive justice, the amount of the bonus must “equal” the burden inflicted
by the work expended and compensate for restricting the executives individ-
ual freedoms. However, participants find executive bonuses more acceptable
in companies that give smaller amounts, suggesting that the equation is out
of balance: People think that compensation for the restriction of executives’
individual freedom is too high.
The direction of the eect of the nominal amount was inverse in Experiment
1 (non sig). As a result, it deserves to be examined in future studies whether
amount of money has a direct eect on acceptability in the case of bonus
aributed to workers and an inverse eect on acceptability in the case of
bonus aributed to executives.
In view of the clarity and diversity of these findings, business ethics re-
searchers can validly extended our technique of concrete scenarios, bor-
rowed from the field of bioethics, to their field. Future studies on larger
samples should check whether the four-position taxonomy found in the
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present, study fully reflects the diversity of opinions in the public. They also
should examine how classical constituents of executive bonuses, like the ex-
tent to which the objectives fixed by the company have been aained, the
global, economic context in which the company has performed or the avail-
ability of experienced senior executives in the sector influence acceptability
of bonuses.
Finally, future studies should explore cultural aspects of lay people’s ethics
thinking about economic aairs. For instance, Walters, Hardin, and Schick
(1995) have suggested that in Asian countries people take economic deci-
sions usually taken by teams rather than alone. This may strongly influence
the way people share rewards. The scenario approach used in the present
study was flexible enough to allow meaningful comparisons between sam-
ples from dierent countries in other fields (e.g. Kamble et al., 2012).
Recent events at Volkswagen AG, where CEO Martin Winterkorn earned
e17.5 million in 2011, compared withe9.3 million a year earlier anecdotally
confirm our findings. He earned more than any other German executive ever
did. However, there were almost no critics. This was the biggest executive
salary in German history and labour union leaders were even defending it in
newspaper interviews. How come? Volkswagen also decided to divide 10% of
company’s benefits amongst all 100.000 workers. Everyone in the company
thus received an annual bonus of e7.500 in 2011.
Of course, e7.500 is lile in comparison to e17.5 million, and objectively
the distribution of the companies benefits is far from horizontal (aer all,
10% are distributed equally to 100.000 persons whereas one person alone
receives 0.23%). Nonetheless, social acceptability as outlined in the current
article was broadly satisfied, which lead to the public reaction that we could
have predicted.

6
T H E C O N C E A L R E V E A L D I L E M M A
6.1 introduction
6.1.1 Trade-o between financial and moral values
A standard definition of CSR is that it is about sacrificing profits in the so-
cial interest (Appendice 9). For there to be a sacrifice, the company needs
to voluntarily go beyond its legal and contractual obligations. CSR thereby
accepts a large range of behaviors, such as being employee friendly, environ-
ment friendly, mindful of morals, respectful of communities where the com-
panies’ plants are located, and even investor friendly. Sometimes, the call for
duty extends beyond company’s immediate realm and includes supporting
the arts, universities and other good causes (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010). A deci-
sive element in this respect is individual altruism, the principle or practice of
concern for the welfare of others and the opposite of selfishness. Numerous
studies exist on altruism in experimental psychology.
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Altruistic behavior responds to a blend of interdependent motivations. First,
they are influenced by genuine, intrinsic altruism: to dierent degrees, ev-
erybody aspires to do good and help. Second, material incentives come into
play: people are more likely to give to charities if contributions are tax de-
ductible. Third, people are also sensitive to social and self-esteem concerns.
How people behave defines what kind of person they are, in the eyes of
others and, no less importantly, in their own.
The importance of social image concerns is generally demonstrated in exper-
iments with public vs. private conditions. In and experiment by Griskevicius
et al. (2010), for example, one experimental group reads a story in which they
imagine to seek work and decide to join a large company. On their first day
in the company building it is described with particularly strong statuary
symbols such as the chic lobby. A control group reads the same story with-
out the statuary symbol priming. Participants then must decide between a
green product described as environment friendly and a non-green product
described as relatively luxurious and powerful. In line with the costly signal-
ing view they find that activating status motives led people to choose green
products over more luxurious non-green products.
In Italy Lacetera and Macis (2008) conducted an experiment where blood
donors were awarded gold, silver and bronze medals to those who donated
the most frequently. There only was an eect of the medal on overall blood
donations if the winners were published in a local newspaper. Similarly Vugt
and Hardy (2009) showed that donors in a public goods game increase their
donations if they are known to other participants.
The importance of self image is more tricky to demonstrate. Dana, We-
ber, and Kuang (2006) show, that when given the opportunity to ignore
whether their actions actually hurt others, many people take advantage of
this “moral wriggle room” to make selfish choices. In their main experiment
participants can choose whether or not they want to know about which dic-
tator game they are playing. In one A is the generous option, in the other
one B is the generous option. Whereas truly generous people would always
choose to know about which game is played and then choose the more gen-
erous option, half of the participants choose to stay ignorant.
In a more direct experiment Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) show that many
people who would voluntarily share $10 with an anonymous other in a dic-
tator game prefer to just take $9 for themselves and not face that choice.
In the same stream of research Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber (2010)
show that many participants who would behave generously in a usual dic-
tator game, delegate the sharing decision to a third party who is known for
being biased in favor of not sharing resources. Said another way, economic
agents are desirous to transmit the “dirty work” that they do not want to do
themselves. Not directly choosing the selfish action seems to relieve them
from the logical damage to self-esteem.
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An interesting interaction between monetary incentives and social-image
motivation was demonstrated by Ariely et al. (2009). In the experiments,
participants had to perform dierent tasks to gain money for charitable
causes in two experimental conditions. In the “private” condition, the only
one who observes his eort and amount earned is the participant herself
(in this way only her self-image can be involved). In the “public” condition
all participants, and some other peers, observe each participants choices (in
this condition both self- and social-image are involved). The first results, in
line with the earlier findings, is that eorts are larger when they are public.
The more notable finding is that the impact of material incentives weakens
considerably (or even reverses) when they are public. Furthermore, this in-
teraction only occurs when the task is performed for a good cause. In other
words the negative impact of public does not occur when participants are
simply earning money for themselves, or for an organization. Implicitly peo-
ple seem to act as if doing good is desirable, but doing good to earn money
is considered objectionable.
The idea that personal moral values are not measurable in monetary terms is
well known in moral psychology. Most notably research on protected values
(Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999), sacred values and taboo trade
os (A. P. Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock, 2003) have well documented peoples
animosity towards transgressing moral ideals in exchange of secular values.
Imagine that you had a fancy dinner with friends, spliing the bill among
you all. Later on, you discover that your own check was never cashed, mean-
ing that you (and you only) ate for free that night. Would you tell the story
to your friends, or would you keep quiet about it? Or imagine that, just as
former German President Christian Wul, you benefited from a legal but
unusually low-interest loan. Would you let the voters know, or would you
try to stop the story from being published? Christian Wullf allegedly did the
laer, and the subsequent public outcry led to his resignation in February
2012.
These two examples illustrate what I call the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma:
the decision to hide or to disclose that one got something which others
would want for themselves, and that it happened for no good reason.
My contention in this article is that individuals make this decision follow-
ing idiosyncratic norms, rather than by rational cost-benefit calculations, or
by the application of a universal norm. Critically, this sections reports four
experiments showing that individuals do not respond to financial incentives
in a paradigm called the Conceal or Reveal Game, and that they are split in
terms of the norm they apply to the situation.
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6.2 the conceal or reveal dilemma
Consider that an agent A faces the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma when she
receives a benefit with two characteristic features: secrecy and unfairness.
Secrecy means that no other agent knows about the benefit unless they
are the ones who intentionally provided it. Unfairness means that whatever
agent A thinks of the deserved or undeserved nature of the benefit, she
knows that others are likely to see the benefit as unfair if they learn about it.
AgentAmust choose between two options: keeping the benefit a secret (the
Conceal option), or leing other agents know about it (the Reveal option).
6.2.1 Cost and benefit resolution
The standard, decision-theoretical approach to the Conceal or Reveal
Dilemma would be for a rational decision maker to weight the expected
benefits and costs of the two options.
On the one hand, revealing an unfair benefit is likely to trigger negative re-
actions from other agents, such as malicious envy and retorsion measures.
People (Range, Horn, Viranyi, & Huber, 2009; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, but
also dogs and monkeys,>) react negatively to unfairness in reward distri-
butions, and they might impose all sorts of penalties to agents who enjoy
undeserved benefits (Cohen-Charash, 2009; R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007; van de
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010).
On the other hand, a decision to conceal an unfair benefit comes with the
risk of being discovered and perceived as a liar. A reputation as a deceiver
can result in a broad range of specific costs, such as intensely negative reac-
tions from others (Wang, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2009), aggravated third-
party punishment (Ohtsubo, Masuda, Watanabe, & Masuchi, 2010), and
fewer opportunities to join partners coalitions (Baumard et al., 2013). An-
other risk, rare but real, is to be targeted for blackmail by unscrupulous
agents (Watve, Damle, Ganguly, Kale, & Dahanukar, 2011).
Even from this cursory analysis, it is immediately apparent how diicult it
is to optimize in the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma. One will find it diicult
to think of all possible outcomes (e.g., blackmail), to translate outcomes in
utility points (e.g., missed opportunities to join coalitions), and to assess
the probabilities of the various outcomes (e.g., third-party punishment con-
ditional on discovery). These three features are precisely that identified by
Bennis et al. (2010) as conducive to another form of decision-making, that
is, the use of deontic norms. I now turn to this alternative resolution of the
dilemma.
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6.2.2 Deontic norm resolution
As an alternative to the use of cost-benefit analysis, the Conceal or Reveal
Dilemma can be resolved by relying on deontic norms, which only consider
the intrinsic acceptability of the two possible actions (conceal, reveal), and
do not factor in their consequences. Recent research emphasized the impor-
tance of these deontic norms for moral decision making (Haidt, 2007), and
especially their use as substitutes to cost-benefit analysis (Baumard et al.,
2013; Bennis et al., 2010; Berns et al., 2012; Sunstein, 2005).
Deontic norms can provide a workable alternative to cost-benefit analysis,
when it is hard (or plain impossible) to assess the range of potential out-
comes, to translate them into utility points, and to assign them each a prob-
ability (Bennis et al., 2010). With respect to the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma,
a deontic resolution consists of applying a general norm supporting one op-
tion or the other, regardless of the consequences of this option.
An important aspect of the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma is that it does not
lend itself to the application of any universal (or quasi-universal) deontic
norm such as do not inflict harm. Dierent norms can be considered instead,
that would either support concealing or support revealing. For example, one
deontic reformulation of the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma is do not boast
vs. do not lie. Boasting about one’s undeserved rewards would amount to
advertising a violation of one of the fundamental moral motives, that of
proportionality of merit and reward (Rai & Fiske, 2011). On the other hand,
concealing the reward would amount to lying, and there is evidence that a
substantial proportion of people prefer not to lie, even if it means they will
incur a cost (Gibson, Tanner, & Wagner, in press; Gneezy, 2005).
The fact that concealing and revealing can both be supported by (dierent)
deontic norms is important because it makes it impossible to predict, ex
ante, what people are going to do. The deontic norm model makes a critical
prediction, though, that distinguishes it from the cost-benefit model: It pre-
dicts that whatever people decide to do, they will not change in response to
financial incentives. In contrast, if people solve the dilemma by cost-benefit
analysis, they should be swayed by experimental manipulations that make
it costly or beneficial to conceal or to reveal. In this Chapter, I provide a de-
tailed test of these critical predictions. The study begins with a quick test
using an hypothetical job scenario, and then turns to the new paradigm, the
Conceal or Reveal Game.
6.2.3 Job Vignee Illustration
To provide a first empirical illustration of the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma, an
online study using an hypothetical job oer vignee was conducted. Partici-
108 the conceal reveal dilemma
pants (120 women and 157 men, mean age 28) were recruited on Mechanical
Turk and read two scenarios, in random order. One scenario read:
Imagine that you have been oered a job and that you are having a
discussion about your salary. The company negotiators tell you that
you are geing a lile more than coworkers who have equal qualifica-
tion and greater seniority than you have. They also tell you that you
can get largely more than them, if you agree to hide that arrangement
from your coworkers. What do you think would be your preference?
In this scenario, there is an incitement to conceal the salary advantage (it
would be larger if concealed). In the other scenario, the parts in italics read
largely more and They also tell you they can hide that arrangement from your
coworkers, if you agree to get only a lile more than them. That is, in this
other scenario, there was a financial incitement to reveal the salary advan-
tage (it would be larger if revealed). Regardless of the incentive structure,
a majority of participants indicated that they would prefer to reveal their
salary advantage (59% and 57%, both significantly greater than chance level,
p = .003 and p = .02).
Overall, about 60% of people chose the Reveal option in the hypothetical
job vignee (whatever the incentives or counter-incentives to do so). We
will see that this proportion might be more significant than it appears at
first glance. In the meantime, I report four experiments conducted within
the paradigm called the Conceal or Reveal Game.
6.3 the conceal or reveal game
The Conceal or Reveal Game was used in four experiments. In Experiment
3 (run on campus) everything was for real. The other experiments were run
online using Mechanical Turk. The game proceeds as follows:
Two players compete in a quiz game for a prize (1 or 2 euros, depending on
the experiment). The winner (the player with the greater number of points
in the quiz) gets the prize as promised. However, the loser is secretly oered
a choice. She is to get a special bonus, whose value depends on whether she
decides to conceal or to reveal the bonus. The two options read as follows
(minus the Conceal and Reveal headers):
conceal You get c euros and we do not tell it to the other player, so the
other player will not know that you earned money while you lost the
game. That is, you get c euros and the final result we will show to
the other player will be: ‘You scored more points than your opponent.
Your reward is [amount of the prize], and the reward of your opponent
is 0 euros.”
reveal You get r euros and we tell it to the other player, so the other player
will know that you earned money while you lost the game. That is, you
get r euros and the final result we will show to the other player will be:
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‘You scored more points than your opponent. Your reward is [amount
of the prize], and the reward of your opponent is r euros.”
In all the experiments reported here, c and r were greater than the amount
of the prize going to the winner in the quiz game. The main variable in
all experiments was the dierence between r and c, that is, the financial
incentive to reveal the bonus. The greater r compared to c, the higher the
incentive to reveal; and the smaller r compared to c, the greater the incentive
to conceal.
6.4 methods
6.4.1 Experiments 10-11
The experiments were conducted on the Mechanical Turk platform. Subjects
read a narrative describing their hypothetical progression in the Conceal or
Reveal Game (people got to answer two trivia questions to illustrate the quiz
part of the game). They indicated whether they would choose the Conceal
option or the Reveal option, if the game was performed for real. There were
120 participants in Experiment 1 (46 women, mean age 30), and 219 partic-
ipants in Experiment 2 (96 women, mean age 32). The incentive to reveal
(r− c) was manipulated between-subject. It was 1, 2, or 3 euros in Experi-
ment 1, and 1 or 5 euros in Experiment 2.
Aer they made a choice, participants indicated the extent to which they
thought the other player would envy their purported payo, using a 4-item
scale adapted from Moran and Schweitzer (2008). This manipulation check
allowed to test whether the manipulation of incentive made a subjective dif-
ference for the participants; that is, whether participants themselves made
a dierence in the utility of winning 1, 2, 3, or 5 euros, by aributing more
envy to their counterpart as a function of the earned sum.
6.4.2 Experiment 12
The experiment was conducted on the campus of the University of Toulouse
(France), with 240 participants (94 women, mean age 23). Participants were
explicitly told that all financial gains were for real, and that the experi-
menters might decide to award discretionary bonuses during the game. Par-
ticipants were paired up to compete in the 8-question trivia quiz. Within
each pair, the participant with the lower score (the quiz loser – ties were re-
solved through a supplementary list of questions) secretly received the Con-
ceal or Reveal oer. The r− c incentive to reveal was manipulated between-
subjects, and could be -1, 0, +1, or +8. While the quiz loser was considering
the Conceal or Reveal oer, the quiz winner was given a personality ques-
tionnaire to fill. This was done in order to keep both players busy, and to
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avoid a situation where the quiz loser would be under scrutiny from the quiz
winner while making a decision.
Once payments were given, quiz losers indicated the extent to which they
thought the quiz winner envied them (same 4-item scale as in Experiments 1
and 2), and quiz winners indicated how much they actually envied the quiz
loser (same 4-item scale). This procedure provided further opportunity to
check whether the manipulation of incentives made a subjective dierence
for the participants, both winners and losers.
6.4.3 Experiment 13
The experiment was conducted on the Mechanical Turk platform, exactly
as in Experiments 1 and 2, except that the r− c incentive was manipulated
within-subject. The 330 participants (143 women, mean age 29) made five
Conceal or Reveal decisions (in randomized order), with r− c incentives of
-8, -1, 0, +1, and +8. To keep the experiment reasonably short, the 4-item
envy scale was omied.
6.5 results
Table 6.1: Percentage of participants choosing to reveal, in all experiments, as a
function of the incentive to reveal (in euros).
Incentive −8 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +5 +8
Expt. 1 72 57 62
Expt. 2 59 51
Expt. 3 70 60 60 66
Expt. 4 54 58 60 48 53
The manipulation checks showed that the incentive manipulation itself was
successful. Figure 6.1 shows that the participants expected others to envy
them the more the higher their revealed earnings were. They were correct
indeed, as shown by the data of Experiment 3, in which we had an opportu-
nity to measure the actual envy that other players experienced. If anything,
participants slightly overestimated the envy they were occasioning to oth-
ers.
Statistics confirm the visual impression produced by Figure 6.1. Predicted
envy was correlated with the earnings of the quiz loser in Study 2 and 3,
respectively r(217) = .19, and r(118) = .58 (p < .01, p < .001); albeit not
in Study 1: r(118) = .05 (p = .55). Finally, as measured in Study 3, experi-
enced envy was correlated with the earnings of the quiz loser, r(118) = .48,
p = .001, and predicted envy was significantly higher than experienced
envy, t(119), p < .001, d = 0.55.
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Figure 6.1: Participants (quiz losers) correctly assume others (quiz winners) to envy
them all the more than their revealed earnings are higher. They slightly
overestimate this experienced envy.
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Having shown that we successfully manipulated incentives, we turn to the
eect of these incentives to the Conceal or Reveal Decision. Table 6.1 dis-
plays the proportion of participants who chose to Reveal, for all levels of
incentives across our five experiments. It is immediately apparent that in
all but one of our 14 experimental conditions, a majority of participants
chose to Reveal (even in the three conditions in which it was costly to do
so).
Increased incentives to reveal did not increase the proportion of participants
choosing to reveal, in any experiment, and even when the incentives were
real. Since outcome was dichotomous, logistic regression models were used
for analysis (cf. Table 6.2). Generalized linear models did not detect any ef-
fect of incentives in Study 1, Study 2, nor Study 3. Neither did a mixed eects
model used to account for fixed eects in Study 4.
In four studies we did not detect a significant eect of incentives on the
proportion of participants choosing to reveal. Therefore, it is appropriate to
compute the meta-proportion of reveal decisions, across our four studies.
Figure 6.2 oers a visual display of this analysis. Across our four studies (to-
talling over 800 participants), the proportion of reveal decision is estimated
at .58, with a 95%- confidence interval of .54–.62, p < 0.001. Further, even a
permissive test does not detect any dierence between the eight incentive
conditions, χ2(7, 1997) = 8.1795,p = .317.
6.6 discussion
The experiments put people in an uncomfortable situation, that of making
public (or not) that they received unfair benefits. It turned out that about
60% of people preferred to advertise their unfair benefits, whatever the per-
sonal incentives or counter-incentives to do so. This insensitivity to incen-
tives is a characteristic sign that a decision is the product of a norm, rather
than a cost-benefit analysis. In that respect, a critical feature of the Conceal
or Reveal Dilemma is that it does not simply oppose a morally commendable
decision to a less commendable one. In particular, people cannot change the
fact that their reward is unfair, and have no way to behave altruistically in
favour of the other player.1 The absence of a strong, straightforwardly appli-
cable norm, paves the way for cultural and individual variations in response
to the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma.
1 That is, if they stick to the implicit rule of non-transferable utility. In one (and only one) of
the 120 pairs of Study 3, did a subject thought of publicly accepting 10 euros, then sharing
them with the other player.
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Figure 6.2: Meta proportion analysis of Studies 1-4. Line width is proportional to
Study N. Line length shows confidence interval of the proportion of
participants deciding to reveal. The vertical dark line displays the meta-
proportion across studies, surrounded by its confidence interval in gray.
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Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
(Intercept) 1.53 (0.77)∗ −0.12 (0.68) 0.15 (4.14) 0.53 (0.16)
-8 −0.27 (0.18)
0 −0.47 (0.55) 0.10 (0.19)
+1 −0.46 (0.55) −0.60 (0.18)
+2 −0.66 (0.48)
+3 −0.47 (0.50)
+5 −0.32 (0.41)
+8 −0.21 (0.57) −0.30 (0.18)
iz score 0.06 (0.13)
Age −0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.05) −0.00 (0.02)
Male −0.49 (0.40) −0.52 (0.44) 0.17 (0.41) −0.32 (0.39)
AIC 162.49 140.62 169.09 2024.13
BIC 176.43 150.96 188.60 2056.58
Log Likelihood −76.25 −66.31 −77.54 −1006.07
Deviance 152.49 132.62 155.09 2012.13
Num. obs. 120 98 120 1650
Num. groups: ID 330
Variance: ID.(Intercept) 2.91
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 6.2: Parameter estimates of logistic regression models for Experi-
ment 1, 2, 3, and a linear mixed model for Experiment 4.
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6.6.1 Cultural variations
The norms that people can apply in the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma do not
appear to be strong and universal (and dierent people might even apply
dierent norms for the same final decision). The cultural prevalence of dif-
ferent norms could accordingly lead to cultural dierences in response to
the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma.
For example, it seems possible that a norm of modesty might encourage
the decision to conceal, given that modesty personality scales oen include
items related to the avoidance of aention-seeking (Chen, Bond, Chan,
Tang, & Buchtel, 2009), phrased for example as I don’t call aention to myself
or I dislike being the center of aention (see the Modesty/Humility scales of
the Values in Action, NEO Personality Inventory, and HEXACO Personality
Inventory, all available from ipip.ori.org). Interestingly for the cur-
rent purpose, there are known cultural variations in the importance of the
modesty norm. For example, the modesty norm is substantially stronger in
some collectivist cultures (Kurman, 2001, 2004), and the eects of this cul-
tural stricture can be detected early on. For example, Cameron, Lau, Fu, and
Lee (2012) showed that Chinese children judged modest lies more positively
and boastful truths less positively than Euro-Canadian children, a cultural
dierence which was shown to increase with age.
It is thus quite possible that cultural dierences in the strength of the mod-
esty norm might translate in dierences in the frequency of concealing de-
cisions in the Conceal or Reveal dilemma. Other cultural dierences, for
example in the likelihood of self-disclosure, might have an impact as well
on Conceal or Reveal decisions: it will be an important task in the future to
map cultural dierences in relevant norms onto behavioural dierences in
the Conceal or Reveal Dilemma.
6.6.2 Individual variations
Whatever the (counter-)incentives, about 60% of people in the experiments
decided to reveal their benefits. There are two possible interpretations of
this finding, that speak directly to current debates in moral-economic deci-
sion making research. In a nutshell, either people follow a strict norm when
they face the Dilemma (and for 60% of them, the rule is to Reveal), or peo-
ple randomly make a decision every time they face the dilemma, with 60-40
odds in favour of Revealing. In other words, either the Conceal and Reveal
Game elicits a mixed population, or it elicits a mixed strategy.
Recent research on cheating would speak for the mixed strategy hypothe-
sis (Ariely, 2012). The frequency of cheating seems to be stable whatever the
incentives to cheat, but this stability is not due to some people being system-
atic cheaters and others being systematically honest. Rather, it reflects the
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fact that everybody cheats a lile. The stable frequency of cheating seems
to reflect a mixed strategy, rather than a mixed population. The bulk of
the literature on moral-economic decision making would nevertheless favor
the mixed populations hypothesis. The first and foremost framework for
explaining insensitivity to incentives in moral-economic decision making is
that of sacred or protected values (Baron & Spranca, 1997; A. P. Fiske & Tet-
lock, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Tetlock, 2003). These values correspond to
core elements of one’ identity (be them religious, ethnic or otherwise), and
their characteristic feature is to resist tradeos. Typically, one will refuse
to transgress a sacred value for money, and will even get upset if asked
for one’s price. One could tentatively interpret incentive-insensitivity in the
Conceal or Reveal Game as the sign that sacred values are at work, and thus
that the 60-40 split reflects a mixed population. It is slightly odd, though, to
think that concealing one’s unfair benefits could be a sacred value for 40%
of the population.
There is another framework that would speak for the mixed population hy-
pothesis, without appealing to sacred values. In the mutualistic model of
morality (Baumard et al., 2013), decisions are made to optimize one’s future
participation in profitable coalitions, by means of establishing a reputation
as a decent partner. Baumard and colleagues argue that this optimization is
more likely to be reached by agents who evolved genuine moral preferences,
than by agents who evolved to compute the expected costs and benefits of
each moral decision. This evolutionary model would predict again that the
60-40 split reflects the evolution of a mixed-population equilibrium in the
Conceal or Reveal Game. A natural direction for future research, in order
to arbitrate between the mixed-population and mixed-strategy accounts,
would be to develop evolutionary game-theoretic models of the Conceal
and Reveal Game (Axelrod, 1986, that would include, e.g., third-party pun-
ishment and meta-punishment;), and to check the conditions under which
the equilibrium supports mixed populations or mixed strategies.
From an experimental perspective, though, the data already point in one
direction. Experiment 4 followed a within-subject design, in which partici-
pants made a series of five decisions, under various levels of incentives. The
data suggest that people adopted one strategy and stuck to it for all levels of
incentives. About 38% of people made the same choice in all five situations,
and 65% made the same choice in four situations out of five. While these
data are only suggestive, they should orient future research towards the
possibility that people have evolved genuine but dierent moral preferences
about what to do in the uncomfortable situation of having been granted
unfair benefits.
Part III
G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N
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B R O A D E R T H E O R E T I C A L I M P L I C AT I O N S
When CSR theories are considered (cf. Appendices 9.1) the question of moral
standards comes up consistently. Whereas CSP theory calls companies to
follow public policy makers, and people’s views in order to gain competitive
advantage in the long run, ST goes even further and holds companies liable
towards the stakeholder (an extended version of the shareholder) who is
defined by the interest he has in regards to the actions of companies. CC
theory aims at institutionalizing spontaneous socially responsible practices
by business leaders by granting citizenship (a concept granted to individual
people) to organizations. Citizenship comes with duties that are defined
by international standards (e.g. UN Principles) but it is unclear whether
they should be enforced by governments or rest moral obligations. SV the-
ory merely requires companies to comply with the fiduciary duties towards
shareholders.
Legitimization of CSR theories is mainly based on philosophical consider-
ations. ST, refers to Immanuel Kant’s imperative of respect for persons. It
is basically stating that people should treat others as ends in themselves as
opposed to means. Treating people as means implies their permission to do
so. For business ethics this is interpreted in saying that companies should
treat stakeholders as ends.
Another example is CC theory, which strongly relies on Aristotelian concep-
tions of citizenship supposed to evoke individual duties and rights within a
political community (Sison, 2011). However, people’s behaviour in the mar-
kets oen is far from virtues like temperance, generosity and sociability, but
closer to envy and diligence (Graafland, 2009).
Reading through the CSR literature one feels the need for seing standards.
Seing standards could put business ethics in a more comfortable position
when arguing. Unfortunately moral standards are by definition subject to
criticism. Since morals arise from conflicting views on how one should be-
have a moral standard cannot be acceptable to everyone for then it would
be no longer a response to a moral issue.
With this limitation in mind, the empirical results from Part ii can be inter-
preted from a business ethics perspective. They provide insight into peoples’
views, judgements and decisions in situations that are controversial. There-
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fore they may only provide standards in the sense that a view or behaviour
is predominant amongst the studied population.
7.1 effects of socially responsible investments on trust
The study in Chapter 4 has shown that CSR in the form of SRI can be a me-
diator of trust in investment funds. Precisely the mediating eect of SRI is
due to the similarity in values that mutual funds can have with the particu-
lar personal values of people. Trust only increases if the values of the funds
are similar to those personal values. The global eect of values commonly
used in SRI (ESG) is amplified by similar personal values.
The economic virtues of trust as a social capital are well documented. For ex-
ample, trust is stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes, with
institutions that restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and with bet-
ter - educated and populations (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Derwall (2007) also
argues in favour of economic virtues of CSR and SRI. Results from Chap-
ter 4 are in favour of the hypothesis that there is a link between these two
phenomena. Strictly speaking they provide a supplementary condition: SRI
can have a positive eect on economic performance because of increased
trust, but only if the values promoted by SRI mutual funds are similar to
the personal values of investors.
CSPT argues that companies will loose their power if they do not take the
responsibility that comes with it. Referring to results from Chapter 4 one can
speculate that this claim could to some extent be grounded in diminishing
economic performance as a result of vanishing trust.
In relation to financial performance people do not readily trade ESG values
for performance. Poor performing funds could catch up with the good per-
formers, but the highest trust scores were always obtained by the primus
inter pares.
This retention towards 1:1 trade os could be related to the issue of green-
washing. Greenwashing is a practice by which a company benefits from so-
cial responsibility without incurring the cost (Laufer, 2003). In other words,
people could refrain from accepting trade os by fearing to be taken in by
dishonest mutual funds. This speculation is supported by the fact that par-
ticipants’s trust did not increase when funds were merely labelled as ethical.
7.1.1 Identification based trust
Conceptually, results of Chapter 4 may refer to identification based trust.
Identification based trust arises from empathy with the other party’s desires
and intentions and as a result of sharing a common identity and similar
personal values (Spielberger, 2004).
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This form of trust arises when trustor and trustee hold similar personal val-
ues, including a shared concept of moral obligation. Identification based
trust trust develops through empathy because the parties eectively un-
derstand and appreciate each other’s wants. Ultimately this mutual under-
standing is developed to the point where each party can eectively act for
the other.
In the seing of mutual fund investments this might sound odd, but ulti-
mately identification based trust develops as both parties know and predict
each other’s needs, choices, and preferences and also share some of those.
This increased identification enables both parties to empathize strongly
with each other and incorporate parts of the other party into their own
identity as collective identity.
In other words people will entrust their savings in mutual funds because
those funds hold similar personal values, share common interests and be-
cause they can predict the needs of their clients. SRI funds have made the
right choice to focus on moral values. This will be more eective when those
values are similar to peoples’ personal values. Nevertheless people probably
require more to trust.
If trust must be built from scratch, making agreements and monitoring com-
pliance can help to build trust. Only in mature relationships, trust may be so
solid, and the risks involved may be so small, that monitoring is not needed
to maintain cooperation.
So what CSR standard could apply to SRI? Probably that of a scrupulous
merchant. People entrust their savings to funds when they seek higher re-
turn as they can expect from treasuries and the fund that they trust to gen-
erate this is obviously someone with integrity and with a long term per-
spective similar to their own. One interesting idea that could be explored in
further studies is that people use the ESG values as proxies for this kind of
person/institution.
7.1.2 Belief in progress
A deeper psychological explanation of the positive eects of moral value
aributes of mutual funds could be belief in progress. Belief in progress is a
concept from terror management and evolves around the idea that the belief
that society will improve and advance in the future can aenuate existential
angst (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2009). Precisely, to resolve
existential angst, people need to feel they will persist in a symbolic manner
even aer their death. In other words, they like to believe their contributions
will last indefinitely and that their life is meaningful. In order to satisfy this
need, people need to assume that society is improving, since otherwise, all
their eorts become immaterial and insignificant.
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One can also see SRI as progress. Since SRI is concerned with long term
extra-financial value creation, SRI investors pursue long term improvement
of the society. This, however, is not a philanthropic action but complemen-
tary to the pursuit of financial well being. Conventional investment strate-
gies may invest in financially profitable companies that engage in anti-
social practices that are not captured by legislation. Therefore, adopting
additional investment techniques to prevent investments in such compa-
nies is a social progress for investors who believe that individual action can
make a dierence.
7.1.3 Support of future generations
Another explanation, that also comes from existential angst, could be sup-
port of future generations. The argument is that to overcome existential
angst, people may show altruist behavior that supports future generations
(such as investing in SRI funds). These behaviours may enable people to
feel their legacy is lasting. Similarly, these behaviours ensure that people
feel connected to some enduring pursuit or endeavour.
For example, in a study by Wade-Benzoni, Tost, Hernandez, and Larrick
(2012), participants had to imagine that they were an executive, whose com-
pany was granted access to some energy source. They had to decide whether
their organization should utilize all these resources. Alternatively, depend-
ing on the condition, they could allocate some of these resources to another
company now, to another company in the future, or to their own company
in the future. All these alternatives oered a benefit: These organizations
could utilize the resources more eiciently. Mortality salience increased the
likelihood that participants would allot resources to another company in
the future but not to another company now or to their own company in the
future. Perhaps, alloing resources to another company in the future was
perceived as a more enduring legacy, diminishing existential angst.
7.2 socially responsible remunerations
The main lesson to learn form Chapter 5 is that remunerations that are
acceptable to the wide sphere of society do exist. When all workers receive a
small share of the companies profits, the aribution procedure is clear and
an extra bonus compensates people who had bad luck (illness, accidents,
etc.) the remuneration is acceptable, no maer if it is executive bonus, or
the overall remuneration plan of a company.
This result may be smiled upon and deemed unrealistic by the pragmatic
business person. But even if the application may seem Utopian, the justice
principles underlying the acceptability judgements of the participants have
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driven human thought for decades. It would be irresponsible not to consider
these psychological drivers when thinking about CSR and compensations.
The central finding that people are most sensitive to the extent of distribu-
tion of remunerations has to be considered in the light of equity models.
Hofmans (2012) have studied the distribution principle and dierent equity
models people use. Further they tested whether individual dierences in eq-
uity models relate to individual dierences in equity sensitivity. Similarly to
the results from Chapter 5 one equity model is in essence a non-integrative
model and another one compares the relative share of a persons outputs
and incomes to referent others. In particular the first one (where people do
not use the performance information to decide on the distribution of the
money) could be ideologically related to the “Always Acceptable” group.
Another interesting implication of unfairly distributed remunerations is the
link between income inequality and trust. Oishi, Kesebir, and Diener (2011)
showed that inequality in income tends to impede trust (this distrust also
impairs happiness). Other studies also indicate that equality can improve
trust and cooperation. In a study by (Cozzolino, 2011) one question mea-
sured the extent to which participants felt that income varies too dramat-
ically in their community, reflecting whether people thought their society
was unequal. Further measures assessed facets of trust, cooperation, social
capital, peoples engagement in the political process and whether partici-
pants oen volunteer in health, education, environment, or other domains.
The perception that society is unequal was negatively associated with all
these measures.
All these findings imply that equality enhances trust and cooperation on the
scale of a society. In societies that are unequal, people with a small income
are likely to experience negative emotions that tend to trigger distrust. Also,
in these societies, people with an exorbitant income are aware that society
is not fair, and this makes them grow suspicious of other people.
A possibility would be that in a context where equality of distributions is
granted, the eects of value similarity are reinforced. This abstract idea,
combining the research from Chapters 4 and 5 could be implemented in
further research. For example an experimental design could test whether
a fair distribution (for example following the averaging model of equity )
of a companies profits can moderate the eect of the values a company
promotes, on trust in the company.
7.3 the conceal reveal dilemma
The finding that people are insensitive to financial incentives when they de-
cide to reveal undeserved benefits, confirms the individual principle claimed
by CSP (cf. Section 9.1.1. According to Wood (1991a), this principle implies
that managers, because they exercise discretion, are personally responsible
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for exercising it and cannot avoid this responsibility through reference to
rules, policies and procedures. The findings presented in Chapter 6 show
that people do have other than fiduciary values and exercise discretion not
only maximizing their payos.
7.3.1 Self Concealment
Findings of insensitivity to financial incentives reported in Chapter 6 could
be related to research on self concealment. Indeed some people oen con-
ceal adverse information about themselves, such as errors or diseases. It
would be interesting to find out whether there is a relation between self
concealment and behavior in the conceal game.
This tendency to self conceal negative information about oneself is strongly
related to limited self disclosure (Uysal, Lin, & Knee, 2010) and positively
related to anxiety and depression and loneliness (Cramer & Lake, 1998). In
the light of these relations it can be a wild speculation that there could be
a clinical component to the concealment of financial advantages.
7.3.2 Approach and avoidance motivation
Another way to think of the conceal-reveal dilemma is the distinction be-
tween approach and avoidance motivation. Simply put organisms have
evolved to approach pleasure and to avoid pain. These motivations are re-
ferred to as approach and avoidance motivation and are both considered
vital for survival (Elliot & Covington, 2001).
This approach has been applied to explain a variety of interesting phenom-
ena. For example, people who aempt to highlight their qualities, rather
than conceal their deficiencies, during social interactions are more satis-
fied with the conversation (Strachman & Gable, 2006, eg.). Similarly people
could derive unpleasant feelings (R. H. Smith & Kim, 2007, eg. envy) from
revealing.
Also, most studies compare the consequences of an approach or avoidance
motivation. Fewer studies have explored the consequences that unfold when
both an approach and avoidance motivation are primed simultaneously. As
in the conceal-reveal dilemma it could be investigated if concurrent priming
or inhibition of both of these motivations makes people feel uncertain in the
reveal game.
There also seems to be an interaction of approach and avoidance motiva-
tion and economic cycles. It has been observed that in times of economic
contraction, an avoidance orientation is more salient since people seek to
prevent losses. On the contrary, during times of economic expansion, an
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approach orientation is more salient, since people seek gain rather than to
avoid problems.
This was illustrated in a study by Millet, Lamey, and Van den Bergh (2012).
Participants imagined hearing a news bulletin that stressed the prediction
that the recent economic contraction will last over the coming years. An-
other group of participants imagined they were hearing a news bulletin
that stressed the prediction that the economy would soon expand. In the
following phase of the experiment both groups were asked to indicate the
degree to which they feel emotions related to avoidance avoidance (eg. fear),
and emotions related to approach (ie. curiosity, interest, and eagerness). Re-
sults showed that imagining economic contraction increased feelings of fear
whereas imagining economic growth evoked feelings of curiosity. A second
experiment found that images of contraction, but not images of growth, de-
creased peoples’ willingness to gamble.
The parallel with the reveal game is that people could change their be-
haviour during economic cycles. One hypothesis is that people abandon
their motivation to avoid adverse feelings during economic expansion,
which could translate into increased revealing because people no longer
avoid adverse feelings. In a second step eventual financial rewards could
trigger a virtuous feedback loop for the one who reveals. At the same time re-
peated revealing could result in stepwise increase of adverse feelings. These
two simultaneous processes could eventually repeat until a culminating
point where expression of the adverse feelings outpaces the reasons for re-
vealing.

8
P R A C T I C A L I M P L I C AT I O N S
The findings Presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provide valu-
able insights and recommendations in several applied areas. More system-
atically, one may distinguish the following major domains:
(a) Behavioural economics and finance (e.g., investment and savings deci-
sions);
(b) Business, administration, and management (e.g., employment, organiza-
tional, and product decisions; strategic planning with scenarios; commu-
nication of decisions; distributed decision making; cultural dierences
in decision making);
(c) Marketing and consumer behaviour (e.g., product advertising, labelling,
and pricing decisions);
(d) Justice issues (e.g., business ethics; conflicts between self-interest and
the other);
8.1 value similarity and trust in mutual funds
The practical implication of the findings presented in Chapter 4 are to be
found primarily in marketing and consumer behaviour. Marketing pertains
to the process that requires developing, pricing, placing, and promoting
goods, ideas, or services in order to facilitate exchanges between customers
and sellers to satisfy the needs and wants of consumers (Truell, 2007).
Thus, at the very center of the marketing process is satisfying the needs
and wants of customers. Consumers buy products that will best meet their
needs, as well as provide the most fulfillment resulting from the exchange
process. In order to meet customers need marketing managers use three
basic market-coverage strategies: undierentiated, dierentiated, and con-
centrated.
An undierentiated marketing strategy occurs when a firm focuses on the
common needs of consumers rather than their dierent needs. When us-
ing this strategy, fund retailers would use funds designed to appeal to
the largest number of potential buyers. For example a mutual fund would
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choose companies that are above average in all areas of CSR. Our results
suggest that this strategy as limited success. Indeed it is not the case that
trust is generally increased by adding moral values to the investment deci-
sion process, but it is crucial instead that the values are highly similar to
the personal values of the investor for the eect to reach its full potential.
Ultimately it would be necessary to compare the benefits of increased
trustworthiness through individually tailored funds against the cost-
eectiveness of an undierentiated strategy (a narrow product focus results
in lower production, inventory, and transportation costs).
A company using a dierentiated strategy makes a conscious decision to di-
vide and target several dierent market segments, with a dierent product
geared to each segment. This would be the case of a retailer that promotes
themed funds. Themed funds invest exclusively in securities representing a
single thing. Whereas this generally refers to themes like real estate, gov-
ernment bonds, commodities or emerging markets, it may also concern sin-
gle moral topics. Examples would be religious funds (eg. Ave Maria Mutual
Funds, Shariah BeES, UNB Al Samaha Islamic), funds who screen for en-
vironment issues and animal welfare only (Rocky Mountain Humane In-
vesting, Cruelty-Free Value Fund, The Humane Equity Fund) or funds who
screen for social issues (Domini Social Equity, Parnassus Workplace Fund).
The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that retailers who can oer themed funds
that appeal to the personal values of each client would have an advantage
over retailers with few ESG funds above average in all categories. Of course
a dierent marketing plan is needed for each segment in order to maximize
the fund subscriptions and this comes with an extra cost. Furthermore, the
opportunity cost of emiing the themed funds for medium sized institutions
who usually promote in-house funds, might be too expensive.
The last strategy is known as the concentrated marketing strategy. The con-
centrated strategy aims at serving a large share of a single market. Typi-
cally it is used by companies with limited resources. This strategy would be
used by a financial institution entirely devoted to social responsibility. The
marketing process of SRI mutual funds would be embedded in a holistic ap-
proach to alternative banking. There are only few international examples of
such institutions (Triodos bank), but more can be found on a national level
(eg. GLS in Germany, Fiare in Spain or Unity trust Bank in the UK).
Heterogeneity analysis has shown that value oriented clients also have in-
creased investor loyalty towards their banks (Bauer & Smeets, 2011). Thus
the concentrated approach allows banks to obtain a much stronger posi-
tion in the segments it targets because of the greater emphasis on the tar-
geted personal values. It also has been argued that this greater emphasis ul-
timately leads to a beer understanding of the needs of the targeted clients.
A promising perspective could also be to inquire about the other party in the
marketing process - namely the retail banker. Indeed recent polls document
that CSR could be a lever for employee araction and engagement (Meister,
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Figure 8.1: Results from a 2013 poll by the nonprofit Net Impact - value similar-
ity increases acceptance of remuneration cuts more than general CSR
commitment.
2013). Whereas, all else being equal, only 35% of respondents would take a
remuneration cut to work for a company commied to CSR, 58% said that
they would do so to “work for an organization with values like my own”
(Meister, 2013) (cf. Figure 8.1) The need to make an impact seems to be even
stronger for younger generations. Since so much of the corporate world has
now jumped on the CSR bandwagon, it can be hard for companies to set
themselves apart - increased value similarity could be a lever for making
the dierence.
8.2 the acceptability of remunerations
Applications of the findings on acceptability of remunerations are in busi-
ness administration and justice issues. Beforehand it is important to say
that they do not provide an answer to the question whether the state or
private sector should be in charge of making remuneration systems more
acceptable to the public. Hence, it could be the starting point for an inter-
esting psychological-political research project.
Many political thinkers, from John Stuart Mill to Third Way social-
democrats have argued in favour of a market economy, with government
having some responsibility for guaranteeing social justice. From such per-
spectives policy measures for increasingly acceptable remunerations could
be envisioned. Indeed, many employee benefits are already legally required.
For example, employers must provide workers remuneration insurance
and social security must be paid partly by the employer. Those benefits,
especially in the case of layworker’s benefits, could be extended.
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On the other hand there are company specific remuneration aspects that
are more diicult to legislate but which contribute to the good functioning
of organizations and society. For example, a bakery would be more likely
to give employees free bread, while a restaurant would oer employees free
or reduced-price meals. Whereas those company specific remunerations are
more costly to large companies, they can have access to dierent employee
advantages through grouped purchases.
Another application is that eorts towards distributive justice of remuner-
ation policy could be implemented by human resource managers into job
satisfaction agendas. These agendas typically include a variety of measures.
According to Brief (1999) “if a person’s work is interesting, the remunera-
tion is fair, the promotional opportunities, and the supervisor is supportive,
and the coworkers are friendly, then employees will be satisfied.” Of course,
the impact of the findings from Chapter 5 on remuneration fairness percep-
tion and job satisfaction must be considered in the context of these other
factors.
8.3 revealing undeserved benefits
Chapter 6 reported evidence that people are insensitive to financial incen-
tives when they decide to reveal or conceal benefits that would seem unfair
to others. This knowledge could become useful in many situations - think
for example of bribery, tax evasion or welfare fraud. In all those situations
the financial incentives may play a smaller role once the person has received
the benefits.
A more indirect application could be in privacy regulation theory. Privacy
regulation refers to the ways in which people and groups control inter-
actions with others, especially about confidential or intimate information
(Spielberger, 2004). All cultures have developed mechanisms for regulating
privacy that generally evolve around “selective control” of the levels of open-
ness and closedness a person seeks.
Due to its importance for eective functioning, privacy regulation is deemed
a “cultural universal” - every society has developed mechanisms that allow
people to regulate interactions with others. However, specific privacy mech-
anisms are culture dependent, and use of privacy regulation mechanisms
is usually guided by cultural norms. Insensitivity to incentives for revealing
benefits that would be perceived as unfair shows that privacy regulation
mechanisms do not merely rely on cost benefit analysis. As suggested ear-
lier (cf. Chapter 6) decisions in the reveal game could as well be influenced
by cultural norms. Amongst the many applications of privacy regulation are
privacy policies in hospitals, in companies, on web sites and security screen-
ing.
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8.4 concluding remark
Throughout the course of my work for this dissertation I have continuously
encountered the phenomenon that for some reason economic issues seem to
be perceived as irreductibly inconsistent with a moral position. It is curious
to see that CSR theories range form economically motivated to normative
approaches as if both together were inconceivable. Empirical studies docu-
ment a change in causal aribution when a desirable behaviour is or is not
financially rewarded (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010) as if doing good while earn-
ing money was impossible. In my own studies, notably in the last one on
undeserved benefits (cf. Chapter 6), participants sometimes unexpectedly
refused to get paid saying they were willing to help science but not in ex-
change for money as if it was impossible to do both at the same time. I found
that some of my colleagues were very uncomfortable with calculus based
financial arguments, others were unable to consider the limits of calculus
(On a few occasions I had the impression that not choosing the financially
optimal solution was considered to be an emotional or intellectual weak-
ness).
My impression is that dialectical reasoning in moral economics is hand-
icapped by deeply held convictions about the status of financial success.
Many consider rich people to be profiteers whose sole motivation and pur-
pose in life is earning more money with no consideration for the well being
of others. Many also consider that financial misfortune is a maer of per-
sonal motivation and that people on welfare are the buccaneers of modern
states.
Dialectic reasoning requires mental flexibility which is particularly hindered
when those convictions are paired with emotions. The stronger the link be-
tween negative emotions and the belief in profiteers or modern buccaneers
the less will someone be able to embrace the opposite view. Not that both
beliefs are wrong, they are accurate descriptions of realities but just not for
every situation. Motility is required in responsible judgement, and improve-
ment of it is where research on morals and economics should ultimately
take us.
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C O R P O R AT E S O C I A L R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y : D E F I N I T I O N
A N D T H E O R Y
When companies act in the interest of the society one generally speaks of
CSR. However there are a variety of formal definitions for the term CSR.
While it is generally accepted that CSR means responsible business con-
duct in the actual economic activity, in environmentally relevant aspects, in
relations with employees and in exchanges with stakeholders, discordance
on a precise definition persists.
The Oxford Handbook of CSR references 25 dierent ways CSR has been
defined in the academic literature (Crane, 2008). Further, in the Anglo-
American usage, and increasingly in the western European countries, re-
lated concepts such as corporate responsibility or CC are used in the discus-
sion about the role and responsibilities of companies in society (Dubielzig &
Schaltegger, 2005). A general problem seems to be the diiculty to pin down
the key points that constitute it.
For example European Commission mentions social and environmental con-
cerns as the two key aspects of CSR. If economic concerns are added we ob-
tain the three dimensions of sustainability mentioned by D. Brown, Dillard,
and Marshall (2006). Crane (2008) includes all dimensions of sustainability
and integrates voluntary social, environmental and economic contributions
of a company that go beyond regulatory compliance. Thus an important
challenge is to clearly distinguish between what are the aspects that consti-
tute CSR and what are not.
Another question that has challenged many scholars is to justify why com-
panies should engage in CSR practices. There are basically two approaches:
the normative and the economically motivated approach. The normative ap-
proach claims that the company draws on non-monetary benefits from so-
ciety, such as infrastructure, security, educational and social systems. In re-
turn, the society expects social responsibility from the company. The norma-
tive approach justifies regulatory pressure from governments and transna-
tional institutions, that require social responsibility from companies (Wühle,
2007).
In line with the normative approach, the International Organization for
Standardization, has launched an International Standard providing guide-
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lines for social responsibility (SR) named ISO 26000 “Guidance on Social Re-
sponsibility” in 2010. This non-certifiable standard is a guide to raise aware-
ness of social responsibility and promote a common terminology. It uses
already existing approaches to environmental and social responsibility (for
example the Global Reporting Initiative) and contains many examples of
CSR best practices.
The economically motivated approach, on the other hand, tries to estab-
lish an intrinsic motivation of companies for the implementation of CSR.
It seeks to demonstrate that a voluntary, non-normative implementation of
CSR is a benefit increase for the company itself. The reason given for this in-
crease in benefits is the creation and valuation of intangible assets, such as
trust, reputation, employee motivation and customer satisfaction (Wühle,
2007). Accordingly many scholars have argued for the business case of CSR
(Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Weber, 2008; Salzmann, Ionescu-somers, & Steger,
2005).
People who believe in economically motivated approaches would thus pro-
mote SRI through the financial out-performance argument. The basic idea
is that SRI gain an advantage though pricing in intangible externalities.
For example they would not invest in a company with a bad reputation
when it comes to child labor practices before there are scandals followed by
outraged consumers and new legislation. Those who favor a normative ap-
proach, on the other hand, would favor communicating the moral standards
that SRI could provide.
As for socially responsible remunerations and honesty in aairs, both can
either be justified through normative or economic approaches. A normative
approach would justify them with increased moral standards, whereas an
economically motivated approach would point towards increased company
performance. It could be argued that it is ethically superior and desirable
for a democratic society to design remunerations in a way that is most ac-
ceptable to the general public. Honesty in business is most likely to be en-
couraged for the sake of transparency in organizations.
Economically motivated approaches would could argue that there is a
causal link between turnover, employee satisfaction and perceived fairness
of remunerations: If workers of a firm think that their own remuneration,
and the remuneration of the other employees of the firm is fair, they will be
more satisfied and more productive in their work. Ultimately, this increase
will benefit the companies turnover.
It has to be acknowledged that the economically motivated approach is
somehow limited to calculus. If payroll becomes higher or incentives for hon-
esty more expensive than the gain in employee motivation through fairer
salaries or the decrease of hidden costs engendered by undeserved benefits,
there simply is no economic reason for continuing the policies.
An important reason for economically motivated CSR makes use of CSR as
a promotional measure. The goal is to present the company as morally su-
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perior and thus gain a competitive advantage over less moral peers. The re-
sults of the studies presented in Part ii could be used to communicate moral
superiority in and eective manner. However it can only be seen as legiti-
mate if the actual CSR performance is in line with the communication. Exag-
gerations, half-truths or individual aspects promoted independently of the
larger unsustainable core business, are called green-washing. Consumers
have been shown to reject green-washing practices leading to a backslash
for companies reputation (Stokes, 2009; Sirieix et al., 2012).
In sum, there is broad agreement about the fact that CSR means doing good
to the society, but controversy persists about the precise actions that compa-
nies can do to do good to the society and foremost about their motivations
to do so.
9.1 theories of corporate social responsibility
There have been many aempts do classify CSR theories, among which
three can be pointed out. Klonoski (1991) identifies three kinds of theories.
The first group is called ’fundamentalism’. It includes all positions that, in
one way or another assert that companies are simply legal artifacts ant their
only social responsibility is increasing profits in compliance with national
and international laws. The second group of theories consists of the theo-
ries that claim a moral person-hood of companies and point to their moral
agencies. As a consequence, companies can be held morally responsible for
their actions. The third group of theories considers the social dimension of
the company to be particularly relevant.
Windsor (2006) also considers three key approaches to CSR. First, ethical re-
sponsibility theory, which presents strong corporate self restraint and altru-
istic duties and expansive public policy to strengthen stakeholders’ rights.
Second economic responsibility theory, which advocates that wealth cre-
ation is only subject to minimalist public policy and eventually customary
business ethics. Third, CC theories which invoke a political metaphor that
provides no true intermediate positioning. In other words, either of the two
conflicting interpretations abandons responsibility language. Neither an in-
strumental interpretation emphasizing managerial discretion to manipulate
philanthropy strategically nor an idealized interpretation substituting vol-
untarism arguments for moral duties provides a theoretical synthesis of eco-
nomics and morals.
A third study by Garriga and Melé (2004) distinguishes four groups of CSR
theories, by considering their respective focus on four dierent aspects of
the social reality: economics, politics, social integration and morals. The
group of theories that focuses on economics considers the companies as
a mere vehicle for wealth creation. The second group, which focuses on the
social power of companies and their responsibility in the political domain as-
sociated with this power. The third group focuses on social integration and
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includes all theories which assert that companies ought to integrate social
demands. The fourth group of theories focuses on moral and comprises all
theories that consider the relationship between business and society should
be embedded with moral values. The following sections build on these dis-
tinction and provide a detailed account for the four most prevalent theories
in CSR.
9.1.1 Corporate Social Performance Theory
CSP theory is grounded in sociology and fits best in the moral person-
hood category of Klonoski (1991). CSP is understood as the configuration
in the business organization of principles of social responsibility, processes
of response to social requirements, and policies, programs and tangible re-
sults that reflect the company’s relations society (Wood, 1991a). This the-
ory claims that business, apart from wealth creation, also has responsibili-
ties for social problems created by business or by other causes, beyond its
economic and legal responsibilities. This includes moral requirements and
discretionary or philanthropic actions carried out by business in favor of
society. That is, improving CSR performance ’means altering corporate be-
havior to produce less harm and more beneficial outcomes for society and
their people (Wood, 1991b).
Conceptually Wood (1991a) presented a synthetic model which is probably
most representative of CSP Theory. It includes:
1. Principles of CSR, expressed on three levels: institutional, organiza-
tional, and individual
2. Processes of corporate social responsiveness
3. Outcomes of corporate behavior
The ’institutional principle’, sometimes mentioned as ’principle of legiti-
macy’ goes back to Davis (1973). Davis arguments are based on morals (hu-
man values and responsibility), social legitimacy (everything that is consid-
ered responsible by society), and a vision of business that pragmatically con-
siders the consequences of irresponsible use of a company’s power. This ap-
proach emphasizes first of all that responsibility is always paired with power,
and the power of companies always has a social impact (Davis, 1960). Hence,
companies are required to assume the resulting responsibilities. However
the factors that influence on the social power of a company are not exclu-
sively internal but also external and shi between the economic, the social
and the political domain. Since companies need social acceptance, the con-
tinued ’vigor of business depends upon its forthright acceptance of further
social-human responsibilities’ (Davis, 1960).
From this he derived a ’power-responsibility’ equation which is formulated
as follows: ’social responsibility of businessmen arises from the amount of
9.1 theories of corporate social responsibility 141
social power they have’ (Davis, 1968). He further stated that those who do
not take responsibility for their power, will ultimately loose it (Davis & Blom-
strom, 1966). Applied to business these ideas mean that society grants legit-
imacy to companies and that in the long run those companies who do not
use their power in a way that is considered responsible by society will loose
it (Davis, 1973).
The principle that power comes with responsibility is found in the situation
remunerations introduced in Section 3. As demonstrated by the historical
account, ancient rulers of the Sumerians and Babylonians (probably some of
the most powerful authorities mankind has known) had introduced rules of
compensation for lay-workers. To a large extent the CSP theory is a hybrid
of normative and economically motivated approaches. Indeed it is unclear
whether those rules were installed out of the rulers empathy for the workers
or whether the true motive was his fear of public resent that would arise
from absence of workers protection in the long run.
Partly this conceptual discomfort is addressed in the dierentiation be-
tween two types of social responsibilities in the institutional principle. First
there is a social-economic responsibility for general economic welfare and
second, there is a social-human responsibility for preserving and develop-
ing human values. Further Davis excludes both extreme positions: the first
stating that companies take power and have no responsibility for what they
are doing and the second that hold companies responsible for ’everything’.
Woods’ conception of the ’organizational principle’ (sometimes called the
’principle of public responsibility’) follows Preston and Post (1975). A central
aspect of it is the public responsibility principle, that is a ’widely shared and
generally acknowledged principle, directing and controlling actions that
have broad implications for society at large or major portions of thereof.’
Conform with this view, business should adhere to the standards of perfor-
mance in law and the existing public policy process.
Pivotal to the ’public responsibility’ approach is the idea that business and
society are two interpenetrating systems. They accentuate the interdepen-
dence between social institutions. This diers from the functional theory of
the relationship between business and society in which every social institu-
tion is considered as mono-functional. The argument is that since business
and society are interpenetrating systems, firms should act socially respon-
sible, because they exist and operate in a shared environment.
The idea that socially irresponsible behavior dispossesses companies from
vital social capital also applies to remunerations. A company might be fi-
nancially beer o with socially less acceptable remuneration systems but
destroy the support from its workers and public institutions which in the
long run could have negative consequences for workers motivation and/or
government subsidies.
According to Preston and Post, managerial standards derive from public pol-
icy. However they consider that public policy includes not only the literal
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text of law and regulations but also the broad paern of social direction
reflected in public opinion, emerging issues, formal legal requirements and
enforcement or implementation of practices (Preston & Post, 1975). They
also acknowledged that discovering the contents of the principle of public
responsibility is a complex and diicult task, variable over time, which re-
quires substantial management heedfulness.
Simultaneously, they advocate business intervention in the public policy
process in particular with regard to areas in which specific public policy
is not clearly established or in transition. ’It is legitimate and may be essen-
tial, that aected firms participate openly in the policy formation’ (Crane,
2008).
Wood (1991a) without agreeing in full with Preston and Post’s theory, un-
derstands business and society relations in a likewise way, as interwoven
rather than being distinct entities. Therefore, social expectations have di-
rect influence on the shaping of CSR.
Preston and Post (1975) analyzed the range of managerial responsibility in
terms of the primary and secondary involvement of the firm in its social
environment. Primary involvement includes the essential economic tasks, as
for example locating and constituting its facilities, acquire suppliers, hiring
employees and marketing products. It further includes legal requirements.
Secondary involvements follow (e.g. career opportunities), arising from the
primary activity of selections and progress of employees.
The ’individual principle’ is, in Woods’ conception, the principle of ’man-
agerial discretion’. Because managers are moral actors, they are obliged to
exercise such discretion, within the very domain of CSR, if they can, towards
socially responsible outcomes. In other words, this principle presumes that
because managers possess discretion they are personally responsible for ex-
ercising it and cannot avoid this responsibility through reference to rules,
policies and procedures (Wood, 1991a).
The principal idea is that a discretionary element of managerial decision
making impacts on CSR performance. The situation studied in Chapter 6 is
that someone has the choice between concealing or revealing undeserved
benefits. Likewise a manager can or cannot tell the public that his company
has benefited from windfall gains such as regulatory changes or that he
personally received beer rates for his mortgage loan since the company
also dealt with his bank. To investigate the drivers of responsible behavior
Chapter 6 presents an experimental paradigm that reproduces the struc-
tural elements of such situations while controlling for interfering factors.
Within the ’process of corporate social responsiveness’ Wood (1991a) en-
compasses ’environmental assessment’, i.e. adapting the organization to its
environment in order to survive, ’stakeholder management’, i.e. analyzing
stakeholder relationships and processes to regulate interdependencies and
relations accurately, and ’issues management’, i.e. which includes external
issues, as for example partnerships between public and private, community
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involvement or social strategies, and internal issues like codes of conduct.
Lastly, ’outcomes of corporate behavior’ include studies on social impacts,
social programs and social policies.
CSP theory also synthesizes relevant developments in the CSR field. It pro-
vides a coherent structure for assessing the relevance of research topics to
central questions. However the theory falls short on several aspects. While
the first comes from the vagueness of the concept of CSR proposals to in-
tegrate stakeholder perspectives to provide precision (Carroll, 1991, 2004)
have not been abundant.
A more important weakness is the lack of integration between moral nor-
mative aspects and business activity. The institutional principle, which
searches for legitimacy, does not approve the moral motivation or respect
(Swanson, 1995). Furthermore the theory only puts emphasis on the social
control of business by paying aention to public responsibility. E. Freeman
and Liedtka (1991) have suggested that CSR merely exists to give a ’human’
face to capitalism, but completely separates economics and morals.
Proponents of the CSP theory labor for a business model respectful to all
people, defending human rights and human conditions at the workplace.
Despite the moral content of such goals, the CSR literature was reluctant to
connect with those moral contents, for a long time. Probably due to the pre-
ponderance of moral relativism terms such as ’values of our society’, ’social
expectation’ or ’performance expectation’ were used instead of more con-
crete ideas. Bowen (1953) talked about objectives and values of our society’.
Similarly Frederick (1960) said that social responsibility means that ’busi-
nessmen should oversee the operations of an economic system that fulfills
the expectations of the public. Sethi (1975) considers CSR to be congruent
with the prevailing social norms, values, and expectations of performance.
Carroll (1979) also emphasized the role of the changing expectations of so-
ciety on the contents of CSR. Even moral responsibilities are behaviors that
society expects companies to follow (Carroll, 1999).
Eels, Walton, and Fox (1961) also took into account moral considerations:
When people talk about CSR they are thinking in terms of the problems
that arise when companies casts their shadow on the social scene, and on
the moral principles that ought to govern the relationships between the com-
panies and the society. Likewise, Davis asserted that the essence of social
responsibility “arises from concern for the moral consequences of one’s acts
as they might aect the interest of others” (Davis, 1968). Notably Frederick
(1987) has advocated a move towards a normative moral foundation of CSR.
The practical implications of this limitation of CSP theory is unfolded in the
studies in Chapter 4. In the situation people express their personal values
and their trust in dierent SRI funds. Vague expression like ’values of our
society’ or ’social expectation’ are measured more precisely in these stud-
ies. Moreover they asses the dierences of trustworthiness between funds
that have values similar to the personal values and those who have not. As-
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sessing the importance of precise moral values for people’s decisions allows
for comparison to the importance of other factors, in particular to financial
performance.
9.1.2 Shareholder Value Theory
SV theory claims that the only social responsibility of business is making
profits and increasing the financial value of the company for shareholders.
Social activities that a company could engage in are acceptable if prescribed
by law or if they contribute to the maximization of SV. This is also the the-
oretical underlying of neoclassical economic theory, which is mainly con-
cerned with the maximization of shareholder utility. The most notable rep-
resentative of this view is Milton Friedman, who wrote: ’In such an economy
there is one and only one social responsibility of business - to use resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free com-
petitions, without deception or fraud’ (Friedman & Friedman, 2002).
This approach oen introduced as SV oriented, generally takes SV maxi-
mization as the supreme reference for corporate governance and business
management. In general it goes along with Agency Theory (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976), which is prevalent in virtually every business school. According
to this theory owners (commonly the shareholders) are the principal and
managers are the agent. The laer bear fiduciary duties towards the former,
and are generally exposed to incentives in order to align their economic in-
terests with those of the owners, and thus with the maximization of SV.
SV theory is based on the premise of a ’free society’ and objects to defen-
dants of other conceptions of CSR that their theories undermine the basis
of a free society: They are ’fundamentally subversive’ (Friedman & Fried-
man, 2002). Friedman and Friedman (2002) published a mainstream media
article saying that ’those who spread the idea of business as not concerned
merely with profits are preaching pure and unadulterated socialism’. Social
responsibility is a ’doctrine that harms the foundations of a free society’.
SV theory further contains several philosophical assumptions originated in
John Lockes’ atomistic vision of society. Lock wrote extensively on the laws
of liberties for the individual person and the necessity of social contracts for
living together. These ideas, along with Adam Smiths ideas on a free marked
economy were of great influence for the American business framework.
People are seen as individuals that have desires and preferences. Some of
their rights (right to live, private property, freedom) are specially empha-
sized. Society is no more than the sum of the individuals and the good of
society is only the agreement on individual interests. This individual per-
spective is compatible with a sense of equality, understood as equal oppor-
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tunity and has, with the formation of interest group pluralism a means of
directing the society.
Private property, in this theory, is considered as an absolute right, limited
only by legal restrictions aiming at limiting abuses. Private property is so
important because it is considered to be the best guarantee of individual
human rights. Property right is a concept that assures individual freedom
from predatory powers of sovereigns. Sternberg (2000) is an strong advocate
of property rights and argues that owners are legally eligible for the benefits
of their investment and that any other use is unjust.
Regarding the concept of the firm, SV theory accepts the artificial nature of
companies, that is companies are regarded as creations of the law (Friedman
& Friedman, 2002), which established duties and rights for companies. First
are seen as combinations of contracts (Williamson & Winter, 1991) that of-
ten adopt the principal-agent relation as in agency theory (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976).
This vision has appealing aspects when one considers it applied to reality:
People who own companies hire people to manage them and these in turn
hire labor to work in the companies. Thus, managers and workers are em-
ployees of the owners. Executives also establish contracts with suppliers,
creditors, and buyers. There is no doubt that the firm is a net of contracts
and the persons among whom a contractual arrangement exists are clearly
defined (Friedman & Friedman, 2002).
Another assumption that is implicit to SV theory is more controversial: the
public and private spheres are fully separated. Business is considered as a
private enterprise autonomous and only restricted by the regulations of the
government without responsibility other than to make profits and create
wealth. This view leads to the position that rejects any responsibility for the
consequences of business activity. For example the consequences of a pol-
lution only have to be taken into account if there is a legal requirement for
it. Friedman says that it is unacceptable to make expenditures on reducing
pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the company
or that is required by law in order to contribute to the social objective of
improving environment (Friedman & Friedman, 2002). That means that the
public good has to be pursued only by the public servants and politicians.
Consequently in this view, if the executive assigns a companies resources to
’social objectives’ that means that she is imposing taxes on shareholders.
One of the main consequences of property rights is that the owners of the
means of production hire managers, who in turn defend the owners inter-
ests. But this raises a decisive problem: executives have fiduciary duties to-
wards the owners. These fiduciary duties come from considering that ’an ex-
ecutive is an employee of the owners of the company’ and as a consequence
the owner has direct responsibilities towards her employers’ (Friedman &
Friedman, 2002).
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The maxim that the purpose of business in society is to generate profits
and that this is companies’ only social responsibility is today expressed in
a wider sense by saying that companies have to be oriented towards maxi-
mizing SV.
Two normative standards exist in SV theory. First, fiduciary duties of exec-
utives towards the shareholders or the companies’ owners become an im-
portant standard for responsibilities. According to Friedman and Friedman
(2002), an executive is an employee of the owners of the business’ and that
is the reason why he has direct responsibility to his employers. His or her
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with the owners’ de-
sires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible.
A companies structure in shareholder theory generally includes a decision-
making structure based on principal-agent theory and to facilitate the fidu-
ciary duties of executives towards shareholders. In a similar way, corporate
governance is basically aributed with the role of defending shareholders’
interests. Management systems also need to be designed to maximize share-
holder wealth.
The second normative standard is compliance with law, with a minimalist
public policy. It covers observance of the ’rules of the game’ of open and
free competition and abiding the law.
Supporters of SV theory point out its eiciency in creating wealth. The man-
agement and governance of a company steered towards maximization of SV
is not only to enrich the shareholders but also to achieve superior economic
performance of the whole system. The argument goes as follows: conduct-
ing business for self interest, announcing profits as the ultimate goal, and
operating under conditions of free and competitive markets within the con-
text of minimalist public policy are the best conditions for wealth creation.
This argument has been advocated by Jensen (2000) claims two centuries of
empirical support. The conditions mentioned before provide incentives for
innovation, cuing costs and prices, producing products with added value
and raising capital for for future investments. Simultaneously, the tax sys-
tem allows for a part of the created wealth to be shared by society through
government. The negative outcomes of companies can simply be avoided
through suitable laws and government interventions accompanied by pri-
vate charity, which can deal with inequalities and other social issues.
The SV theory is prevalent and backed by the law in most countries and
many companies are running under its guidance. Nevertheless, many crit-
ics have pointed out the weaknesses of this theory. At first, economic per-
formance is not the whole public good. It is imaginable that profits go up
while workers are exploited, natural resources irreversibly exhausted and
the environment deteriorated.
For Adam Smith public good is provided by the ’invisible hand’, and this
idea is still present in approaches supporting SV theory. K. Arrow (1985) has
criticized both the eiciency of markets and the separation of political and
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economic power arguing that the eects of externalities through asymmet-
ric information destroys Smiths’ invisible hand and the connection between
micro and macro levels and therefore the eiciency of capital markets.
In practice, the SV maximization approach oen results in short term prof-
its, for example through reduction in labor expenses, rather than long term
profitability. Overall there is increasing evidence that economic success de-
pends largely on management eorts to integrate other factors than share-
holder interests, as for example those of employees, customers, suppliers,
local communities, and other groups with stakes in the companies activities
(stakeholders) (Crane, 2008). As successful business needs more than profits
to exist in the long run. It requires trust, a sense of loyalty, and good relation-
ships with all stakeholders. Consequently a lasting company need cooper-
ation with those involved in or interdependent with the firm (L. T. Hosmer,
1995; Kay, 1993; Koer & Heske, 1992).
SRI is a showcase of two diiculties SV encounters when applied. First, it
is not always clear what is in the best interest of shareholders. For exam-
ple the financial performance of SRI is still under debate. If the inclusion of
moral extra financial criteria represents a financial disadvantage it is in di-
rect conflict with the legal principle of fiduciary duties fund managers have
towards their clients (normative standard of SV theory 1. If on the opposite
SRI allows fund managers to outperform conventional funds (eg. because
they penalize unethical companies before regulatory changes) all managers
would be legally bound to include this information 2.
The second diiculty SV theory has is the balance of short term vs. long
term shareholder interests. What is in the short term beneficial for share-
holders might be wrong in the long run. Morally irresponsible business con-
duct might outperform in the short run (eg. by finding legal loopholes and
passing the costs of externalities to the public) but that in the long run the
society amends such behavior and withdraws vital support from the com-
pany. A major factor of this support a society has towards a business is
trust.
Chapter 4 has as a starting point the assertion of a general loss of trust in
the financial sector aer the financial crisis of 2008. This loss of trust leads
to the need for rebuilding public trust for its long term success. Since SRI
funds carry moral values similar to people’s personal values it is possible
that they can help lever the funds perceived trustworthiness. Thus, from a
SV perspective it would be important to assess whether a) SRI is a compet-
itive advantage as compared to conventional investments and b) whether
SRI has eects on intangible assets such as trust. Chapter 4 experimentally
addresses the laer question.
1 A thorough discussion from a legal perspective and eventual regulatory solutions are pro-
vided by Siegl (2011).
2 Partisans of this argument oen mention reputational risk that impacts stock valuation
models in the long run.
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Another diiculty of SV is the application of agency theory. Recently doubts
have been raised as to whether current executive bonus practices are al-
ways in the best interest of the company and shareholders (Delves, 2003).
The most prominent example are recursive executive remunerations voting
structures (Bebchuk & Jesse M . Fried, 2003). Simply put most executives are
also members of the boards of other companies and therefore determine the
remuneration of their peers. By seing high standards they can thus influ-
ence on their own remuneration in their own interest 3.
In Chapter 5 one study evaluates the social acceptability of aempts to alien-
ate manager and shareholder interests through remuneration systems that
connect high bonuses to share value (stocks, stock options). Two other stud-
ies link the components of remuneration systems to social justice factors.
Three more major critiques have be made to SV theory. a) SV’s pivotal con-
cept of property rights has also been criticized as not acceptable for modern
theories of property (Donaldson & Preston, 1995a). Drucker, Dyson, Handy,
Sao, and Senge (1997) have argued that the concepts of property and own-
ership no longer suiciently describe what a company really is. Capital is
neither the only nor the main asset of a company, whereas people who work
in the company are increasingly its principal asset.
b) In regard to the constraints of law, critics point out that laws are imper-
fect and with limited eects. It is impossible, and inconvenient to regulate
everything in business life. Furthermore laws are generally voted aer some
negative impact has already occurred. Moreover, oen companies find loop-
holes in the law and many regulations strangle business creativity and en-
trepreneurship. Additionally, when interventions are to frequent and make
use of laws, rules and other governmental instruments this is opposed to
the minimalist regulation presumption, required for free competition.
c) some critics have been made on the narrow conception of human beings
within this approach. People are reduced to the freedom of election and self
interest, The vision of society is atomistic and business activity autonomous
within society (Davis, 1960; Preston & Post, 1975; Sethi, 1975; Grant, 1991).
The focus on the personal value of telling the truth in Chapter 6 is an indirect
application of these three critiques. In essence, the problem people face in
the experiments is that they have to chose whether they are willing to reveal
their undeserved benefits and incur adverse feelings like envy from others
or if they are willing to keep them secret consciously hiding their advantage.
Also, sometimes both options can come with a financial (dis-)advantages.
This situation combines the specific features of all three critiques: a) the le-
gal concept of property right is not necessarily the determining factor of the
decision to conceal or reveal ones undeserved benefits; b) in this situation
there is oen a legal gray area, a privileged treatment because of a social
3 Further, merger and acquisition activities albeit their disciplining eects on managers, can
cause economic instability and insecurity (Delves, 2003)
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status or position might not be illegal nevertheless it will be perceived as
misplaced and the decision maker might take account for this. c) Of course
there are also personal factors that cold play a role in the decision to reveal
or conceal. In particular personal values and adhesion to a given social norm
like truth telling might be salient.
9.1.3 Stakeholder Theory
ST, in contrast to shareholder theory, considers all people or groups with
a ’stake’ in the company. In General, stakeholders are groups and individ-
uals who benefit or are harmed by the actions of a company. From such a
perspective, CSR can be conceived in the way that companies have an obli-
gation to constituent groups in society other that stockholders and beyond
that prescribed by law (Jones, 1980).
On the other hand not all authors agree that business responsibilities to-
wards the firm’s stakeholders fall in the domain of CSR. For example, E. Free-
man and Liedtka (1991) defend the stakeholder approach, and airm that
CSR is not a useful idea and ought to be abandoned. They think that
the question of CSR does not arise when the term stakeholder is widely
enough defined to include suppliers, community, employees, customers, and
financiers. They write “once we come to see each of these groups, and the
people within them, as legitimate partners in the dialog about ’what is
this company going to be,’ the social responsibility of the resulting entity
is moot”. Alternatively they suggest that companies have responsibility to
all the parties aected by their activity, in other words they have responsi-
bilities towards the stakeholders.
R. E. Freeman (2005) have suggested that the genuine responsibility of busi-
ness is to create value for stakeholders, including local communities. They
have argued that the main goal of CSR is to create value for stakeholders
by fulfilling the firms responsibilities towards them without separating busi-
ness from morals. Accordingly they propose to replace the term CSR with
’company stakeholder responsibility’ to mark a dierent interpretation of
the CSR meaning. Similarly, Wheeler, Colbert, and Freeman (2003) have pro-
posed to reconcile the stakeholder approach, CSR and sustainability with
the creation of values (economic, social, ecologic) for constituencies of the
firm and not only economic value for shareholders. This stakeholder value
oriented theory for understanding the responsibilities of business is thus
quite dierent form SV theory.
Even though there exists more than one approach, a proper definition of the
theory is given by Clarkson (1995): “The firm is a system of stakeholders op-
erating within the larger system of the host society that provides the neces-
sary legal and market infrastructure for the firms activities. The purpose of
the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by converting their
stakes into goods and services.
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R. E. Freeman (1984) conceives ST as a way of thinking about strategic man-
agement. It should provide a way of conceiving how a company should set
and implement a direction. Besides being a managerial theory it is also a
normative theory which requires management to have moral duty to pro-
tect the company as a whole, and as a consequence of this goal, to protect
the interests of all stakeholders. Management has the duty to look aer
the health of the company, which involves balancing the multiple claims of
conflicting stakeholders (Evan & Freeman, 1988).
ST requires companies to be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders:
customers, suppliers, owners, employees and local communities and to as-
sure the maintain the continuity of the firm (Evan & Freeman, 1988). The
structure of decision making is based on the discretion of top management
and corporate governance and should include stakeholder representatives.
The concept of stakeholder is very close to the one of stockholder, in some
sort it is a generalization of it. According to R. E. Freeman (1984) it is meant
to generalize the notion of stockholder as the only group to whom manage-
ment needs to be responsible. The notion of stakeholder can be understood
in two senses: In its narrow sense, the term includes those groups who are
vital to the continuity and success of the company; in a wide sense this in-
cludes any group or person who can aect or is aected by the company
(R. E. Freeman & Reed, 1983; R. E. Freeman, 1984). Accordingly, stakehold-
ers are identified by the interest they have in regards to the actions of the
company, and it is assumed that the interests of all stakeholders have an
intrinsic value (Donaldson & Preston, 1995b).
In both situations, SRI funds and remuneration, presented in Chapters 4
and 5 there could be a narrow and a wide interpretation of stakeholders. In
a narrow sense stakeholders of SRI are those who posses shares of the invest-
ment fund, the employees of the investment fund and also of companies the
fund is invested in. In a wider sense stakeholders also comprise those who
are aected by the actions of the fund. Since SRI claim to impact on society
this means we all are stakeholders in a wide sense. The situation of remu-
nerations is similar in many ways. In the narrow sense shareholders, em-
ployees, customers and eventually suppliers are the stakeholders, whereas
in the wide sense we all are stakeholders. The media coverage of high CEO
bonuses is a very good example of the impact on society that could justify
a wider interpretation.
Both, stakeholder and shareholder theory, have in common their convic-
tions about democracy and market economy principles. Nevertheless they
dier on several other points. In ST the firm is regarded as an abstract entity
where a variety of interests converge rather than a complex set of contracts.
The function of the firm is related to the interests of various individual peo-
ple or groups who influence on or are influenced by the activities of the
company. Put in a dierent way, the purpose of a company is to serve as a
vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests (Evan & Freeman, 1988).
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Legitimacy of ST is grounded on two moral principles called ’Principle of
Corporate Rights’ and ’Principle of Corporate Eects’ (Evan & Freeman,
1988). Both principles invoke Kant’s dictum of respect for persons. The for-
mer says that companies and managers are not allowed to violate the legit-
imate rights of others to determine their future. The laer emphasizes the
responsibility for consequences by stating that companies and managers
are responsible for the eects of their actions on others. They further estab-
lished two more principles (“Stakeholder Management Principles”) to guide
managerial decision making (Evan & Freeman, 1988):
P1: The company ought to be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders:
Its customers, suppliers, owners, employees and local communities.
The rights of these groups must be ensured, and further the groups
must participate, in some sense, in decisions that substantially aect
their welfare.
P2: Management bears a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders and to the
company as an abstract entity. It must act in the interests of stake-
holders as their agent, and it must act in the interest of the company
to ensure the survival of the company, safeguarding the long-term
stakes of each group.
The three studies presented in Chapter 5 could serve as a template for in-
cluding stakeholders in corporate decision making as stipulated in P1. In
those studies people (stakeholders in the wide sense) make judgments about
dierent remuneration situations. The particular arrangement of the situa-
tions allows to extract peoples opinions on such complex situations in which
many parameters need to be considered.
ST has been adapted by dierent authors to several moral theories: Femi-
nist Ethics (Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994; Burton & Dunn, 1996), com-
mon good theory (Argandoña, 1998), the integrative social contracts the-
ory (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) and the principle of fairness (R. A. Phillips,
1997). This moral pluralism is encouraged by R. E. Freeman (1994) who states
that ST can hold dierent moral models.
One of the central tasks of the stakeholder approach is balancing the inter-
ests of the dierent stakeholders. A useful distinction that helps with this
complex task is made by Carson (1993):
Business executives have positive duties to promote the inter-
ests of all stakeholders. (These are prima facie duties) But the
duties to some stakeholders are more important than the duties
to other stakeholders. Thus, sometimes lesser interests of more
important stakeholders take precedence over the greater inter-
ests of more important stakeholders. Positive duties of stake-
holders are constrained by negative duties, as for example not
to lie or break the law.
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Practical applications of this theory are oen found in codes of conduct. For
example the seven Principles of Stakeholder Management proposed by the
Clarkson Center for Business Ethics (Clarkson Center for Business Ethics,
1999):
1. Managers should acknowledge and actively monitor the concerns of
all legitimate stakeholders, and should take their interests appropri-
ately into account in decision-making and operations.
2. Managers should listen to and openly communicate with stakehold-
ers about their respective concerns and contributions, and about the
risks that they assume because of their involvement with the com-
pany.
3. Managers should adopt processes and modes of behavior that are
sensitive to the concerns and capabilities of each stakeholder con-
stituency.
4. Managers should recognize the interdependence of eorts and re-
wards among stakeholders, and should aempt to achieve a fair distri-
bution of the benefits and burdens of corporate activity among them,
taking into account their respective risks and vulnerabilities.
5. Manages should work cooperatively with other entities, both public
and private, to insure that risks and harms arising from a company’s
activities are minimized and, where they cannot be avoided, appropri-
ately compensated.
6. Managers should avoid altogether activities that might jeopardize
inalienable human rights (e.g., the right to life) or give rise to risks
which, if clearly understood, would be patently unacceptable to rele-
vant stakeholders.
7. Managers should acknowledge the potential conflicts between (a)
their own role as corporate stakeholders, and (b) their legal and moral
responsibilities for the interests of stakeholders, and should address
such conflicts through open communication, appropriate reporting
and incentive systems, and, where necessary, third party review.
As comes clear form these principles, they propose a normative approach for
management and not an inflexible code to be applied unequivocally. They
consist of a set of guidelines that respect stakeholders’ legitimate interests
an rights. They also combine both, the principle of a company’s eects and
the principle of corporate rights.
It also becomes clear that those principles are addressed to the manage-
ment and their application it le to management discretion to a large extent.
Knowing the drivers of managerial behavior thus would be an edge in imple-
mentation of ethical principles. Financial incentives are commonly thought
to be a main driver of managerial behavior. Whit regard to this their ef-
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fectiveness in encouraging (discouraging) the decision to reveal undeserved
benefits is tested in Chapter 6.
There exist many advantages of ST. The first of its strengths is that it seems
morally superior to SV theory because it takes into account not only what
it required by law but also the very interests of stakeholders in executive-
stakeholder relations. As a consequence the duties of managers are wider
than managements fiduciary duties to the shareholders. Additionally, prop-
erty rights considerations beer fit with justice requirements than SV the-
ory. Finally, ST, is more respectful of human dignity and rights.
It further contributes to a language that is more in line with human dignity
that other languages which tend to signify that people are mere human re-
sources and a company a maer of ownership, which is bought and sold,
independently form the consideration that the company is run by real per-
sons. This addresses the need to reverse the language and measures of busi-
ness that Drucker et al. (1997) calls for: “A good business is a community
with purpose, and a community is not something to be owned. A commu-
nity as members, and those members have rights, including the right to vote
or express their views on major issues.”
A second strength of ST is that it replaced that vagueness of CSR concepts
by addressing concrete interests and practices and visualizing specific re-
sponsibilities to specific groups of people aected by business activity (Blair,
1995; Clarkson, 1995).
Third, ST is not a loose moral theory without connection to business man-
agement, but a managerial theory concerned with business success. The nor-
mative aspects come later and are closely ties to managerial decision mak-
ing. Stakeholder management is well accepted in many companies and pro-
vides guidelines that can lead to business success in the long term (Collins &
Porras, 1994). However there is still debate about the relationship between
financial performance and ST (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999).
With these strength also come weaknesses, or beer aspects of the strat-
egy that have been criticized. R. Phillips (2003) has argued that criticisms
sometimes take the form of critical distortions and at other times of friendly
misinterpretations. The laer oen consider that ST is socialism and refers
to the entire economy, they also interpret it as a moral doctrine. Another
misinterpretation is to apply ST only to companies and to deduce that it
requires legal changes.
Others have criticized that ST is unable to provide a specific objective func-
tion for companies. Since the ’balancing of stakeholder interests abandons
an objective basis for evaluating business actions (Jensen, 2000; Sundaram
& Inkpen, 2004). R. E. Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) have replied to
this that, (a) the goal of creating value for stakeholders is decidedly pro-
shareholder, (b) creating value for stakeholders creates appropriate incen-
tives for managers to assume entrepreneurial risk, (c) having one objective
function will make governance and management diicult, (d) it is easier to
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make stakeholders out of shareholders rather than vice versa, and (e) in the
event of a breach of contract or trust, shareholders, compared with stake-
holders, have protection (or can seek remedies) through mechanisms such
as the market price.
As mentioned earlier on the methods used in Chapter 5 are a first step
towards objective measures of stakeholder interests and can serve as tem-
plates. The question of socially acceptable remunerations is but one aspect
managerial decisions that concern stakeholders. Similar studies could be
conducted in other situations like supply chain responsibility, environmen-
tal politics or human resource management.
ST has also been criticized for being an excuse for managerial opportunism
(Jensen, 2000; Macroux, 2000; Sternberg, 2000). The argument goes as fol-
lows: Managers are able to justify self-serving behavior by appealing to the
interests of those stakeholders who benefit. Hence the ST, eectively de-
stroys business accountability because a business that is accountable to all,
is actually accountable to none. However, R. Phillips (2003) reply that man-
agerial opportunism is a problem that is not specific to ST. Furthermore,
just because managers can justify self serving behavior by referring to stake-
holder interests does not give persuasiveness to their argument per se.
Another criticism is that ST primarily concerns the distribution of final out-
puts (Macroux, 2000). To this R. Phillips (2003) answer that actually ST is
concerned with who has input in decision-making as well as with who ben-
efits from the outcomes of such decisions.
Divers criticisms come from accepting that managers bear a fiduciary
duty to all stakeholders and that all of them are supposed to be treated
equally, balancing their interests (Macroux, 2000; Sternberg, 2000). Macroux
(2000) brings forward the argument that stakeholder-executive relations
contemplated by stakeholder theories are necessarily non-fiduciary, while
shareholder-executive relations possess all aspects that make fiduciary du-
ties morally necessary to those relations. He concludes that ST is morally
lacking because (a) it fails to account for shareholders being owed fiduciary
duties, and (b) treats all stakeholders’ interests equally despite sharehold-
ers’ legitimate claim to managerial partiality as required by the fiduciary
duties owed to them. R. Phillips (2003) objects to this that only legitimate
interests should be considered in ST, and Gioia (1999) adds that a normative
theory based on ’shouting from the sidelines’ that decision makers should
do the right thing sound credible to managers.
Another objection is that ST admits several interpretations (e.g. feminist,
ecological, fair contracts). According to Hummels (1988) each interpretation
provides a dierent set of stakeholders and stresses the importance of spe-
cific values, rights and interests. But, dierent stakeholder interpretations
lead to dierent distributions of benefits and burden, of values, rights and
interests.
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It also has been objected that stakeholder representation in corporate de-
cision making has diiculties in justification and implementation. Etzioni
(1998) has argued that even though the theory can justify stakeholders tak-
ing part in corporate governance, it cannot be implemented without eect
on the common good: ’while all stakeholders and not only shareholders
have fair claim to a voice in corporate governance, recognizing such claims
may be damaging to the well-being of the economy, and hence injurious to
the common good. It might be further maintained that such considerations
should outweigh the fairness claim (Etzioni, 1998).
9.1.4 Corporate Citizenship
CC theory is somewhat grounded in the observation that business leaders
have been involving their companies in philanthropic activities and dona-
tions to communities where they operate. This observation has been inter-
preted as an expression of good CC by some. Thus, for Carroll (1991) being
a good corporate citizen means actively engaging in acts or programs to
promote human welfare, whereas being a good global corporate citizen is
related to philanthropic responsibility, which ’reflects global society’s expec-
tations that business will engage in social activities that are not mandated
by law nor generally expected of business in a moral sense’ (Carroll, 2004).
However the term CC is also used to designate CSR (Wood & Logsdon, 2001;
Maen & Crane, 2005). Beyond this dierentiation in meaning, other schol-
ars have pointed out that CC is a dierent way of understanding the role of
business in society. Birch (2001) considers CC as innovation, whereas CSR is
more concerned with social responsibilities as an external aair. Wood and
Logsdon (2001) think that the linguistic dierence between CSR and CC
includes a strong dierence in how business organizations should act in re-
spect to stakeholders. Similarly Windsor (2001) believes CC is a managerial
movement that substitutes a dierent conception for social responsibility.
Whereas Moon, Crane, and Maen (2005) suggest that CC is a metaphor
for business participation in society.
The term citizenship has its origins in political science. The term ’citizen’
is supposed to evoke an individual persons’ duties and rights within a po-
litical community. It also contains the more general idea of being part of a
community. In the Aristotelian tradition, companies are supposed to con-
tribute to the common good of society, and in particular to the community,
as a good citizenship because they are seen as an integral part of society. In
this tradition, the notion of citizen is far more linked to participation then
to individual rights. Emission of SRI by large banks would be considered a
participation in the improvement of environmental or social aairs, rather
than a question of individual rights for example.
Aristotle considers that being a citizen is mainly to have ’the right to par-
ticipate in the public life of the state, which was more in the line of duty
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and a responsibility to look aer the interest of the community (Erisksen
& Weigard, 2000). But not all approaches on CC share this view. However
they all are focused on rights and, even more on duties, responsibilities and
possibilities for partnerships between business and societal groups and in-
stitutions.
According to Solomon (1992) the first principle of business ethics is that the
company itself is a citizen, a member of the larger community and incon-
ceivable without it. Companies like individual persons are part and parcel
of the communities that created them, and the responsibilities they bear
are not the products of argument or implicit contracts, but intrinsic to their
very existence as social entities. From this point of view a company that
adopts socially unacceptable remuneration principles would undermine the
larger community from which it originates and which is essential for the
company’s existence.
This view contrasts perspectives of CSR that, implicitly or explicitly, agree
with Friedman’s assumption that companies are autonomous, independent
entities, whether or not they consider their obligations towards the sur-
rounding community (Solomon, 1992). Friedman’s point is that the regula-
tion of failures like excess bonus remunerations should be dealt with outside
of the company, if they do not harm financial interests.
For Waddock and Smith (2000) CC is in essence about the relationships that
a company develops with stakeholders. They assume that being a good cor-
porate global citizen, is largely about respect for others. But simultaneously
this involves building good relationships with stakeholders and this in turn
is the same thing as doing business well.
Most supporters of corporate citizen theory caution against an overhasty
application of the citizenship concept to business. In their view citizenship
refers primarily to individual people. For instance, (Logsdon & Wood, 2002),
analyzed the concept of ’citizen’ and then considered possible meanings of
’corporate citizen’ and then ’business citizenship’. They conclude that busi-
ness citizenship is not equivalent to individual citizenship, it rather derives
from and is secondary to individual citizenship.
Parry (1991) has made a distinction between three views of citizenship: min-
imalist, communitarian, and universal rights. A minimalist view of citizen-
ship regards citizens merely as residents of a common jurisdiction who ac-
knowledge certain duties and rights. The communitarian view ties citizens
in a particular social context, where the rules, traditions, and culture of the
own community are highly meaningful, along with the participation in such
a community. Third is the universal human rights perspective of citizenship
which grounds on the moral assumption of rights as necessary for the recog-
nition of human dignity. Logsdon and Wood (2002) believe that, although
business organizations can be seen from any of these three perspectives,
only the third one is suitable for global companies. Thus, based on univer-
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sal human rights and on integrative social contracts theory (Donaldson &
Dunfee, 1994), scholars have developed global business citizenship theory.
Global business citizen theory holds that organizations are vehicles for man-
ifesting human creativity. They facilitate the creation of surplus value, and
thus allow people and societies to do more with resources. The interests of
companies and their actions are impossible to be captured entirely in con-
tracts as they span over multiple locales. In fact, each company is seen as
a participant in a network of stakeholder relationships. Because companies
can be considered as citizens, with a secondary status to individuals, they
also have weaker rights and duties.
In a nutshell, global business citizenship can be seen as a set of policies and
practices that allow a business organization to abide by a limited number
of universal moral standards, to respect local cultural variations that are
consistent with those standards, to experiment with ways to re-conciliate
local practice with the standards when they are not consistent, and to imple-
ment systematic learning processes for the benefit of the organization, local
stakeholders, and the larger global community (Logsdon & Wood, 2005b).
Concerning specially multinational companies, they explain that a global
business citizen is a multinational enterprise that responsibly implements
duties to people and to societies within and across national and cultural
borders (Wood & Logsdon, 2001).
The process of global business citizenship has several requirements. First, it
needs a set of fundamental values that are enclosed in the corporate code
of conduct and in corporate policies that express universal moral standards.
Second, an implementation throughout the organization with awareness of
where the code and policies fit well and where they might not fit stakeholder
expectations. Third, analysis and experimentation of how to deal with prob-
lem cases. fourth and last, systematic learning processes to communicate
the results of implementation and experiments internally and externally
(Logsdon & Wood, 2005a).
The first requirement grounds on psychology because it calls for universal
moral values. Psychologist have documented many values that are funda-
mental for people. Trading values lie love, justice or honor for secular values
can even lead to adverse reactions (Tetlock, 2003; A. P. Fiske & Tetlock, 1997).
However, research on those protected values has also shown that they can
arise from social norms (Ritov & Baron, 1999) and that not all people adhere
to the same degree (Baron & Spranca, 1997).
Building on insights from this previous research Chapter 6 focuses on one
particular universal values, namely truth telling. The decision to reveal the
truth to others is highly estimated in most cultures and linked to feelings
of honor (Wang et al., 2009). It is also essential in building long term trust
in organizations (Mishra, 1996) and excuse of immoral behavior (Gibson et
al., in press).
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A dierent perspective on CC is oered by Maen and Crane (2005): Ex-
tended theoretical conceptualization of CC. Their starting point is an ex-
amination of the notion of citizenship from the perspective of its original
political meaning. They further consider that globalization has changed the
relative roles of governments and companies in administering citizenship
rights, with companies assuming this role in either of the following cases:
Government ceases to administer citizenship rights, government has not yet
administered citizenship rights, or the administration of citizenship rights
is beyond the reach of the nation-state government.
They further assert that companies are active in citizenship and exhibit cit-
izenship behavior (Maen & Crane, 2005), yet the company is neither a cit-
izen itself nor does it have citizenship. CC is described as the role of the
company in administering citizenship rights for people. This conducts to the
acknowledgment that companies administer certain aspects of citizenship
for others, including traditional stakeholders like employees, customers or
shareholders, but also including those with no direct relationships to the
company.
In describing how companies administer citizenship rights, particularly in
countries where governments fail in those responsibilities, the extended the-
oretical conceptualization dierentiates three social roles tied to three types
of rights (social, civil and political) recognized in democratic societies. Com-
panies are providers of social rights by supplying people with social ser-
vices which provide the freedom to participate in society, like education
and health care. Companies are also providers of civil rights by enabling cit-
izens civil rights which provide freedom from abuses and third parties. Last,
companies are also providers of political rights being an additional conduit
for the exercise of individual political rights.
The provision of those three rights comes with the responsibility of main-
taining it. This is equivalent to the state who provides national security and
has the responsibility to maintain it. Providing people with social rights for
example implies the responsibility to maintain those social rights and guar-
antee highly acceptable wages, equal opportunity in education and up to
date health care.
However the proposal of Maen and Crane (2005) is merely descriptive. Ac-
tually they question whether this triple role of companies is acceptable,
since the administration of the three rights is not mandatory but rather
up to managerial discretion. If companies act as corporate citizens in the
described way, how can they be held accountable towards society? Govern-
ments are accountable to citizens and can be discharged form their respon-
sibilities through elections. This is not the case for companies (Maen &
Crane, 2005).
When it comes to strengths of the CC theory and the global business cit-
izenship concepts a first one is probably that it might be more appealing
to some practitioners simply because of its terminology. Indeed, concepts
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such as ’business ethics’ or ’social responsibilities’ are thought to oppose
business whereas CC can be seen as the fact that corporate citizens capture
their rightful place in society, next to other citizens forming a community
(Maen, Crane, Chapple, & Chappie, 2003).
A second item is in overbearing the narrow functionalist vision of business
which reduces it to a purely economic purpose. Not without neglecting the
basic economic responsibility of business, the notion of CC emphasizes the
social and moral dimensions of companies and their function in securing
human rights, administer social welfare and human development in our so-
cieties.
Another positive feature of CC is its extensive global reach, which seems
increasingly appropriate in globalization. It argues that, from an economic
perspective all citizenship activities that avoid risks, enhance a company’s
reputation, and as a consequence increase long term financial performance
(Vidal, 1999). Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) argue that strategic invest-
ments in citizenship programs are comparable to investments in R&D or
advertising. Under certain conditions citizenship programs can help com-
panies that are in the process of globalization to reduce the perception of
being perceived as peregrine by establishing ties within local communities
and enhancing reputation among local employees, customers and regula-
tors.
A recurring criticism of CC is that it is a concept that lacks focus, and in-
cludes many dierent subjects, like public-private partnerships, corporate
ethical practices, corporate community economic development, corporate
voluntarism, corporate community involvement or corporate brand, image
and reputation management (Windsor, 2001). The allegation is that the the-
ory lacks unity and coherence and serves as eponym for many loose prac-
tices.
Both approaches, global business citizenship and extended theory of CC,
have received specific criticisms. Moon et al. (2005) acknowledge some merit
to global business citizen theory, nevertheless they argue that the approach
is limiting future developments. First, they argue that it is incapable of ad-
equately examining the the underlying metaphorical nature of the applica-
tion of citizenship to companies. Second, it relies on quite simplistic notions
of citizenship that do not allow to establish normative or conceptual poten-
tial of the term. Third, the approach cannot contribute to the understanding
of business society relations. Fourth, it does not provide a normative base for
the social role of companies since it is essentially voluntary. Fih, its narrow
view limits the scope of companies activities. For example it has diiculties
to model actions such as political donations, lobbying or involvement in rule
making. Lastly, they argue that the application of a concept like citizenship
to companies needs a clearer definition of the conditions required to extend
the concept form individual people to organizations.
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Because its conceptualization of CC is considered highly speculative with
lile empirical support, extended theory of CC was also criticized (van Oost-
erhout, 2005). Further the approach fails to discuss corporate rights along
with responsibilities. Additionally it is not explicit why and how CC can
emerge and be sustained and what companies may expect in return for the
responsibilities they assume. Crane and Maen (2005) responded to these
criticisms and clarified the position of CC theorists.
Another objection to CC is that it is absolutely dependent on managerial
discretion and has a philanthropic ideology (Windsor, 2001). The criticism
is that those who use this concept do so to take advantage of increasing
social expectations of corporate benefits in times of government cutbacks
and of strategic management aimed at value creation by the company. The
reproach of CC is flawed if one considers a wider vision of business as a
member of the society and the definition of citizenship more closely related
to moral duties. In addition, even in the case that some specific programs
of CC are related to philanthropy there can be beneficial eects and even
long term value creation. Besides, the global business citizenship approach
is about universal human right, and not philanthropy in the first place.
Relating to its managerial ideology, CC is definitely managerial centered,
but this is not necessarily a negative feature, and to beware abuses, operand
accountability and social controls may be established.
One more issue that could be considered a feebleness or open question in
CC theory is the lack of explicitness about who is charged with establish-
ing the standards for global citizenship (Munshi, 2004). This issue could be
addressed by considering that sets of universal standards and principles al-
ready exist. One could, for example think of the UN Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, the UN Principles for Respon-
sible Investment and so forth. Furthermore there is increasing evidence on
common grounds in religions, wisdom traditions and values (Moses, 2001;
Tetlock, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Caldwell & Dixon, 2009; A. P. Fiske &
Tetlock, 1997).
Finally another weakness is despite the fact that universal human rights
can be a measure in the direction of a CC conception based on relational
stakeholder networks, it can be objected that this is a minimalist approach.
A supportive relationship with stakeholders should require solidarity with
them and not merely respect for their rights. Most people would agree that
a good society must be respectful of human rights, but the chances are high
that this agreement is not a suicient condition to build up a good society.
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M AT E R I A L S F R O M S E C T I O N 1
10.1 experiment 1
Experiment 1 comprised a Visual Basic script implemented in a .pptx
file. The file can be downloaded at https://dl.dropbox.com/
u/2877944/Questionnaire.ppsm. If the link is no longer active
please send an email to the author.
10.2 experiment 2: limesurvey script
1 // JavaScript Document
// Pour la question 1
3
Maintenant imaginez qu ’ un de vos amis , s ouc i eux de l
’éthique, veuille investir dans un fond éthique
5 qui considère des valeurs morales lors de la
sélection de titres.
Votre ami vous sollicite pour savoir s ’ i l peut f a i r e
c on f i a n c e aux fonds . Nous vous demandons
7 d ’indiquer pour chaque fond décrits ci-dessous votre
degré de confiance.
9 ( de 0 : Pas du tout d ’ a c co rd à 10 : Tout à f a i t d
’accord).
<script src= " h t t p : / / enque t e s . univ− t l s e 2 . f r / s c r i p t s /
Mon_Nouveau_Quest ionnaire . j s " type= " t e x t /
j a v a s c r i p t "></script>
11 <script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
ConstitueLesLibels( ’ { INSERTANS : 5 3 3 3 8 X451X2615 } ’, {
INSERTANS:53338X451X2616A},{INSERTANS:53338
X451X2616B}, {INSERTANS:53338X451X2616C}, {
INSERTANS:53338X451X2616D}, {INSERTANS:53338
X451X2616E}, {INSERTANS:53338X451X2616F}, {
INSERTANS:53338X451X2617A}, {INSERTANS:53338
X451X2617B}, {INSERTANS:53338X451X2617C}, {
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INSERTANS:53338X451X2617D}, {INSERTANS:53338
X451X2617E}, {INSERTANS:53338X451X2617F});
13 </script>
15 // Pour les sliders
17
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
19 disp(lib1);
</script>
21 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
23 disp(lib2);
</script>
25 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
27 disp(lib3);
</script>
29 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
31 disp(lib4);
</script>
33 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
35 disp(lib5);
</script>
37 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
39 disp(lib6);
</script>
41 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
43 disp(lib7);
</script>
45 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
47 disp(lib8);
</script>
49 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
51 disp(lib9);
</script>
53 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
55 disp(lib10);
</script>
57 //
<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
59 disp(lib11);
</script>
61 //
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<script type= " t e x t / j a v a s c r i p t " charset= " u t f −8 ">
63 disp(lib12);
</script>
var phrase1A = " Le fond <b>&quot ; F i d e l i t y Value Green
&quot ; , < / b> <b>un fond &ea cu t e ; th ique </ b > , ";
2 var phrase1B= " Le fond <b>&quot ; F i d e l i t y Value Growth
&quot ; , < / b> ";
var phrase2= " g&ea cu t e ; r&ea cu t e ; par " ;
4 var phrase3F= " <b>Susanne Roubin </ b><br / > ";
var phrase3M= " <b>Mark Bu f f e r </ b><br / > ";
6 var phrase4= " e s t&nbsp ; p r o f i t a b l e depu i s 10 ans e t a
eu une des m e i l l e u r e s per fo rmances dans son
s e c t e u r d ’ a c t i v i t&ea cu t e ; . < br / > ";
var phrase5= " <br / >R&ea cu t e ; cemment i l a &ea cu t e ; t&
ea cu t e ; &ea cu t e ; va lu&ea cu t e ; par une agence de
no t a t i o n &ea cu t e ; t h i qu e e t <br / > a re&c c e d i l ; u d ’
e x c e l l e n t e s no t e s dans l e s domaines <br / > ";
8
var phrase6A = " de l a con f o rm i t&ea cu t e ; &agrave ; l a
l o i n a t i o n a l e ";
10 var phrase6B = " i n t e r n a t i o n a l e e t de l a t r a n s p a r e n c e
de l ’ e n t r e p r i s e ";
var phrase6C = " du r e s p e c t des d r o i t s des
t r a v a i l l e u r s ";
12 var phrase6D = " de l a p r o t e c t i o n de l ’ environnement "
;
var phrase6E = " des a c t i o n s pour l a s an t&ea cu t e ; e t
l a s&ea cu t e ; c u r i t&ea cu t e ; pubique ";
14 var phrase6F = " de l a l u t t e c on t r e l a c o r r u p t i o n ";
16 var phrase7 = " <br / > Est−ce que vous j uge z ce fonds
d igne de c on f i a n c e ? <br />< br / > ";
18 var label = " ";
var estUnHomme = false;
20 var monTab1 = new Array;
var monTab2 = new Array;
22 var lib1 = " ";
var lib2 = " ";
24 var lib3 = " ";
var lib4 = " ";
26 var lib5 = " ";
var lib6 = " ";
28 var lib7 = " ";
var lib8 = " ";
30 var lib9 = " ";
var lib10= " ";
32 var lib11= " ";
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var lib12= " ";
34
function disp(txt) { document.write(txt) }
36
function inverser(i,j) {
38 var temp1=monTab1[i];
var temp2=monTab2[i];
40
monTab1[i]= monTab1[j];
42 monTab2[i]= monTab2[j];
44 monTab1[j]=temp1;
monTab2[j]=temp2;
46 }
48 function TriTab() {
// tab est le nom du tableau a deux dim,
dont la valeur numérique
50 // est en 0, trie par ordre croissant
52 var n=monTab1.length;
var continuer=true;
54 var i=0;
var iter=0;
56
58
while (continuer)
60 {
iter++;
62 continuer=false;
for (i=0;i<n-1;i++)
64 {
if (Math.min(monTab1[i],
monTab1[i])!= monTab1[i
])
66 {
inververser(i,i+1);
68 continuer=true;
}
70 }
}
72
// for (i=0;i<n;i++) {tab[i]=ordre*tab[i];}
74
}
76
function DispTab() {
78 var nb=monTab1.length;
for (var i = 0; i < nb; i++)
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80 disp( " E l&ea cu t e ; ment n ° "+i+ " : <B> "
+monTab1[i]+ " "+monTab2[i]+ " </B><
BR> ");
}
82
84 function InitProfilA(A, B, C, D, E, F)
{
86 monTab1[0] = A;
monTab1[1] = B;
88 monTab1[2] = C;
monTab1[3] = D;
90 monTab1[4] = E;
monTab1[5] = F;
92 }
94 function InitProfilB(A, B, C, D, E, F)
{
96 monTab1[0] = monTab1[0] + A;
monTab1[1] = monTab1[1] + B;
98 monTab1[2] = monTab1[2] + C;
monTab1[3] = monTab1[3] + D;
100 monTab1[4] = monTab1[4] + E;
monTab1[5] = monTab1[5] + F;
102 }
104 function InitTabPhrases()
{
106 monTab2[0]= phrase6A;
monTab2[1]= phrase6B;
108 monTab2[2]= phrase6C;
monTab2[3]= phrase6D;
110 monTab2[4]= phrase6E;
monTab2[5]= phrase6F;
112 }
114 function Les2Max()
{return(monTab2[4]+ " e t " + monTab2[5]);
116 }
function Les2Min()
118 {return(monTab2[0] + " e t " + monTab2[1]);
}
120 function Les2Midle()
{return(monTab2[2] + " e t " + monTab2[3]);
122 }
124 function InitLab()
{
126 label = " ";
}
128
166 materials from section 1
/*
130 */
function SelonEthique(ethique)
132 {
if(ethique == true)
134 {
label = label + phrase1A + phrase2 ;
136 }
else
138 {
label = label + phrase1B + phrase2 ;
140 }
}
142 /*
*/
144 function SelonLeSexeInv(inverse)
{
146 femme = false;
if((estUnHomme == true ) && (inverse == false))
148 {
femme = false;
150 }
if((estUnHomme == false ) && (inverse == true))
152 {
femme = false;
154 }
if((estUnHomme == true ) && (inverse == true))
156 {
femme = true;
158 }
if((estUnHomme == false) && (inverse == false))
160 {
femme = true;
162 }
if(femme == true)
164 {
label = label + phrase3F ;
166 }
else
168 {
label = label + phrase3M ;
170 }
}
172
function Suite1()
174 {
label = label + phrase4 + phrase5 ;
176 }
178 function Suite2()
{
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180 label = label + phrase7 ;
}
182
function ConstitueUnLabel(ethique, inverse, type)
184 {
186 InitLab();
SelonEthique(ethique);
188 SelonLeSexeInv(inverse);
Suite1();
190 if (type == 1)
{
192 label = label + Les2Min();
}
194 if (type == 2)
{
196 label = label + Les2Midle();
}
198 if (type == 3)
{
200 label = label + Les2Max();
}
202
Suite2();
204 //disp(label) ;
206 return(label);
}
208
function ConstitueLesLibels(Sexe, TabA1, TabA2,TabA3
, TabA4, TabA5, TabA6, TabB1, TabB2, TabB3, TabB4
, TabB5, TabB6)
210 {
if( Sexe == ’ Féminin ’)
212 {
estUnHomme = false;
214 }
else
216 {
estUnHome = true ;
218 }
220 InitProfilA(TabA1, TabA2, TabA3, TabA4, TabA5,
TabA6);
InitProfilB(TabB1, TabB2, TabB3, TabB4, TabB5,
TabB6);
222 InitTabPhrases();
TriTab();
224 // DispTab();
226
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lib1 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,false,1);
228 lib2 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,false,2);
lib3 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,false,3);
230 lib4 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,true,1);
lib5 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,true,2);
232 lib6 = ConstitueUnLabel(true,true,3);
lib7 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,false,1);
234 lib8 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,false,2);
lib9 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,false,3);
236 lib10 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,true,1);
lib11 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,true,2);
238 lib12 = ConstitueUnLabel(false,true,3);
240 }
242 /*
Debut de d’activation Lien Lime Survey
244 */
246 //ConstitueLesLibels(’Femme’, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6,
5, 4, 3, 2, 1) ;
10.3 experiment 3
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Figure 10.1: Materials used for the fund descriptions In Experiment 3 of section 1.
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Figure 10.2: Value Similarity Scale used in Experiemnt 3
11
M AT E R I A L S F R O M S E C T I O N 2
11.1 study 1
For ecological reasons (materials make 30+ pages) they are provided as
downloads at the following link: http://goo.gl/euwx1.If the link is
no longer active please send an email to the author.
11.2 study 2
For ecological reasons (materials make 100+ pages) they are provided
as downloads at the following links: http://goo.gl/j280D and
http://goo.gl/gsc12.
If the links are no longer active please send an email to the author.
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12.1 materials from online experiments
For ecological reasons (materials make 30+ pages) they are provided as
downloads at the following link: http://goo.gl/K9FQV.If the link is
no longer active please send an email to the author.
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S C R I P T S S E C T I O N 1
13.1 data
Data and Scripts used for Data Analysis and Visualization. All data is pro-
vided in a compressed file which can be downloaded at the following link:
https://dl.dropbox.com/u/2877944/ThesisData.zip
13.2 experiment 1
#Analysis of EX1
2 summary(EX1)
4 require(plyr)
6 require(outliers)
8 rm.outlier(EX1$Trust, fill =TRUE)
10 ## ANOVA
require(MASS) ##
12 require(nlme) ## for lme()
require(multcomp) ## for multiple comparison
14 summary(mod.ex1 <- aov(Trust ~ Sim*Perf + Error(
subject/Sim), data = EX1))
Lme.mod <- lme(Trust ~ Sim + Perf, random = ~1 |
subject/Sim, data = EX1)
16 anova(Lme.mod)
summary(Lme.mod)
18 summary(glht(Lme.mod, linfct=mcp(Sim= " Tukey "))) #
Differences Similarity
summary(glht(Lme.mod, linfct=mcp(Perf= " Tukey "))) #
Differences Performance
20
22
185
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24 ## Norm data within specified groups in a data frame
; it normalizes each
## subject (identified by idvar) so that they have
the same mean, within each group
26 ## specified by betweenvars.
normDataWithin <- function(data=NULL, idvar,
measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
28 na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE)
{
require(plyr)
30
# Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
32 data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
.fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
34 c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
},
36 measurevar,
na.rm
38 )
40 # Put the subject means with original data
data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
42
# Get the normalized data in a new column
44 measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
46 mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
48 # Remove this subject mean column
data$subjMean <- NULL
50
return(data)
52 }
54
56 ## Summarizes data, handling within-subjects
variables by removing inter-subject variability.
## It will still work if there are no within-S
variables.
58 ## Gives count, un-normed mean, normed mean (with
same between-group mean),
## standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
and confidence interval.
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60 ## If there are within-subject variables, calculate
adjusted values using method from Morey (2008).
## data: a data frame.
62 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
64 ## withinvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are within-subjects variables
## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
66 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
68 summarySEwithin <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
betweenvars=NULL, withinvars=NULL,
idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .
drop=TRUE) {
70
# Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
72 factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
74
if (!all(factorvars)) {
76 nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
78 paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
80 }
82 # Get the means from the un-normed data
datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
84 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
86 # Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
datac$sd <- NULL
88 datac$se <- NULL
datac$ci <- NULL
90
# Norm each subject’s data
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92 ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
94 # This is the name of the new column
measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
96
# Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
98 ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
100
# Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
102 # Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
104 FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
106
# Apply the correction factor
108 ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
110 ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
112 # Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
merge(datac, ndatac)
114 }
116 EX1sum <- summarySEwithin(EX1, measurevar= " T ru s t ",
withinvars=c( " Sim ", " P e r f "), idvar= " s u b j e c t ")
118 #order Sim factors
EX1sum$Sim<-factor(EX1sum$Sim, levels=c( " High ", "
Con t ro l ", " Low"))
120
122 require(ggplot2)
124 ggplot(EX1sum, aes(x=Sim, y=Trust, fill=Perf)) +
geom_bar(position=position_dodge(.9), colour= "
b l a c k ", stat= " i d e n t i t y ") +
126 geom_errorbar(position=position_dodge(.9), width
=.25, aes(ymin=Trust-se, ymax=Trust+se)) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
128 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
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theme_bw() +
130 geom_hline(yintercept=5.612, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
132 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
134 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
136 ylab( " T ru s two r t h i n e s s ")+
xlab( " Value S i m i l a r i t y ")+
138 scale_fill_discrete(name= " F i n a n c i a l \ nPer formance "
)
13.3 experiment 2
summary(EX2)
2
require(outliers)
4
rm.outlier(EX2$Trust, fill =TRUE)
6
8 ## ANOVA
require(MASS) ##
10 require(nlme) ## for lme()
require(multcomp) ## for multiple comparison
12 summary(mod.ex2 <- aov(Trust ~ Sim*Label + Error(
subject/(Sim*Label)), data=EX2))
Lme.mod <- lme(Trust ~ Sim + Label, random = ~1 |
subject/Sim, data = EX2)
14 anova(Lme.mod)
summary(Lme.mod)
16 summary(glht(Lme.mod, linfct=mcp(Sim= " Tukey "))) #
Differences Similarity
summary(glht(Lme.mod, linfct=mcp(Label= " Tukey "))) #
Differences Performance
18
20
## Norm data within specified groups in a data frame
; it normalizes each
22 ## subject (identified by idvar) so that they have
the same mean, within each group
## specified by betweenvars.
24 normDataWithin <- function(data=NULL, idvar,
measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
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na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE)
{
26 require(plyr)
28 # Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
30 .fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
32 },
measurevar,
34 na.rm
)
36
# Put the subject means with original data
38 data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
40 # Get the normalized data in a new column
measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
42 data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
44
# Remove this subject mean column
46 data$subjMean <- NULL
48 return(data)
}
50
## Summarizes data, handling within-subjects
variables by removing inter-subject variability.
52 ## It will still work if there are no within-S
variables.
## Gives count, un-normed mean, normed mean (with
same between-group mean),
54 ## standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
and confidence interval.
## If there are within-subject variables, calculate
adjusted values using method from Morey (2008).
56 ## data: a data frame.
## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
58 ## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
## withinvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are within-subjects variables
13.3 experiment 2 191
60 ## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
62 ## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
summarySEwithin <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
betweenvars=NULL, withinvars=NULL,
64 idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .
drop=TRUE) {
66 # Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
68 FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
70 if (!all(factorvars)) {
nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
72 message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
74 data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
}
76
# Get the means from the un-normed data
78 datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
80
# Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
82 datac$sd <- NULL
datac$se <- NULL
84 datac$ci <- NULL
86 # Norm each subject’s data
ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
88
# This is the name of the new column
90 measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
92 # Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
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94 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
96 # Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
# Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
98 nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
100 correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
102 # Apply the correction factor
ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
104 ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
106
# Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
108 merge(datac, ndatac)
}
110
EX2sum <- summarySEwithin(EX2, measurevar= " T ru s t ",
withinvars=c( " Sim ", " L abe l "), idvar= " s u b j e c t ")
112
EX2sum$Sim <- factor(EX2sum$Sim, levels = c( " Sma l l ",
" Moderate ", " Large "))
114 EX2sum$Label <- factor(EX2sum$Label, levels = c( "
E t h i c a l ", " Conven t i ona l "))
require(ggplot2)
116
ggplot(EX2sum, aes(x=Sim, y=Trust, fill=Label)) +
118 geom_bar(position=position_dodge(.9), colour= "
b l a c k ", stat= " i d e n t i t y ") +
geom_errorbar(position=position_dodge(.9), width
=.25, aes(ymin=Trust-se, ymax=Trust+se)) +
120 coord_cartesian(ylim=c(3,7)) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
122 theme_bw() +
geom_hline(yintercept=5.502, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
124 theme(legend.position= " top ") +
theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
126 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
128 theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
ylab( " T ru s two r t h i n e s s ")+
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130 xlab( " Value S i m i l a r i t y ")+
scale_fill_discrete(name= " L abe l ")
13.4 experiment 3
1 #Analysis of EX3
summary(EX3)
3
require(outliers)
5
rm.outlier(EX3$Trust, fill =TRUE)
7 rm.outlier(EX3$SimScale, fill=TRUE)
9
#Anova on experimental desigsn Similarity (3) *
Performance(2)
11 summary(aov.ex3 <- aov(Trust ~ Perf*Sim + Error(
subject/(Perf*Sim)), data=EX3))
summary(aov2.ex3 <- aov(Trust ~ValueSet + Error(
subject/ValueSet), data = EX3))
13
15 ##define Norm dat within function
function(data=NULL, idvar, measurevar, betweenvars=
NULL,
17 na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE) {
require(plyr)
19
# Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
21 data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
.fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
23 c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
},
25 measurevar,
na.rm
27 )
29 # Put the subject means with original data
data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
31
# Get the normalized data in a new column
33 measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
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data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
35 mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
37 # Remove this subject mean column
data$subjMean <- NULL
39
return(data)
41 }
43
##Summarize data according to within subject factor
design
45 ## SummarySEwithin funciton
function(data=NULL, measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
withinvars=NULL,
47 idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE, conf.interval=.95,
.drop=TRUE) {
49 # Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
51 FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
53 if (!all(factorvars)) {
nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
55 message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
57 data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
}
59
# Get the means from the un-normed data
61 datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
63
# Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
65 datac$sd <- NULL
datac$se <- NULL
67 datac$ci <- NULL
69 # Norm each subject’s data
ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
71
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# This is the name of the new column
73 measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
75 # Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
77 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
79 # Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
# Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
81 nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
83 correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
85 # Apply the correction factor
ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
87 ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
89
# Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
91 merge(datac, ndatac)
}
93
95 ## Plot of experiemntal design that is not in the
manuscript
97
EX3sum <- summarySEwithin(EX3, measurevar= " T ru s t ",
withinvars=c( " Sim ", " P e r f "), idvar= " s u b j e c t ")
99
require(ggplot2)
101 ggplot(EX3sum, aes(x=Sim, y=Trust, fill=Perf)) +
geom_bar(position=position_dodge(.9), colour= "
b l a c k ", stat= " i d e n t i t y ") +
103 geom_errorbar(position=position_dodge(.9), width
=.25, aes(ymin=Trust-se, ymax=Trust+se)) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(6,8)) +
105 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
107 geom_hline(yintercept=7.248, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
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109 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
111 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
113 ylab( " T ru s two r t h i n e s s ")+
xlab( " Value S i m i l a r i t y ")+
115 scale_fill_discrete(name= " F i n a n a c i a l \ nPer formance
")
117
#mediation analysis was performed in SPSS using
Preacher and Hayes "mediate" macro
119 # Regression Graph
121 library(ggplot2)
library(MASS)
123 EX3$Trustworthiness=11-EX3$Trust
125 # H L M -> L M H
127 # (L) Competitiveness & Supply Chain
# (M) Transparency & Conformity to laws
129 # (H) Workers rights & Environment
131 EX3$Intercept <- c(rep(7.06, 230), rep(7.29, 230),
rep(7.38, 230))
133 EX3$ValueSet <- factor(EX3$Sim, labels = c( " Workers
r i g h t s & Environment ", " Compe t i t i v ene s s & Supply
Chain ", " Transparency & Conformity to laws "))
135 ggplot(EX3, aes(x=SimScale, y=Trust, color=Perf)) +
scale_color_manual(values=c( " f i r e b r i c k 3 ", "
r o y a l b l u e 3 "), name= " F i n a n c i a l \ nPer formance ")+
137 facet_grid(.~ValueSet) +
geom_point(size=2, alpha=0.5, shape=19, position=
position_jitter(width=.15, height=.15))+
139 stat_smooth(method= " r lm ", size=1) +
scale_x_continuous( " Value S i m i l a r i t y ")+
141 theme(legend.position= " top ", aspect.ratio=1.7/1)+
theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
143 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
145 theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
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geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")
1 #load required packages before running the code
below
require(mediation)
3 require(plyr)
require(boot)
5 require(car)
require(effects)
7
9 ### Mediation
11 # Dependent, Independent, and Proposed Mediator
Variables:
# DV (Y) = CREATIV
13 # IV (X) = LEADER
# MEDS (M) = EFFICACY
15 #
# Statistical Controls:
17 # CONTROL= AGE
# SEX
19 # DIPLOMA
# DEPART
21 # SUPTENUR
23 #IV to Mediators (a paths)
summary(mod.m <- lm(Similarity ~ Values , EX3)) ##
estimate m model
25 #Direct Effects of Mediators on DV (b paths)
#Direct Effect of IV on DV (c-prime path)
27 #Partial Effect of Control Variables on DV
#Model Summary for DV Model
29 summary(mod.y <- lm(Trust ~ Similarity + Values, EX3
)) ##estimate y model
#Total Effect of IV on DV (c path)
31 summary(mod.c <- lm(Trust ~ Values, EX3))
33 #Indirect Effects of IV on DV through Proposed
Mediators (ab paths)
# Data boot Bias SE
35 #EFFICACY ,0314 ,0270 -,0044 ,0261
# Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence
Intervals
37 # Lower Upper
# EFFICACY -,0039 ,1089
39
#carefully inspect ?mediate for details
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41 #although not recommended, ’T’ acts for ’TRUE’ and ’
F’ acts for ’FALSE’
med_a <- mediate(mod.m, mod.y, treat= ’ Va lues ’,
mediator= ’ S i m i l a r i t y ’,
43 boot=T, sims=50) ##supply m and y
models for mediation analysis
summary(med_a)
45 #to properly view the graph, maximize the Plots pane
or ’Zoom’
plot(med_a)
47
#a*b=0.0314
49 (med_axb <- as.numeric(coef(mod.m)[ ’ Va lues ’] * coef(
mod.y)[ ’ S i m i l a r i t y ’])) #Data
med_a$d0
51 mean(med_a$d0.sims) #boot: average coefficient from
bootstraps
#estimate bias using the bootstrap draws contained
in the output (d0.sims, etc) as
53 (d0.bias <- mean(med_a$d0.sim) - med_a$d0)
sd(as.vector(med_a$d0.sims)) #SE
55 #med_a$d0 - med_axb #bias
14
S C R I P T S S E C T I O N 2
14.1 executive compensation plans
Statistica Workbooks and R-Scripts used for Data Analysis and Visu-
alization. Significance analysis and visualization was performed using
Statistica soware. The “Workbook” file is are provided as download
at the following link: https://dl.dropbox.com/u/2877944/
Compensaiton1.stw
14.2 compensation policies
1 summary(EX1)
3 require(plyr)
5 EX1s<-EX1
require(outliers)
7 rm.outlier(EX1$Acceptability, fill =TRUE)
9 ##Norm data within
## Norms the data within specified groups in a data
frame; it normalizes each
11 ## subject (identified by idvar) so that they have
the same mean, within each group
## specified by betweenvars.
13 ## data: a data frame.
## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
15 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
17 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
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normDataWithin <- function(data=NULL, idvar,
measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
19 na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE)
{
require(plyr)
21
# Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
23 data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
.fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
25 c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
},
27 measurevar,
na.rm
29 )
31 # Put the subject means with original data
data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
33
# Get the normalized data in a new column
35 measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
37 mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
39 # Remove this subject mean column
data$subjMean <- NULL
41
return(data)
43 }
45 ## Summarizes data, handling within-subjects
variables by removing inter-subject variability.
## It will still work if there are no within-S
variables.
47 ## Gives count, un-normed mean, normed mean (with
same between-group mean),
## standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
and confidence interval.
49 ## If there are within-subject variables, calculate
adjusted values using method from Morey (2008).
## data: a data frame.
51 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
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53 ## withinvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are within-subjects variables
## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
55 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
57 summarySEwithin <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
betweenvars=NULL, withinvars=NULL,
idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .
drop=TRUE) {
59
# Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
61 factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
63
if (!all(factorvars)) {
65 nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
67 paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
69 }
71 # Get the means from the un-normed data
datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
73 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
75 # Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
datac$sd <- NULL
77 datac$se <- NULL
datac$ci <- NULL
79
# Norm each subject’s data
81 ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
83 # This is the name of the new column
measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
85
# Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
202 scripts section 2
87 ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
89
# Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
91 # Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
93 FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
95
# Apply the correction factor
97 ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
99 ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
101 # Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
merge(datac, ndatac)
103 }
105 ## Summarizes data.
## Gives count, mean, standard deviation, standard
error of the mean, and confidence interval (
default 95%).
107 ## data: a data frame.
## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
109 ## groupvars: a vector containing names of columns
that contain grouping variables
## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
111 ## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
summarySE <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
groupvars=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
113 conf.interval=.95, .drop=TRUE)
{
require(plyr)
115
# New version of length which can handle NA’s: if
na.rm==T, don’t count them
117 length2 <- function (x, na.rm=FALSE) {
if (na.rm) sum(!is.na(x))
119 else length(x)
}
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121
# This is does the summary; it’s not easy to
understand...
123 datac <- ddply(data, groupvars, .drop=.drop,
.fun= function(xx, col, na.rm) {
125 c( N = length2(xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
mean = mean (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
127 sd = sd (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm)
)
129 },
measurevar,
131 na.rm
)
133
# Rename the "mean" column
135 datac <- rename(datac, c( "mean "=measurevar))
137 datac$se <- datac$sd / sqrt(datac$N) # Calculate
standard error of the mean
139 # Confidence interval multiplier for standard
error
# Calculate t-statistic for confidence interval:
141 # e.g., if conf.interval is .95, use .975 (above/
below), and use df=N-1
ciMult <- qt(conf.interval/2 + .5, datac$N-1)
143 datac$ci <- datac$se * ciMult
145 return(datac)
}
147
EX1sum <- summarySEwithin(EX1s, measurevar= "
A c c e p t a b i l i t y ", withinvars=c( " S p e c i a l ", "
Transparency ", " Amount ", " Ex t en t "), idvar= "
s u b j e c t ")
149
require(ggplot2)
151
EX1sum$Transparency<-factor(EX1sum$Transparency,
levels=c( " C l e a r ", " Obscure ", " A r b i t r a r y "))
153 EX1sum$Amount<-factor(EX1sum$Amount, levels=c( " 3
month ", " 1 month "))
EX1sum$Special<-factor(EX1sum$Special, levels=c( " 3
month s p e c i a l ", " 1 month s p e c i a l ", "No s p e c i a l "))
155
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157 qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1sum,
group = Special, colour= Special, facets = Extent
~Amount, geom= " l i n e ")+
geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
159 facet_wrap(Extent~Amount, nrow=1)+
scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
161 coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
163 theme_bw() +
geom_hline(yintercept=5.54, linetype= " dashed ") +
165 theme(legend.position= " top ") +
theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
167 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))
169
EX1sumClu <- summarySEwithin(EX1s, measurevar= "
A c c e p t a b i l i t y ", betweenvars= " C l u s t e r ", withinvars
=c( " S p e c i a l ", " Transparency ", " Amount ", " Ex t en t "),
idvar= " s u b j e c t ")
171
## Ask for Cluster means \\\ require(plyr)
173 ddply(EX1s,~Cluster,summarise,mean=mean(
Acceptability),sd=sd(Acceptability))
175 ## manually define the Intercepts for each cluster
EX1sumClu$Intercept <- c(rep(5.91, 36), rep(3.88,
36), rep(7.63, 36), rep(4.8, 36))
177
##Reorder Procedure levels
179 EX1sumClu$Transparency<-factor(EX1sumClu$
Transparency, levels=c( " C l e a r ", " Obscure ", "
A r b i t r a r y "))
181 ##Order Cluster levels
EX1sumClu$Cluster<-factor(EX1sumClu$Cluster, levels=
c( " 3 ", " 1 ", " 4 ", " 2 "))
183
#Order Special
185 EX1sumClu$Special<-factor(EX1sumClu$Special, levels=
c( " 3 month s p e c i a l ", " 1 month s p e c i a l ", "No
s p e c i a l "))
187
#Create Cluster factor for names display
189 EX1sumClu$Cluster1 <- factor(c(rep( " ’ Ra the r
Accep tab l e ’ ", 36), rep( " ’ Ra the r unac c ep t ab l e ’ ",
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36), rep( " ’ Always ’ ", 36), rep( " ’ Only i f a l l ’ ",
36)))
191 ##Order Cluster1 levels
EX1sumClu$Cluster1<-factor(EX1sumClu$Cluster1,
levels=c( " ’ Always ’ ", " ’ Ra the r Accep tab l e ’ ", " ’ Only
i f a l l ’ ", " ’ Ra the r unac c ep t ab l e ’ "))
193
195
#Plot
197 qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1sumClu,
group = Special, colour= Special, facets =
Extent~Amount~Cluster1, geom= " l i n e ")+
geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
199 facet_wrap(Extent~Amount~Cluster1, nrow=4)+
scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
201 coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
203 theme_bw() +
geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
205 theme(legend.position= " top ") +
theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
207 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
209 theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")
211
#Subsetting all clusters
213 EX1c1.sub <- subset(EX1sumClu, Cluster == 1)
EX1c2.sub <- subset(EX1sumClu, Cluster == 2)
215 EX1c3.sub <- subset(EX1sumClu, Cluster == 3)
EX1c4.sub <- subset(EX1sumClu, Cluster == 4)
217
##Plotting all cluster graphs
219 p1<-qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1c1.
sub, group = Special, colour= Special, facets =
Extent~Amount, geom= " l i n e ")+
geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
221 facet_wrap(Extent~Amount, nrow=1)+
scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
223 coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
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225 theme_bw() +
geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
227 theme(legend.position= " top ") +
theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
229 theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
231 theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")+
233 ggtitle( " Always Acc ep t ab l e ") +
theme(plot.title = element_text(lineheight=.8,
face= " bo ld "))
235
p2<-qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1c2.
sub, group = Special, colour= Special, facets =
Extent~Amount, geom= " l i n e ")+
237 geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
facet_wrap(Extent~Amount, nrow=1)+
239 scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
241 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
243 geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
245 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
247 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
249 geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")+
ggtitle( " Mainly Depends on Ex t en t and S p e c i a l
Bonus ") +
251 theme(plot.title = element_text(lineheight=.8,
face= " bo ld "))
253
p3<- qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1c3
.sub, group = Special, colour= Special, facets =
Extent~Amount, geom= " l i n e ")+
255 geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
facet_wrap(Extent~Amount, nrow=1)+
14.2 compensation policies 207
257 scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
259 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
261 geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
263 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
265 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
267 geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")+
ggtitle( " Mainly Depends on Ex t en t ") +
269 theme(plot.title = element_text(lineheight=.8,
face= " bo ld "))
271
p4<-qplot(Transparency, Acceptability, data = EX1c4.
sub, group = Special, colour= Special, facets =
Extent~Amount, geom= " l i n e ")+
273 geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
facet_wrap(Extent~Amount, nrow=1)+
275 scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
277 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
279 geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
281 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
283 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
285 geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")+
ggtitle( " Mainly Depends on Procedure ") +
287 theme(plot.title = element_text(lineheight=.8,
face= " bo ld "))
289
##Define Multipot function
291 # Multiple plot function
#
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293 # ggplot objects can be passed in ..., or to
plotlist (as a list of ggplot objects)
# - cols: Number of columns in layout
295 # - layout: A matrix specifying the layout. If
present, ’cols’ is ignored.
#
297 # If the layout is something like matrix(c(1,2,3,3),
nrow=2, byrow=TRUE),
# then plot 1 will go in the upper left, 2 will go
in the upper right, and
299 # 3 will go all the way across the bottom.
#
301 multiplot <- function(..., plotlist=NULL, file, cols
=1, layout=NULL) {
require(grid)
303
# Make a list from the ... arguments and plotlist
305 plots <- c(list(...), plotlist)
307 numPlots = length(plots)
309 # If layout is NULL, then use ’cols’ to determine
layout
if (is.null(layout)) {
311 # Make the panel
# ncol: Number of columns of plots
313 # nrow: Number of rows needed, calculated from #
of cols
layout <- matrix(seq(1, cols * ceiling(numPlots/
cols)),
315 ncol = cols, nrow = ceiling(
numPlots/cols))
}
317
if (numPlots==1) {
319 print(plots[[1]])
321 } else {
# Set up the page
323 grid.newpage()
pushViewport(viewport(layout = grid.layout(nrow(
layout), ncol(layout))))
325
# Make each plot, in the correct location
327 for (i in 1:numPlots) {
# Get the i,j matrix positions of the regions
that contain this subplot
329 matchidx <- as.data.frame(which(layout == i,
arr.ind = TRUE))
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331 print(plots[[i]], vp = viewport(layout.pos.row
= matchidx$row,
layout.pos.col
= matchidx
$col))
333 }
}
335 }
337 ##Plot all graphs in one
multiplot(p3, p1, p4, p2, cols=2)
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summary(EX2)
2
EX2s<-EX2
4 require(outliers)
rm.outlier(EX2$Acceptability, fill =TRUE)
6
##Norm data within
8 ## Norms the data within specified groups in a data
frame; it normalizes each
## subject (identified by idvar) so that they have
the same mean, within each group
10 ## specified by betweenvars.
## data: a data frame.
12 ## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
14 ## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
16 normDataWithin <- function(data=NULL, idvar,
measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE)
{
18 require(plyr)
20 # Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
22 .fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
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c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
24 },
measurevar,
26 na.rm
)
28
# Put the subject means with original data
30 data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
32 # Get the normalized data in a new column
measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
34 data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
36
# Remove this subject mean column
38 data$subjMean <- NULL
40 return(data)
}
42
## Summarizes data, handling within-subjects
variables by removing inter-subject variability.
44 ## It will still work if there are no within-S
variables.
## Gives count, un-normed mean, normed mean (with
same between-group mean),
46 ## standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
and confidence interval.
## If there are within-subject variables, calculate
adjusted values using method from Morey (2008).
48 ## data: a data frame.
## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
50 ## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
## withinvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are within-subjects variables
52 ## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
54 ## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
summarySEwithin <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
betweenvars=NULL, withinvars=NULL,
56 idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .
drop=TRUE) {
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58 # Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
60 FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
62 if (!all(factorvars)) {
nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
64 message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
66 data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
}
68
# Get the means from the un-normed data
70 datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
72
# Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
74 datac$sd <- NULL
datac$se <- NULL
76 datac$ci <- NULL
78 # Norm each subject’s data
ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
80
# This is the name of the new column
82 measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
84 # Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
86 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
88 # Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
# Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
90 nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
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92 correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
94 # Apply the correction factor
ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
96 ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
98
# Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
100 merge(datac, ndatac)
}
102
## Summarizes data.
104 ## Gives count, mean, standard deviation, standard
error of the mean, and confidence interval (
default 95%).
## data: a data frame.
106 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## groupvars: a vector containing names of columns
that contain grouping variables
108 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
110 summarySE <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
groupvars=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .drop=TRUE)
{
112 require(plyr)
114 # New version of length which can handle NA’s: if
na.rm==T, don’t count them
length2 <- function (x, na.rm=FALSE) {
116 if (na.rm) sum(!is.na(x))
else length(x)
118 }
120 # This is does the summary; it’s not easy to
understand...
datac <- ddply(data, groupvars, .drop=.drop,
122 .fun= function(xx, col, na.rm) {
c( N = length2(xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
124 mean = mean (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
sd = sd (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm)
126 )
},
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128 measurevar,
na.rm
130 )
132 # Rename the "mean" column
datac <- rename(datac, c( "mean "=measurevar))
134
datac$se <- datac$sd / sqrt(datac$N) # Calculate
standard error of the mean
136
# Confidence interval multiplier for standard
error
138 # Calculate t-statistic for confidence interval:
# e.g., if conf.interval is .95, use .975 (above/
below), and use df=N-1
140 ciMult <- qt(conf.interval/2 + .5, datac$N-1)
datac$ci <- datac$se * ciMult
142
return(datac)
144 }
146 EX2sum <- summarySEwithin(EX2s, measurevar= "
A c c e p t a b i l i t y ", withinvars=c( " S p e c i a l ", "
Transparency ", " Amount ", " Ex t en t "), idvar= "
s u b j e c t ")
148 require(ggplot2)
require(grid)
150
EX2sum$Amount<-factor(EX2sum$Amount, levels=c( " 18
month ", " 12 month ", " 6 month "))
152 EX2sum$Special<-factor(EX2sum$Special, levels=c( "
S p e c i a l ", "No s p e c i a l "))
154
qplot(Extent, Acceptability, data = EX2sum, group =
Amount, colour= Amount, facets = Transparency~
Special, geom= " l i n e ")+
156 geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
facet_wrap(Transparency~Special, nrow=1)+
158 scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
160 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
162 geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " dashed ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
164 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
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theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
166 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())
168
EX2sumClu <- summarySEwithin(EX2s, measurevar= "
A c c e p t a b i l i t y ", betweenvars= " C l u s t e r ", withinvars
=c( " S p e c i a l ", " Transparency ", " Amount ", " Ex t en t "),
idvar= " s u b j e c t ")
170
172 ## Ask for Cluster means
ddply(EX2s,~Cluster,summarise,mean=mean(
Acceptability),sd=sd(Acceptability))
174
## manually define the Intercepts for each cluster
176 EX2sumClu$Intercept <- c(rep(4.79, 36), rep(1.72,
36), rep(3.44, 36), rep(7.84, 36))
178 #Order cluster factors
EX2sumClu$Cluster<-factor(EX2sumClu$Cluster, levels=
c( " 4 ", " 1 ", " 3 ", " 2 "))
180
#Order Special
182 EX2sumClu$Special<-factor(EX2sumClu$Special, levels=
c( " S p e c i a l ", "No s p e c i a l "))
184 #Order Amount
EX2sumClu$Amount<-factor(EX2sumClu$Amount, levels=c(
" 18 month ", " 12 month ", " 6 month "))
186
188 #Create Cluster factor for names display
EX2sumClu$Cluster1 <- factor(c(rep( " ’ A l l and Clear ’ "
, 36), rep( " ’ Unaccep tab l e ’ ", 36), rep( " ’ Ra the r
not ’ ", 36), rep( " ’ Always ’ ", 36)))
190
#Reorder Cluster names
192 EX2sumClu$Cluster1<-factor(EX2sumClu$Cluster1,
levels=c( " ’ Always ’ ", " ’ A l l and Clear ’ ", " ’ Ra the r
not ’ ", " ’ Unaccep tab l e ’ "))
194
qplot(Extent, Acceptability, data = EX2sumClu, group
= Amount, colour= Amount, facets = Transparency~
Special~Cluster1, geom= " l i n e ")+
196 geom_point() + geom_errorbar(aes(ymin=
Acceptability-se, ymax=Acceptability+se), width
=.1, size=.3, position=position_dodge())+
facet_wrap(Transparency~Special~Cluster1, nrow=4)+
14.3 executives bonuses 215
198 scale_fill_manual(values=c( " #CCCCCC", " # FFFFFF ")) +
coord_cartesian(ylim=c(0,10)) +
200 scale_y_continuous(breaks=seq(1:10)) +
theme_bw() +
202 geom_hline(yintercept=4.71, linetype= " d o t t e d ") +
theme(legend.position= " top ") +
204 theme(legend.title = element_text(colour= " b l a c k ",
size=12, face= " bo ld "))+
theme(axis.title.x = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=12))+
206 theme(axis.title.y = element_text(face= " bo ld ",
colour= " b l a c k ", size=14))+
theme(strip.text.x = element_text())+
208 geom_hline(aes(yintercept = Intercept), linetype= "
dashed ")

15
S C R I P T S S E C T I O N 3
15.1 figures of section 3
R-Scripts used for Data Visualization. Significance analysis was performed
using SPSS soware. The present script only produces the figures.
1 ##Norm data within
## Norms the data within specified groups in a data
frame; it normalizes each
3 ## subject (identified by idvar) so that they have
the same mean, within each group
## specified by betweenvars.
5 ## data: a data frame.
## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
7 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
9 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
normDataWithin <- function(data=NULL, idvar,
measurevar, betweenvars=NULL,
11 na.rm=FALSE, .drop=TRUE)
{
require(plyr)
13
# Measure var on left, idvar + between vars on
right of formula.
15 data.subjMean <- ddply(data, c(idvar, betweenvars)
, .drop=.drop,
.fun = function(xx, col, na
.rm) {
17 c(subjMean = mean(xx[,col
], na.rm=na.rm))
},
19 measurevar,
na.rm
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21 )
23 # Put the subject means with original data
data <- merge(data, data.subjMean)
25
# Get the normalized data in a new column
27 measureNormedVar <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep
= " ")
data[,measureNormedVar] <- data[,measurevar] -
data[, " subjMean "] +
29 mean(data[,measurevar], na.rm=na.rm)
31 # Remove this subject mean column
data$subjMean <- NULL
33
return(data)
35 }
37 ## Summarizes data, handling within-subjects
variables by removing inter-subject variability.
## It will still work if there are no within-S
variables.
39 ## Gives count, un-normed mean, normed mean (with
same between-group mean),
## standard deviation, standard error of the mean,
and confidence interval.
41 ## If there are within-subject variables, calculate
adjusted values using method from Morey (2008).
## data: a data frame.
43 ## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
## betweenvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are between-subjects variables
45 ## withinvars: a vector containing names of
columns that are within-subjects variables
## idvar: the name of a column that identifies
each subject (or matched subjects)
47 ## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
49 summarySEwithin <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
betweenvars=NULL, withinvars=NULL,
idvar=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
conf.interval=.95, .
drop=TRUE) {
51
# Ensure that the betweenvars and withinvars are
factors
53 factorvars <- vapply(data[, c(betweenvars,
withinvars), drop=FALSE],
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FUN=is.factor, FUN.VALUE=
logical(1))
55
if (!all(factorvars)) {
57 nonfactorvars <- names(factorvars)[!factorvars]
message( " Au t oma t i c a l l y c onv e r t i n g the f o l l ow i n g
non− f a c t o r s to f a c t o r s : ",
59 paste(nonfactorvars, collapse = " , "))
data[nonfactorvars] <- lapply(data[nonfactorvars
], factor)
61 }
63 # Get the means from the un-normed data
datac <- summarySE(data, measurevar, groupvars=c(
betweenvars, withinvars),
65 na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=conf
.interval, .drop=.drop)
67 # Drop all the unused columns (these will be
calculated with normed data)
datac$sd <- NULL
69 datac$se <- NULL
datac$ci <- NULL
71
# Norm each subject’s data
73 ndata <- normDataWithin(data, idvar, measurevar,
betweenvars, na.rm, .drop=.drop)
75 # This is the name of the new column
measurevar_n <- paste(measurevar, "_norm ", sep= " ")
77
# Collapse the normed data - now we can treat
between and within vars the same
79 ndatac <- summarySE(ndata, measurevar_n, groupvars
=c(betweenvars, withinvars),
na.rm=na.rm, conf.interval=
conf.interval, .drop=.drop)
81
# Apply correction from Morey (2008) to the
standard error and confidence interval
83 # Get the product of the number of conditions of
within-S variables
nWithinGroups <- prod(vapply(ndatac[,withinvars
, drop=FALSE], FUN=nlevels,
85 FUN.VALUE=numeric
(1)))
correctionFactor <- sqrt( nWithinGroups / (
nWithinGroups-1) )
87
# Apply the correction factor
89 ndatac$sd <- ndatac$sd * correctionFactor
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ndatac$se <- ndatac$se * correctionFactor
91 ndatac$ci <- ndatac$ci * correctionFactor
93 # Combine the un-normed means with the normed
results
merge(datac, ndatac)
95 }
97 ## Summarizes data.
## Gives count, mean, standard deviation, standard
error of the mean, and confidence interval (
default 95%).
99 ## data: a data frame.
## measurevar: the name of a column that contains
the variable to be summariezed
101 ## groupvars: a vector containing names of columns
that contain grouping variables
## na.rm: a boolean that indicates whether to
ignore NA’s
103 ## conf.interval: the percent range of the
confidence interval (default is 95%)
summarySE <- function(data=NULL, measurevar,
groupvars=NULL, na.rm=FALSE,
105 conf.interval=.95, .drop=TRUE)
{
require(plyr)
107
# New version of length which can handle NA’s: if
na.rm==T, don’t count them
109 length2 <- function (x, na.rm=FALSE) {
if (na.rm) sum(!is.na(x))
111 else length(x)
}
113
# This is does the summary; it’s not easy to
understand...
115 datac <- ddply(data, groupvars, .drop=.drop,
.fun= function(xx, col, na.rm) {
117 c( N = length2(xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
mean = mean (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm),
119 sd = sd (xx[,col], na.rm
=na.rm)
)
121 },
measurevar,
123 na.rm
)
125
# Rename the "mean" column
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127 datac <- rename(datac, c( "mean "=measurevar))
129 datac$se <- datac$sd / sqrt(datac$N) # Calculate
standard error of the mean
131 # Confidence interval multiplier for standard
error
# Calculate t-statistic for confidence interval:
133 # e.g., if conf.interval is .95, use .975 (above/
below), and use df=N-1
ciMult <- qt(conf.interval/2 + .5, datac$N-1)
135 datac$ci <- datac$se * ciMult
137 return(datac)
}
139
141 sumdata <- summarySE(PlotReveal, measurevar= "
De c i s i on ", groupvars= " Expt ")
143
require(ggplot2)
145
Figure1<-ggplot(sumdata, aes(factor(Expt),sumdata$
Decision,ymin=sumdata$Decision-sumdata$ci,ymax=
sumdata$Decision+sumdata$ci,colour=factor(Expt),
size=sumdata$N))+
147 geom_linerange() +
coord_flip()+xlab( " Exper iment ") +
149 ylab( " P r opo r t i on o f r e v e a l c h o i c e s ")+
geom_hline(yintercept=.5,size=0.75,linetype=2)+
151 geom_hline(yintercept=.58,size=47,alpha=0.1)+
geom_hline(yintercept=.58,size=1)+
153 theme_bw()+theme(legend.position= " none ", aspect.
ratio=2/1)
155
require(MASS)
157 Figure2<-ggplot(PlotPredicted, aes(Earnings,Score,
linetype=Perspective))+
stat_smooth(method= " r lm ",fill= " l i g h t g r a y ",colour= "
b l a c k ",size=1)+
159 geom_point(aes(colour= factor(Expt)),size=2,shape
=19,position=position_jitter(width=.3, height
=.1) , alpha=0.33)+
xlab( " Revea l ed e a rn i ng s o f qu i z l o s e r ") +
161 ylab( " Envy o f qu i z winner ") +
scale_colour_manual( " ",values= c( " red ", " da rkgreen "
, " b l u e "),labels=c( " Expt . 1 ", " Expt . 2 ", " Expt . 3 "))+
163 theme_bw()+ theme(legend.position= " r i g h t ", aspect.
ratio=2/1.25)
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165
tiff( " F i gu r e 1 . t i f f ", width=4, height=5, units= " i n ",
res=320, compression= " lzw ")
167 plot(Figure1)
dev.off()
169
tiff( " F i gu r e 2 . t i f f ", width=4, height=5, units= " i n ",
res=320, compression= " lzw ")
171 plot(Figure2)
dev.off()
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S U P P L E M E N TA R Y TA B L E S S E C T I O N 1
16.1 descriptive statistics experiment 6
Variable n Min x¯ x˜ Max IQR #NA
SRI fund 196 0.0 49.0 50.0 100.0 45.0 0
Conventional fund 196 0.0 31.2 27.5 100.0 40.0 0
Time 196 4.2 272.9 69.1 32923.1 75.1 0
Clicks 196 2.0 5.9 4.0 37.0 4.0 0
Don.WWF 196 0.0 189.7 0.0 5000.0 100.0 0
Don.CARE 196 0.0 223.5 0.0 3000.0 200.0 0
Don.TranspIntl 196 0.0 65.2 0.0 1000.0 10.0 0
Don.WIKI 196 0.0 72.0 0.0 5000.0 0.0 0
OverallDonation 196 0.0 550.3 100.0 5000.0 500.0 0
Discount 196 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
InvestmentExpertise 196 1.0 2.9 3.0 5.3 1.7 0
Cons.Eectiveness 196 2.8 5.7 5.9 7.0 1.5 0
SelfMonitoring 196 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0
Altruism 196 2.6 5.5 5.5 7.0 1.0 0
Risk 196 1.0 3.2 3.3 6.7 1.8 0
Capital 196 3.0 17.6 16.5 32.0 14.0 0
SRI performance 196 1.0 4.2 4.0 6.0 3.0 0
Business vs. environment 196 1.0 4.1 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Business vs. social 196 1.0 4.2 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI expertise 196 1.0 2.8 3.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI abundance 196 1.0 4.5 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI improve S 196 1.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 1.2 0
SRI improve E 196 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI riskiness 196 1.0 3.6 4.0 7.0 1.0 0
SRI eectivenss 1 196 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI eectivenss 2 196 1.0 4.7 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Age 196 14.0 50.8 52.0 114.0 19.0 0
Education 196 1.0 3.6 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
Table 16.1: Table of continuous measure in Experiment 6.
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Variable Levels n Min x¯ x˜ Max IQR #NA
SRI fund Don 49 0.0 52.4 50.0 100.0 40.0 0
Label 49 0.0 55.9 50.0 100.0 20.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 40.4 50.0 100.0 30.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 47.3 50.0 100.0 55.0 0
all 196 0.0 49.0 50.0 100.0 45.0 0
Conventional fund Don 49 0.0 28.5 25.0 100.0 35.0 0
Label 49 0.0 30.6 30.0 100.0 40.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 34.5 30.0 100.0 30.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 31.3 25.0 100.0 40.0 0
all 196 0.0 31.2 27.5 100.0 40.0 0
Time Don 49 4.2 140.7 69.1 1160.3 153.0 0
Label 49 4.3 89.8 62.4 847.1 50.9 0
Newspaper.Art 49 12.6 91.4 67.2 628.3 71.1 0
NumberOfFunds 49 13.4 769.6 76.7 32923.1 73.8 0
all 196 4.2 272.9 69.1 32923.1 75.1 0
Clicks Don 49 2.0 6.3 4.0 25.0 5.0 0
Label 49 2.0 5.0 4.0 13.0 4.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 2.0 5.4 5.0 19.0 4.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 2.0 6.9 5.0 37.0 4.0 0
all 196 2.0 5.9 4.0 37.0 4.0 0
Don.WWF Don 49 0.0 184.5 0.0 5000.0 100.0 0
Label 49 0.0 222.7 0.0 2000.0 300.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 255.7 10.0 3000.0 200.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 95.8 0.0 1000.0 50.0 0
all 196 0.0 189.7 0.0 5000.0 100.0 0
Don.CARE Don 49 0.0 223.0 0.0 2500.0 200.0 0
Label 49 0.0 368.5 50.0 3000.0 500.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 181.4 0.0 2500.0 100.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 121.0 0.0 1000.0 100.0 0
all 196 0.0 223.5 0.0 3000.0 200.0 0
Don.TranspIntl Don 49 0.0 38.7 0.0 500.0 0.0 0
Label 49 0.0 126.1 0.0 1000.0 50.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 78.6 0.0 1000.0 50.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 17.2 0.0 180.0 0.0 0
all 196 0.0 65.2 0.0 1000.0 10.0 0
Don.WIKI Don 49 0.0 125.4 0.0 5000.0 0.0 0
Label 49 0.0 95.6 0.0 1000.0 25.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 56.5 0.0 1500.0 0.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 10.5 0.0 150.0 0.0 0
all 196 0.0 72.0 0.0 5000.0 0.0 0
OverallDonation Don 49 0.0 571.5 150.0 5000.0 500.0 0
Label 49 0.0 812.9 200.0 5000.0 1000.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 572.2 100.0 5000.0 500.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 244.6 100.0 2000.0 220.0 0
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all 196 0.0 550.3 100.0 5000.0 500.0 0
Discount Don 49 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
Label 49 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
all 196 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.0 0.0 0
InvestmentExperience Don 49 1.0 2.8 3.0 4.7 1.3 0
Label 49 1.3 2.9 3.0 5.0 1.3 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 2.8 3.0 4.7 1.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 2.9 3.3 5.3 1.7 0
all 196 1.0 2.9 3.0 5.3 1.7 0
Cons.Eectiveness Don 49 3.5 5.8 6.0 7.0 1.8 0
Label 49 2.8 5.5 5.8 7.0 1.2 0
Newspaper.Art 49 3.5 5.8 6.0 7.0 1.2 0
NumberOfFunds 49 4.0 5.7 6.0 7.0 1.8 0
all 196 2.8 5.7 5.9 7.0 1.5 0
SelfMonitoring Don 49 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 0
Label 49 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0
Newspaper.Art 49 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.2 0
NumberOfFunds 49 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0
all 196 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0
Altruism Don 49 4.0 5.5 5.4 7.0 0.9 0
Label 49 2.9 5.4 5.4 6.6 1.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 2.6 5.3 5.4 7.0 1.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 3.5 5.6 5.6 7.0 0.9 0
all 196 2.6 5.5 5.5 7.0 1.0 0
Risk Don 49 1.0 3.1 3.2 5.8 1.8 0
Label 49 1.2 3.2 3.3 5.2 1.5 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 3.2 3.5 5.5 2.2 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 3.2 3.7 6.7 1.7 0
all 196 1.0 3.2 3.3 6.7 1.8 0
Capital Don 49 3.0 16.3 14.0 30.5 13.0 0
Label 49 5.0 16.9 15.0 32.0 12.5 0
Newspaper.Art 49 4.0 17.3 16.5 32.0 17.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 4.5 20.1 20.0 32.0 12.0 0
all 196 3.0 17.6 16.5 32.0 14.0 0
SRI Performance Don 49 1.0 4.2 4.0 6.0 2.0 0
Label 49 2.0 4.2 4.0 6.0 3.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 2.0 4.1 4.0 6.0 2.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 2.0 4.3 4.0 6.0 3.0 0
all 196 1.0 4.2 4.0 6.0 3.0 0
Business vs. environment Don 49 1.0 4.3 4.0 7.0 3.0 0
Label 49 1.0 4.0 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 4.2 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
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NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 3.9 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 4.1 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Business vs. social Don 49 1.0 4.0 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 4.5 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 4.2 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 4.2 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 4.2 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI expertise Don 49 1.0 2.9 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
Label 49 1.0 2.8 3.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 2.6 2.0 6.0 3.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 3.1 3.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 2.8 3.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI abundance Don 49 1.0 4.5 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 4.5 4.0 7.0 1.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 4.9 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 4.1 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 4.5 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI improve S Don 49 1.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 5.3 5.0 7.0 1.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 3.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 1.2 0
SRI improve E Don 49 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 5.3 5.0 7.0 3.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 2.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI riskiness Don 49 1.0 3.5 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 3.9 4.0 7.0 1.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 3.5 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 3.6 4.0 7.0 1.0 0
all 196 1.0 3.6 4.0 7.0 1.0 0
SRI eectivenss 1 Don 49 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 2.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 4.9 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 5.2 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
SRI eectivenss 2 Don 49 1.0 4.8 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 5.2 6.0 7.0 2.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 4.5 4.0 7.0 3.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 4.6 5.0 7.0 3.0 0
all 196 1.0 4.7 5.0 7.0 2.0 0
Age Don 49 24.0 50.8 51.0 114.0 15.0 0
Label 49 14.0 50.2 50.0 72.0 19.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 19.0 49.4 50.0 73.0 21.0 0
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NumberOfFunds 49 22.0 52.7 53.0 74.0 13.0 0
all 196 14.0 50.8 52.0 114.0 19.0 0
Studies Don 49 1.0 3.8 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
Label 49 1.0 3.4 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 3.4 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 4.1 4.0 7.0 2.0 0
all 196 1.0 3.6 3.0 7.0 3.0 0
Work Don 49 1.0 5.8 6.0 9.0 2.0 0
Label 49 1.0 5.0 5.0 9.0 4.0 0
Newspaper.Art 49 1.0 5.2 5.0 9.0 4.0 0
NumberOfFunds 49 1.0 5.2 5.0 9.0 4.0 0
all 196 1.0 5.3 5.0 9.0 4.0 0
Table 16.2: Table of continuous measures in Experiment 5, broken dow by experime-
neal groups.
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Interaction model SRI investors M1: SRI.propotion SRIInvestor ∗
(Don.WWF+Don.CARE+Don.TranspIntl+Don.WIKI+ Label ∗
Risk + Label ∗ InvestmentExperience + Label ∗ ISR.Conn.1 +
Label∗ ISR.Abon.2+Public.article∗SelfMonitoring+Altruism+
Discount + Cons.Effectiveness + Capital + ISR.Conn.1 +
ImproveS+ ImproveE+ ISR.Risk.5+ ISR.Raison.1+ ISR.Raison2+
Crisis.1 + Crisis.2 + Clicks + Time + Age + Studies + Work)
16.2 betareg: sri funds interaction with investor type exper-
iment 5
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]
Table 16.3: Likelihood to invest in SRI funds interaction with investor type (betareg;
standardized scores)
Dependent variable:
Proportion of SRI
All investors
SRI Investor 2.470∗∗ (1.109)
Don WWF −0.123 (0.107)
Don Care −0.101 (0.102)
Don Transp. Intl −0.011 (0.121)
Don Wiki −0.310 (0.297)
Label 0.065 (0.206)
Risk propensity 0.244 (0.168)
Investment Experience 0.103 (0.203)
SRI knowledge −0.635∗∗∗ (0.183)
SRI abundance −0.091 (0.165)
Public article −0.282 (0.209)
Self monitoring 0.328∗ (0.185)
Altruism −0.042 (0.105)
Discount −0.281∗∗∗ (0.101)
Cons. Eectiveness −0.160 (0.117)
Capital −0.103 (0.126)
Improve S −0.194 (0.184)
Improve E 0.355∗∗ (0.155)
SRI less risky −0.118 (0.108)
Improve coporate behav. 0.174 (0.146)
Not partner wrong 0.190 (0.133)
Values E 0.493∗∗∗ (0.136)
Values s −0.037 (0.117)
Clicks on Funds −0.166 (0.102)
Continued in Table 16.4
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]
Table 16.4: Likelihood to invest in SRI funds interaction with investor type (betareg;
standardized scores) (2)
Continued from Table 16.3
Time to select Funds −0.105 (0.092)
Age 0.007 (0.143)
Studies 0.246∗∗ (0.110)
Work −0.231∗ (0.118)
Label:Risk propensity −0.134 (0.211)
Label:Invest. Experience −0.471∗ (0.245)
Label:SRI knowledge 0.534∗∗ (0.234)
Label:SRI abundance −0.346∗ (0.204)
Public article:Self monitoring −0.188 (0.211)
SRI Investor:Don WWF 2.940 (2.217)
SRI Investor:Don Care −1.149∗ (0.589)
SRI Investor:Don Transp. Intl −0.193 (0.568)
SRI Investor:Don Wiki 0.245 (0.319)
SRI Investor:Label −0.473 (0.442)
SRI Investor:Risk propensity −0.273 (0.414)
SRI Investor:Investment Experience −0.109 (0.495)
SRI Investor:SRI knowledge −0.163 (0.527)
SRI Investor:SRI abundance 0.313 (0.529)
SRI Investor:Public article 0.419 (0.490)
SRI Investor:Self monitoring −0.572 (0.429)
SRI Investor:Altruism 0.166 (0.249)
SRI Investor:Discount −0.090 (0.341)
Continued in Table 16.5
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]
Table 16.5: Likelihood to invest in SRI funds interaction with investor type (betareg;
standardized scores) (3)
Continued from Table 16.4
SRI Investor:Cons. Eectiveness 0.825∗∗∗ (0.273)
SRI Investor:Capital −0.115 (0.264)
SRI Investor:Improve S 0.365 (0.338)
SRI Investor:Improve E −0.236 (0.387)
SRI Investor:SRI less risky 0.520∗∗ (0.254)
SRI Investor:Improve coporate behav. −0.241 (0.282)
SRI Investor:Not partner wrong −0.037 (0.250)
SRI Investor:Values E −0.980∗∗∗ (0.250)
SRI Investor:Values s −0.629∗∗ (0.248)
SRI Investor:Clicks on Funds −0.500∗ (0.295)
SRI Investor:Time to select Funds 24.799∗∗∗ (9.343)
SRI Investor:Age −0.074 (0.302)
SRI Investor:Studies −0.303 (0.242)
SRI Investor:Work 0.133 (0.255)
SRI Investor:Label:Risk propensity 0.097 (0.485)
SRI Investor:Label:Invest. Experience 1.359∗∗ (0.625)
SRI Investor:Label:SRI knowlege 0.130 (0.653)
SRI Investor:Label:SRI abundance −0.504 (0.638)
SRI Investor:Public article:Self monitoring 0.301 (0.502)
Constant 0.602∗∗∗ (0.197)
Observations 197
R2 0.477
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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17.1 compensation policies experiment 6
Table 17.1: Always Acceptable Cluster ANOVA following an Extent (2) x Amount (2)
x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 16760 1 16760 739,4 0 0,99
Extent(E) 3 1 3 3,6 0,1 0,34
Amount(A) 10 1 10 1,8 0,22 0,21
Procedure(P) 34 2 17 1,8 0,2 0,2
Special(S) 1 2 1 0,3 0,74 0,04
E*A 5 1 5 7 0,03 0,5
E*P 2 2 1 0,5 0,59 0,07
A*P 1 2 1 0,4 0,71 0,05
E*S 10 2 5 3,8 0,05 0,35
A*S 0 2 0 0,1 0,95 0,01
P*S 3 4 1 0,6 0,68 0,08
E*A*P 3 2 2 0,9 0,43 0,11
E*A*S 0 2 0 0 0,98 0
E*P*S 5 4 1 1 0,41 0,13
A*P*S 7 4 2 1,4 0,26 0,17
E*A*P*S 3 4 1 0,6 0,7 0,07
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Table 17.2: Distribute and Compensate Cluster ANOVA following an Extent (2) x
Amount (2) x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 42718 1 42718 3281,5 0 0,99
Extent (E) 951 1 951 64,1 0 0,66
Amount (A) 48 1 48 8,5 0,01 0,2
Procedure(P) 170 2 85 14 0 0,3
Special (S) 766 2 383 26,5 0 0,45
E*A 7 1 7 3,5 0,07 0,1
E*P 8 2 4 1,4 0,26 0,04
A*P 0 2 0 0,1 0,89 0
E*S 30 2 15 6,6 0 0,17
A*S 0 2 0 0 0,95 0
P*S 3 4 1 0,4 0,81 0,01
E*A*P 7 2 4 2,1 0,13 0,06
E*A*S 5 2 3 1,1 0,34 0,03
E*P*S 10 4 2 1,1 0,35 0,03
A*P*S 6 4 1 0,6 0,65 0,02
E*A*P*S 7 4 2 0,9 0,48 0,03
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Table 17.3: Egalitarians Cluster ANOVA following an Extent (2) x Amount (2) x Pro-
cedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 14104 1 14104 1058 0 0,99
Extent (E) 4634 1 4634 340,5 0 0,96
Amount (A) 0 1 0 0,1 0,8 0
Procedure(P) 156 2 78 12,9 0 0,45
Special (S) 129 2 65 14,6 0 0,48
E*A 1 1 1 0,2 0,67 0,01
E*P 27 2 14 2,1 0,14 0,11
A*P 1 2 1 0,9 0,43 0,05
E*S 13 2 7 3,5 0,04 0,18
A*S 1 2 0 0,4 0,66 0,03
P*S 3 4 1 0,3 0,87 0,02
E*A*P 1 2 1 0,4 0,66 0,03
E*A*S 1 2 0 0,1 0,89 0,01
E*P*S 4 4 1 0,7 0,58 0,04
A*P*S 6 4 1 0,8 0,53 0,05
E*A*P*S 1 4 0 0,1 0,99 0
236 supplementary tables section 2
Table 17.4: Legalists Cluster ANOVA following an Extent (2) x Amount (2) x Proce-
dure (3) x Special (3) within subject design
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 5413 1 5413 260 0 0,97
Extent (E) 333 1 333 28,3 0 0,76
Amount (A) 0 1 0 0 0,88 0
Procedure(P) 984 2 492 28,3 0 0,76
Special (S) 58 2 29 6,3 0,01 0,41
E*A 1 1 1 1,6 0,24 0,15
E*P 102 2 51 13,3 0 0,6
A*P 0 2 0 0 0,99 0
E*S 2 2 1 0,9 0,41 0,09
A*S 0 2 0 0,3 0,77 0,03
P*S 19 4 5 2,5 0,06 0,22
E*A*P 1 2 0 0,4 0,69 0,04
E*A*S 2 2 1 0,6 0,55 0,06
E*P*S 12 4 3 1,5 0,22 0,14
A*P*S 2 4 0 0,3 0,86 0,03
E*A*P*S 2 4 1 0,3 0,86 0,03
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Table 17.5: Always Acceptable Cluster ANOVA following a Cluster (4) x Extent (2)
x Amount (2) x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 36552 1 36552 1225,2 0 0,99
Special (S) 1 1 1 0,2 0,69 0,01
Extent (E) 45 2 22 1,4 0,28 0,1
Procedure(P) 14 1 14 1,8 0,21 0,13
Amount (A) 7 2 4 1,3 0,29 0,1
S*E 3 2 2 0,8 0,44 0,07
S*P 2 1 2 1 0,35 0,07
E*P 9 2 4 2,1 0,14 0,15
S*A 2 2 1 0,6 0,56 0,05
E*A 6 4 2 1,9 0,13 0,14
P*A 2 2 1 0,7 0,51 0,06
S*E*P 6 2 3 1,5 0,24 0,11
S*E*A 1 4 0 0,5 0,71 0,04
S*P*A 1 2 0 0,5 0,64 0,04
E*P*A 6 4 2 2 0,11 0,14
S*E*P*A 1 4 0 1,2 0,33 0,09
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Table 17.6: Egalitarians Cluster ANOVA following a Cluster (4) x Extent (2) x
Amount (2) x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 8498 1 8498 732,7 0 0,99
Special (S) 636 1 636 25,4 0 0,7
Extent (E) 676 2 338 43,6 0 0,8
Procedure(P) 524 1 524 19 0 0,63
Amount (A) 23 2 11 3,8 0,04 0,26
S*E 19 2 9 2,5 0,11 0,18
S*P 40 1 40 20,1 0 0,65
E*P 28 2 14 4,5 0,02 0,29
S*A 3 2 2 0,9 0,44 0,07
E*A 21 4 5 4,5 0 0,29
P*A 6 2 3 1,3 0,29 0,11
S*E*P 5 2 3 1,3 0,29 0,11
S*E*A 4 4 1 0,4 0,78 0,04
S*P*A 2 2 1 0,4 0,68 0,03
E*P*A 4 4 1 0,6 0,69 0,05
S*E*P*A 3 4 1 0,3 0,86 0,03
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Table 17.7: Distribute and Small amounts Cluster ANOVA following a Cluster (4)
x Extent (2) x Amount (2) x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject
design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 30160 1 30160 797,5 0 0,97
Special (S) 181 1 181 6,8 0,02 0,22
Extent (E) 952 2 476 35,3 0 0,6
Procedure(P) 435 1 435 10,3 0 0,3
Amount (A) 328 2 164 14,9 0 0,38
S*E 13 2 6 2,2 0,12 0,08
S*P 8 1 8 3,9 0,06 0,14
E*P 2 2 1 0,4 0,65 0,02
S*A 0 2 0 0 0,97 0
E*A 16 4 4 2 0,1 0,08
P*A 15 2 8 4,5 0,02 0,16
S*E*P 1 2 1 0,3 0,74 0,01
S*E*A 7 4 2 0,7 0,58 0,03
S*P*A 7 2 4 1,4 0,26 0,05
E*P*A 1 4 0 0,1 0,96 0,01
S*E*P*A 5 4 1 0,5 0,74 0,02
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Table 17.8: Depends on Amount Cluster ANOVA following a Cluster (4) x Extent (2)
x Amount (2) x Procedure (3) x Special (3) within subject design.
SS DF MS F p Î·2
Intercept 2390 1 2390 84,3 0 0,91
Special (S) 0 1 0 0,3 0,57 0,04
Extent (E) 29 2 15 3,3 0,06 0,29
Procedure(P) 0 1 0 0,2 0,64 0,03
Amount (A) 530 2 265 7,4 0,01 0,48
S*E 3 2 2 5,4 0,02 0,4
S*P 1 1 1 1,6 0,24 0,17
E*P 1 2 0 0,2 0,8 0,03
S*A 2 2 1 2,4 0,12 0,23
E*A 15 4 4 2,9 0,04 0,27
P*A 2 2 1 2,1 0,16 0,2
S*E*P 1 2 1 1 0,38 0,11
S*E*A 4 4 1 1,6 0,2 0,16
S*P*A 0 2 0 0,1 0,88 0,02
E*P*A 1 4 0 0,8 0,56 0,09
S*E*P*A 3 4 1 1,2 0,33 0,13
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I N F O R M AT I O N I N T E G R AT I O N T H E O R Y
In information integration studies the common methodology directly mea-
sures respondents answers to an orthogonalized set of stimuli. Asking par-
ticipants directly about their judgments is in strong contrast to most stud-
ies in social psychology in which the manipulated variables are hidden to
respondents. Consequently, this methodology is less prone to the experi-
menter bias. Said in another way it is particularly important in this method-
ology that the participants do not grow suspicious, and that there is absolute
transparency about the aims of the person who is studying them.
I have long thought about information integrations’ place in psychologi-
cal science. It seems to me to be a holistic approach that embraces the
thought process in a comfortable way. Comfortable, because it provides the
researcher with a “clef en main” solution. The high degree of consistency be-
tween theory and methodology is probably its greatest strength and leaves
the researcher fully equipped, if he is willing to adopt IIT. The following
paragraphs outline information integrations conceptual and methodologi-
cal foundations in greater detail.
This unified approach to social cognition has to be distinguished from previ-
ously discussed approaches in that it operates with validated scale values of
the stimuli presented to participants. This is why the theory is also referred
to as functional measurement. Functional theory of cognition aims mainly
at being a theory of judgment in everyday life (Anderson, 2008, 1982, 1991).
Its primary purpose is to explain the rules of judgments that we use in every
day life. Its particularity is that it is not based on a principle of consistency
of respondents but rather relies on algebraic models for the combination of
stimuli.
Since there are many examples of situations of judgment there are as many
applications of the theory, in some way they are endless. IIT has been eec-
tively applied to moral cognition such as the decision to end lives (Guedj
et al., 2005; Teisseyre et al., 2005; Frileux, Lelièvre, Muñoz Sastre, Mullet, &
Sorum, 2003; Frileux et al., 2004) and conflict resolution (Kpanake & Mullet,
2011). Before applying functional theory of cognition to the moral issue of
socially acceptable remuneration systems in Chapter 5, this section presents
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Figure 18.1: Information Integration Model
its theoretical foundations and basic structure as laid down in Anderson
(2001) and Cadet and Chasseigne (2009).
IIT considers that psychological activity is fundamentally concerned with
judgments and the idea that it is an activity of information integration. This
idea can also be found in the writings of other early authors: Janet (1889) for
example, calls this phenomenon “psychological aggregation” and claims it
to be the central process of mental activity. For Janet, the human brain pro-
duces, continuous synthesis of multiple mental sensations (and associated
thoughts) that it receives (or generates).
18.1 basic concepts
Figure 18.1 shows the graph of IIT proposed by Anderson (1981). It shows a
field of external stimuli (S1, S2, ...) which undergoes three successive opera-
tions: (a) The valuation process that matches a given stimulus S1, a psycho-
logical representation s1, (b) an integration process that aggregates these
psychological representations into a default answer, r, and (c) a response
process which makes the implicit response observable. The information in-
tegration graph explicitly includes the initial state and the goals of the per-
son. The three operators Valuation, Integration and Response are governed
by the goals of the person. Thus, the graph illustrates two key aspects of
judgments: Possessiveness and multi-determination.
The concept of valuation expresses the contextualized and purposeful nature
of every judgment. The concept of valuation is not an assessment or an
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estimate of an external stimulus (S1) by the subject, but the creation of a
subjective value. Valuation is the process that regulates the creation of a
representation. A creation operating from an external source based on the
purpose and personal experiences accumulated by the person who judges.
This idea of integration valuation is close, for example, Janet (1889) who
argued that current sensations do only make sense if they are related with
elements from past experiences.
The valuation process creates values that are in a format ready to be inte-
grated. The parameters depend on the dimension on which the judgment
is made (the particular purpose assigned in the task) and the motivational
and/or emotional state of the person who judges. This means that it is not a
constant of the stimulus S. The valuation process involves external stimuli
S1, S2, S3, which can be physical or social and gives them a psychological
sense, which in turn is translatable in terms of scale values (values scales,
s1, s2, s3).
Of course the external stimuli (Si) can be very dierent, and might imply
various scales and shapes. For example, suppose that S1, S2, S3 are the ele-
ments of a situation to buy a coee bag. S1 could be the taste of the coee:
“Very good”. S2 could be the price of the coee bag: Price high. S3 may be
that the producers are remunerated in a fair trade scheme (social respon-
sibility): It has a fair trade label. These three stimuli are incommensurable,
they are expressed along dierent scales in nature (taste, price and social
responsibility) and their metric. A prerequisite for the integration within
the framework of information theory is to ensure the commensurability of
these stimuli. This is achieved through translation of each stimulus along a
common scale. In this particular case the common scale is imposed by the
situation: the goal is to buy a coee bag. The scale along which a response
is expressed needs to be a scale of aractiveness of the product to the con-
sumer.
The stimulus “very good” (S1) will be associated with a certain degree of at-
tractiveness (s1): High. Similarly, the two stimuli “very expensive” and “very
responsible towards producers” (S2 and S3) are associated with two other
values (s2 and s3) in terms of degree of araction: Low and moderate. The
functions that connect S1 - S3 to s1 - s3 are called value functions. The forms
of these functions can be very dierent. In the example, the functions f1 and
f3 are monotone increasing functions: The beer the taste and the more so-
cially responsible, the greater the araction towards the coee bag. The f2
function on the other hand is a decreasing monotone function. The higher
the price, the lower the araction towards the coee bag. But in general,
it is not excluded that some functions are logarithmic or have a threshold
(Muñoz Sastre, Mullet, & Sorum, 1999). Concerning price, for example, it
is possible that beyond a certain value of S2, the psychological representa-
tion’s value s2 does impact more. But below this value, s2 could be linearly
related to S2.
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Aer the process of valuation which assures the commensurability of all
stimuli (S1, S2, S3 in the example), the subjective values s1, s2, s3 are inte-
grated to produce a unified response within the person, which is called im-
plicit response r. The integration process is thus responsible for the produc-
tion of a multiply determined singular response. The concept of integration
expresses the multi-determined nature of every judgment.
During integration, scale values si scan receive dierent weights wi, reflect-
ing the dierent importance that a person grants to dierent sources of
information. In the example the weight w1, associated with the scale value
of taste may be twice the weight w2, associated with the scale value of price.
Weight can also be zero, that of social responsibility, for example, if one con-
siders that business should not care for fair producer remunerations a the
psychological representation of the fair trade label will not be weighted in
the purchase of a coee bag.
In some cases, the weight wi is independent of the scale value si. In other
cases not and a dierent weight, wi, corresponds to each value si. Imagine
for example, when the values S1 and s1 (taste) are very low, then the weight
of the scale value corresponding to this stimulus is very important. And this
independently of the price or social responsibility of the coee, if s1 is low,
that means the coee really tastes disgusting, its degree of aractiveness
remain very low in general.
Conversely, when the values S1 and s1 are medium, then the weight of the
taste stimulus might be more limited and price and social responsibility will
be more decisive. During integration, scale values can play dierent roles.
In some cases, integration by summing, averaging or subtraction, the role
is the same: One scale value is simply added or subtracted to another. In
other cases, integration by multiplication, the role is dierent since a value
can act as the weight of another value.
In a third step, following the evaluation and integration processes, the in-
trinsic response r is converted into an observable response R by an operator
response during the response process. An observable response may be a fa-
cial expression, a physiological, motor, or verbal response. In experimenta-
tion it is most likely to be the selection of a point on a judgment scale. The
function that links R and r is called response function or motor function.
When this function is linear, the study of the integration process is greatly
simplified. This is not always the case.
18.2 rules of information integration
At least in appearance, the additive rule is, the most basic rule in IIT. It as-
sumes that during the process of information integration leading to a judg-
ment, the various pieces of information simply add up their eects. In other
words, this rule assumes that the eect each piece of information has on
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Figure 18.2: Example of the characteristic shape of the additive rule.
the final judgment is independent of the eect of all other information, i.e.
the context in which the judgment is made, and the element is processed.
Figure 18.2 shows the characteristic shape of an additive rule found in Nann
et al. (2012). It is a situation were Cambodian patients ad health profes-
sionals judge the priority of HIV-infected in relation to the allocation of
antiretroviral drugs. The vertical axis is the priority level judgment. On the
horizontal axis are the patient’s family responsibilities (young father, aged
about 35, with four young children; young male patient, aged about 35,
without children; older father, aged about 65, with adult children; or young
mother, aged about 35, with four young children). The dierent lines rep-
resent the severity of infection (moderate severity level; high severity level;
very high severity level). The two graphs represent the financial diiculties
of the family (can sustain itself versus cannot sustain itself).
Each point on the graph corresponds to a unique configuration of infor-
mation, that is to say a concrete situation of judgment. For example, the
information judged for the top le point on the le graph is suicient fi-
nancial resources, young father with four children and very high severity.
The approximate parallelism of the curves demonstrates the additivity of
the eect of severity.
The logic of the test of additivity of eects is as follows. Let 1 and 3 be
the subjective counter values, si (also called scale values) corresponding to
the modalities of the first factor Si(family responsibilities) and 1 and 3, are
the subjective counter values corresponding to the modalities of the sec-
ond factor (severity of infection). These values are derived from the pre-
viously described valuation process. For simplicity’s sake we shall assume
equal weight of the two factors and two modalities for each factor. If we
fix the weight of each factor w = 2, we obtain the following four values:
(2x1) + (2x1) = 4; (2x1) + (2x3) = 8; (2x3) + (2x1) = 8; (2x3) + (2x3) =
12. The dierences between the four values taken two by two are constant:
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12− 8 = 4and8− 4 = 4. The parallel curves express nothing other than
this constancy. If an experiment is based on the principles described above,
and if one organizes the resulting judgments as in figure 18.2 and if the
curves are parallel, then it is fair to say that the judgment rule used is
additive. Additive judgments oen combine with other rules and are com-
mon in everyday judgments, and moral judgment (Muñoz Sastre et al., 2007;
Kpanake & Mullet, 2011; Frileux et al., 2004; Muñoz Sastre et al., 1999).
The disjunctive rule is a bit more complex than the additive rule. It assumes
that during the process of information integration, the various pieces of
information do not simply add up their eects. In other words, this rule as-
sumes that the eect of each piece of information on the final judgment
depends on one or several other pieces of information that form the context
in which the judgment is made, i.e. in which this particular element is pro-
cessed. This rule assumes that the weight of a piece of information during
the process that leads to a judgment is proportional to the relative value of
this piece of information.
The right panel of figure 18.3 illustrates the disjunctive rule. In this situa-
tion, soccer experts judged the appropriateness of a strategy that consist in
quickly restarting to play towards the end of the game in order to surprise
the adverse team (Rulence-Pâques, Fruchart, Dru, & Mullet, 2005). The ver-
tical axis is the judgments of appropriateness. On the horizontal axis is the
score of the match (win, tie or loose). The dierent lines represent the numer-
ical relationship of players in the team to the opponents players (superior,
equal, inferior). Each point on the graph corresponds to a specific configu-
ration information, or in other word to a concrete judgment situation: The
lower le point, for example, represents a judgment situation where the
team is about to win the game, but in numerical inferiority. The upper right
would be a team that is about to loose the game and in numerical supe-
riority. The curves are not parallel, they converge towards the right. This
demonstrates the disjunctive nature of the judgments.
The logic behind the disjunctive rule is as follows. In the previous section,
we assumed that 1 and 3 were subjective counter values corresponding to
the two modalities of each of the two factors considered. The values corre-
sponding to the combinations of the two factors, when applying an additive
model and assuming equal weights of 2 are 4, 8, 8, and 12. The dierences
between the four values taken two by two are constant. In contrast, within
the disjunctive model the weight of a piece of information depends on the
value of at least one other element. Think of the case of two values that
can be considered equal (loosing the game and being numerically inferior
or winning the game and being numerically superior), then under the dis-
junctive rule, the weight of the two factors are identical. As in the previous
example we shall assume equal weight of the two factors and two modali-
ties for each factor. Think of the case of two values that can be considered
dierent (loosing the game and being numerically superior or winning the
game and being numerically inferior), then the weight of the two factors
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Figure 18.3: Example of the characteristic shape of the conjunctive rule (le panel)
and the disjunctive rule (right panel).
will be dierent. The application of the disjunctive rule assumes that the
element with the smallest value also receives the smallest weight, which we
will set to 1, and the element with the highest value receives the greatest
weight that we will set to 3.
If we use the same vales as in the previous example, 1 and 3, and at-
tribute them to the game score and numerical proportion, a simple cal-
culation result in four values: (2 ∗ 1) + (2 ∗ 1) = 4, (1 ∗ 1) + (3 ∗ 3) =
10, (3 ∗ 3) + (1 ∗ 1) = 10, (2 ∗ 3) + (2 ∗ 3) = 12. The dierences between
the four values taken in pairs are not constant: 12− 10 = 2 and 10− 4 = 6.
The non-parallel curves in Figure 18.3 expresses nothing other than this non-
constancy. The fan-shaped form of the graph, open to the le, expresses the
disjunctive rule. If an experiment is based on the principles described above,
and if one organizes the resulting judgments as in figure 18.3, and if there is
a convergence of the curves to the right, then it is reasonable to assert the
prevalence of a disjunctive judgment rule.
The conjunctive rule is symmetrical to the disjunctive rule. Like the disjunc-
tive rule, the conjunctive rule assumes that during the process of informa-
tion integration that leads to the judgment, the various pieces of informa-
tion do not simply add up their eects. Unlike the disjunctive rule, the con-
junctive rule assumes that the weight gained by one information during the
process is inversely proportional to the value of this element.
Examples of the conjunctive rule can be found in the le graph of Figure 18.3
and in Figure 18.4. The right panel of Figure 18.4 represents a situation in
which people were estimating the intention to migrate to another country
based on the dierence in wages between countries of origin and host coun-
tries and the ease with which a job can be found in the host country (Neto &
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Figure 18.4: Example of the characteristic shape of the conjunctive rule (le panel).
Mullet, 1998). The vertical axis plots the judgments of intention. The horizon-
tal axis plots three levels of wage dierential: Low, average and high. The
three curves correspond to three levels of job opportunities: Few, average
and many opportunities. Again, each point on the graph corresponds to a
configuration of dierent information, that is to say to a concrete judgment
situation. The lower le point represents the situation of few job opportu-
nities and a low wage dierential between the two countries, whereas the
upper right point represents a situation in which many job opportunities
and a high wage dierential are present. The three curves are not parallel
and diverge to the right. This shows the conjunctiveness of the eects of
each variable in the judgment.
The logic of the conjunctive rule is the opposite of the disjunctive rule. Un-
der the conjunctive model, the weight of a piece of information also depends
on the value of at least one other component. Think of the case of two val-
ues that can be considered identical (rater low wage dierential and few
opportunities to find an employment or an aractive wage dierential and
a good chance of finding work), then in the case of a conjunctive rule the
weight of both factors will be identical in these contexts. Again we shall we
fix them to 2. Now Imagine the case of two values that can be considered
as dierent (an aractive wage dierential and few job opportunities or an
unaractive wage dierential and prey good job opportunities), then the
weight of the two factors will be dierent. The application of the conjunctive
rule assumes that the element with the smallest value receives the greatest
weight, we shall set it to 3, and the element with the largest value receives
the smallest weight, which we shall set to 1.
If we now aect the values 1 and 3 (as in the previous example) to the
two factors, job opportunity and wage dierential, a simple calculation
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is enough to obtain the four values that correspond to the data points:
(2x1) + (2x1) = 4, (3x1) + (1x3) = 6, (1x3) + (3x1) = 6, (2x3) + (2x3) =
12. Again, the dierences between the four values taken in pairs are not
constant: 12− 6 = 6and6− 4 = 2. The non-parallelism of the curves in
Figure 18.4 expresses this non-constancy. The fan-shaped form of the graph,
open to the right, expresses the conjunctive rule. If an experiment is based
on the principles described above, and if one organizes the resulting judg-
ments as in figure 18.4, and if there is a divergence of the curves to the right,
then it is reasonable to assert the prevalence of a conjunctive judgment rule.
The additive, disjunctive and conjunctive rules are appear to be relatively
simple. Another question of interest for models of cognitive algebra is the
operator used to generate the paern. Consider for example the additive
rule, illustrated by the parallelism of the curves in Figure 18.2. There are
two possible operations that can result in such a paern. We have already
considered the first one, to sum up the equally heightened psychological
counter values, but there is also the possibility to obtain the same paral-
lelism through averaging.
To dierentiate between the two calculations researchers add a supplemen-
tary factor to the experimental design. For the sake of simplicity I shall omit
the mathematical demonstration, and admonish the reader to Cadet and
Chasseigne (2009). The basic idea is that a variation in the third factor al-
ters the steepness of the parallel curves in the case of averaging but not in
the case of summation.
But the integrative principle of dierent information can also be multipli-
cation. In the case of this principle on of the pieces of information (experi-
mental factor) determines the weight taken by another information, while
in all previous rules every piece of information received a particular weight,
invariable in the case of the additive rule and variable in the case of disjunc-
tive and conjunctive rules.
It is possible to identify the multiplication principle in experimental designs
with factors that have more then two modalities. Again I request the reader
to accept a simple description of the graphical interpretation and invite
the reader interested in the formal proof to consult Cadet and Chasseigne
(2009). The particularity of multiplicative processes is that the extension of
the lines of all three modalities of a factor have a common crossing point.
This common crossing is typical for multiplicative operations and does not
occur in other integration principles.
IIT’s methodological strength is that it allows the psychological researcher
to work closely with his object, namely the participants thought process.
The graphical interpretation (with sound mathematical foundations as de-
scribed above) allows for immediate feedback on the question of interest but
also on the quality of materials and the procedural precautions taken during
the experimental phase. In other words, the researcher is somewhat guided
250 information integration theory
towards improved questioning, design and methodology through the par-
ticipants answers.
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Abstract
This doctoral dissertation addresses the problem of decisions involving
economic and moral values. It reviews moral decisions in the economic
domain, focused on the situations of empirical interest in this dissertation
(Cahpter 2). Chapter 4 asks if SRI can help to restore trust in mutual funds.
Main results suggest that the positive eects of SRI techniques are highly
dependent on the similarity in values between the individual investor and
a given fund. Chapter 5 draws a portrait of laypersons’ acceptability of
a company’s executive compensations and general remuneration policies.
The main result identifies four clusters of individuals, who decide based on
personal views about the justice of remunerations. Chapter 6 introduces
an experimental game (the conceal-reveal dilemma) in which people have
the choice between revealing and concealing benefits that others deem
as undeserved. The main result is that people rely on decision strategies
other than cost-benefit analysis. Consequently, appealing to peoples’ moral
values is an alternative to financial incentives in situations with undeserved
benefits. The last two chapters (Chapter 7 and 8) discuss the theoretical
and practical implications of our empirical findings.
Keywords: socially responsible investment, decision making, information
integration theory, experimental game, value similarity, trust
Résumé
Cee thèse concerne des décisions dans des situations complexes qui
impliquent des valeurs économiques et moraux. Chapitre 2 introduit les
décisions morales en contexte économiques en proposant les situations
d’un intérêt empirique. Le sujet du chapitre 4 est de restaurer la confiance
dans les fonds communs de placement. Les principaux résultats suggèrent
que les eets positifs de l’approche ISR sont tributaires de la similarité des
valeurs de l’investisseur individuel avec celles du fonds. Chapitre 5 dresse
un portrait de l’acceptabilité sociale de la rémunération des dirigeants
et celle des politiques de rémunération générales d’une entreprise. Le
principal résultat indique l’existence de groupes de personnes qui sont
jugent a partir de points de vue personnels sur la justice des rémunérations.
Chapitre 6 introduit un jeu expérimental (le dilemme conceal-reveal) qui
permet l’étude des personnes ayant le choix entre révéler et cacher des
avantages qui seraient jugés comme non méritée par d’autres. Le résultat
principal est que les choix ne reposent pas sur une analyse coÃ»ts-bénéfices.
En conséquence, faire appel aux valeurs moraux peut être une alternative
intéressante dans de telles situations. Enfin, les deux derniers chapitres
(Chapitre 7 et Chapitre 8) des implications théoriques et pratiques de ces
résultats empiriques.
Mots-clefs: investissement socialement responsable, prise de décision, théorie
fonctionelle de la cognition, jeu experimental, similarité de valeurs, confiance
